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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to understand how Board level Directors engage with 
information. The study has its roots in Sir Adrian Cadbury’s (1992:4.8) requirement 
that “directors receive timely, relevant information tailored to their needs”. This 
research aims to investigate the underlying assumption that Directors actually 
engage with the information provided.  
 
The study uses grounded theory to look within the Board’s processes. The research 
uses the Board pack’s journey, from creation to the output from the Board, to 
provide clarity on the engagement processes undertaken by the organisation, the 
individual Director and the Board as a group. This is then contextualised through 
looking more widely at perceptions of the Board’s role and the corporate 
governance environment within which the Board sits. 
 
The data collected for the research comprised interviews, observations and 
technical meetings. The interviewees included nine Board Chairs; eleven Non-
Executive Directors; four Board level Executives; five information providers to 
Boards; one Board advisor and one industry/academic expert. This represented 
experiences from over 100 Boards including two top FTSE100 companies. 
Additionally, five Board meetings were attended to observe Directors in context and 
four technical meetings were undertaken to understand specific issues. 
 
The resulting theory identified is that the level of engagement with the information 
by Directors is determined by ‘Allocating Effort’. This effort is a balance between the 
level of risk perceived; by, and to, the individual, the Board as a group and the 
organisation; balanced with the perceived complexity of the issue at each stage of 
the Board pack’s journey. This balance is constrained by the time available and the 
understanding of the role of the Board. 
 
This theory was further developed by looking at the symbols that externalise the 
allocation of effort. They are identified as labelling the papers as: ‘For Note’, ‘For 
Report’ and ‘For Discussion’. Each of these paper types have a risk and complexity 
element, however, there was no paper type for high risk/complex. This research 
identified that ‘Ad Hoc Committees’ are used to fill the gap in the process of 
‘Allocating Effort’. Furthermore, in relating the symbols back to the theory of 
‘Allocating Effort’, it provides a tool for understanding the alignment, or 
misalignment, within the Board of their shared understanding of their role and risk 
appetites. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
“It is for Chairmen to make certain that their non-executive directors 
receive timely, relevant information tailored to their needs, that they are 
properly briefed on the issues arising at board meetings, and that they 
make an effective contribution as board member in practice.” (Cadbury, 
1992:4.8) 
 
“The chairman is responsible for ensuring that the directors receive 
accurate, timely and clear information. Management has an obligation 
to provide such information but directors should seek clarification or 
amplification where necessary.” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:13) 
 
These two statements were made 22 years apart and both refer to the style of 
information that should be supplied to the Directors. However, neither of them 
identify how the Director should engage with the information provided, regardless of 
whether it is timely, relevant, accurate or clear. As such, these regulations are 
based on the underlying assumption that Board level Director’s do engage with the 
information they receive. It is this underlying, unspoken, assumption that this 
research aims to investigate.  
 
The aim of this research is to advance the knowledge of the processes that are 
undertaken within the Board. The process that is specifically to be researched is 
how Directors engage with the information they are provided with, or further source, 
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to enable them undertake their role. The aim is to gain a fuller understanding of the 
processes undertaken within the “black box” of the Board (Pettigrew, 1992:178).  
 
This research uses a grounded theory approach to understand, in depth, the area of 
interest and the issues the Directors face when engaging with the information, as 
identified by the Directors themselves (Glaser, 1998:115). Grounded theory enables 
an abductive approach to be used (Reichertz, 2007:224) with the aim of 
understanding the underlying problem that Directors face in relation to the 
information they receive; thereby developing a theory of how Directors engage with 
information and the factors that influence their engagement.  
 
This research has two aims; primarily to generate a theory that further develops the 
underpinning knowledge in relation to how Boards work and adds to the body of 
knowledge on Boards. Secondly, a theory that has practical application in assisting 
a lay person, that is to say an ordinary Director or other interested party, to 
understand the interrelationship between information, Board members and the 
Board.  
 
1.2 Corporate Governance – A Brief Introduction 
Boards are a key mechanism within corporate governance. There is no universally 
agreed definition of corporate governance as the key issues are addressed by a 
range of authors, regulators and institutes. Manzoni and Islam’s (2009:35) definition 
of corporate governance, for example, defines it as a system that consists of;  
“[F]ormal and informal institutions, laws and rules that determine 
those organisational forms which assign ownership, delegate power 
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and monitor decision-making, while auditing and releasing 
information and distributing profits and benefits.”  
Whilst this definition encompasses a large number of aspects of corporate 
governance, Tricker (1984:7) puts it simply as “if management is about running a 
business, governance is about seeing that it is run properly”. Tihanyi et al. 
(2014:1535) explains that the definition of governance is becoming more inclusive 
and 
 “refer[s] to governance as leadership systems, managerial control 
protocols, property rights, decision rights, and other practices that give 
organizations their authority and mandates for action”  
It is this inclusive definition that provides the context for this research.  
 
Regulations, in general, identify that the Board is ultimately responsible for the 
corporate governance of the organisation (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). 
There are a significant number of regulations, and codes of conduct, in place for 
organisations to comply with depending on their location, industry and ownership 
status. Each of these regulations provides an insight into the social norms, historical 
scandals and the role organisations play within that environment. This nuanced 
context influences the corporate governance structures, approaches and priorities 
within the organisation. Organisations themselves are also individual; they have 
their own history, traditions, norms and strategies, all of which influence both the 
corporate governance philosophy and structures they create.  
 
The requirement for corporate governance derives from the separation of principals 
and agents. Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) interpret this agency relationship 
“…as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf 
  Introduction  
 
18 
 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent”  
 
Berle and Means (1932) identified the “Agent-Principal” problem as the distance, in 
terms of control, that has grown over time as the separation of the principals and 
their agents has increased, predominately through the increase in the number of 
principals, i.e. shareholders. In simple terms, as the number of shareholders have 
increased their individual influence over the organisation has decreased. As James 
(1933:515) summarises in his review of Berle and Means’ book 
“[The principal’s] property has become "passive"; that is, he holds 
merely a piece of paper representing an equity on which he hopes to 
get a return. In a word his Ptolemaic corporate universe has become 
Copernican. He is no longer the gravitational center. "Control" is.” 
 
This separation led to the appointment of Directors to a Board to oversee, or control, 
the activities of the agent. The Board is made up of Executive Directors, such as the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (i.e. Agents) and Non-Executive Directors, who 
represent the shareholders (i.e. Principals). Non-Executive Directors can be sub-
divided into two groups; Independent and Non-Independent. A Non-Independent 
Director, whilst, not working full time for the organisation, may be a family member, 
a former employee (such as the previous CEO) or have other close ties to the 
organisation (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). They may also be representatives 
of major investors or parent companies. Conversely, Independent Directors have no 
links to the organisation outside of their Directors role. It is important to note that 
within some literature, particularly non-technical, the term ‘Non-Executive Director’ 
(or NED) is used as a surrogate for ‘Independent Director’. For the purposes of this 
research, the term Independent Director will be used to clearly identify the Board 
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members whose role is to represent the principals and who are free from private 
connections to the organisation. Nevertheless, UK law as well as the Financial 
Reporting Council, amongst others, clearly identifies that the governance of an 
organisation is the responsibility of the entire Board of Directors (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2014). 
 
The Board has a number of roles which they may be expected to fulfil, though each 
Board will have its own individually defined terms of reference. Broadly, these can 
be separated into two areas; providing direction and monitoring progress.  Zahra 
and Pearce II (1989) also conclude that the Board has a service role both in guiding 
senior management and enhancing the organisation’s reputation. Additionally, the 
Board, specifically the Independent Directors, have a role in bringing with them 
resources such as information and access to contacts, as well as creating 
legitimacy for the organisation (Hillman et al., 2000). 
 
The Boards’ decision making role varies dependent on the Board’s characteristics, 
which can “range from working with management to develop strategic direction to 
merely ratifying management's proposals” (Stiles, 2001:631). The Kay Report, 
issued on behalf of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skill (BIS), 
emphasised that it is “the obligation of Directors to promote the success of the 
company and that such success is to be measured over the long-term” (Kay, 
2012:57).  
 
Leblanc and Gilles (2005:248), in their research into the inside of the Boardroom, 
conclude that one of the pivotal factors in decision making is the behavioural 
aspects of the Board of Directors both as individuals and as a group. Hambrick 
(2007:334) identifies that organisations are “informationally complex” and it is the 
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“biases and dispositions” of the top management team on which the information is 
interpreted and decisions made. Whilst Hambrick focused on Executives, Useem 
and Zelleke (2006) found that there is more pressure on Boards to make decisions 
following changes in regulations and corporate scandals, therefore making 
Hambrick’s work appropriate to Boards. 
 
The term corporate governance has been referenced as being first used in 1962 by 
Richard Eells of Columbia Business School (Farrar, 2005:3). Over the past 50 years 
the term has become commonplace, though it has evolved to have ambiguous 
meanings. Farrar (2005:4) provides one illustration of the structure of corporate 
governance. 
 
Figure 1 - The Structure of Corporate Governance (Farrar, 2005:4) 
 
Within each of these structures there are a number of elements. These elements 
include: how the organisation is governed, the organisation’s strategic direction, 
monitoring of strategic progress, monitoring of management activities, risk 
management, regulatory compliance, shareholder responsibility, stakeholder 
management, public relations and decision making (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
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Financial Reporting Council, 2014:40, Mallin, 2010, Tricker, 2009, Zahra and 
Pearce II, 1989). This provides for a complex and interwoven set of variables that 
offer the opportunity of further investigation.   
 
1.3 The Research Area of Interest 
Roberts et al. (2005:S5) identify that there is a “very limited understanding of the 
working processes and effects of Board of Directors”. As Huse (2005) identifies, few 
empirical articles on Boards focus on behaviours. Leblanc and Gilles (2005:1) focus 
on the inner workings of the Board; they raise a concern that rules, regulations and 
academic studies are focused on structural aspects of the Board composition and 
not on the activities within the Board.  
 
The area of interest for this research, as illustrated in Figure 2, is the stage after the 
individual Director has received the information supplied by the organisation, usually 
in the form of a ‘Board Pack’, and prior to a Board agreed output, such as a 
decision. That is to say, this research looks at the inner workings of the Board both 
in terms of individual Directors and collectively as a Board. 
 
Figure 2 – Research Area of Interest 
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1.4   Research Motivation 
“For the process scholar… the real fascination is with the actual 
operation of the board in and outside of the boardroom” (Pettigrew, 
1992:178) 
It is this fascination and desire to understand what is happening inside the 
Boardroom that has motivated my research. It is hoped that if we more fully 
understand what is occurring within the Boardroom we may begin to understand 
more about the why it is happening and how it affects the organisation and the 
impact this has on the organisation and its stakeholders. 
 
Additionally, my own experience of working directly with Boards and providing them 
with information has provided further motivation for this research area. These 
experiences led me to observe that different organisations, and their Directors, have 
different needs and wants, in relation to the information provided. Additionally, 
different Directors have different ways of absorbing and applying the information 
provided. These differences appear, to an observer, to influence their approach to 
their being a Director. It is these underlying issues and observation that provide the 
inspiration for this research. 
 
Finally, this research, in the words of Corbin and Strauss (2008:16), fulfils my  
“…desire to step beyond the known and enter into the world of 
participants, to see the world from their perspective and in doing so 
make discoveries that will [could] contribute to the development of 
empirical knowledge”   
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1.5 Introduction to Selected Methodology 
“Although research methodologies evolve over time, there has been 
little change in the fundamental principles of good research design: 
match your design to your question, match construct definition with 
operationalization, carefully specify your model, use measures with 
established construct validity or provide such evidence, choose 
samples and procedures that are appropriate to your unique research 
question” (Bono and McNamara, 2011:659) 
 
As such, the selection of an appropriate research methodology is critical to ensuring 
quality research. This research aims to understand how the Directors engage with 
the information provided to them to undertake their role. As identified in section 1.3, 
there is little research into the inner workings of the Board; as such this needs to be 
taken into account when selecting the methodology. With regards to models and 
measures relating information to Boards, there is little prior work from which to 
develop such models and measures into a robust, valid, construct. Therefore, the 
selected methodology needed to be able to fill this underlying knowledge gap with 
the aim of generating a theoretical construct for future research.  
 
The primary aspect is to match the design with the question posed (Bono and 
McNamara, 2011). In this research there is an area of research, as opposed to a 
specific question. Likewise, a 
“[G]rounded theory researcher starts with an area of interest, not a 
professionally preconceived problem” (Glaser, 1998:118) 
That is to say, a grounded theory study does not begin with a formalised research 
question or hypothesis (Birks and Mills, 2011:20). A grounded theory study begins 
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with an area of interest and the researcher “keeps his [her] mind open to the true 
problems in the area” (Glaser, 1992:22). As little is known about how Boards use 
information, this research aims to identify the underlying issues in the arena with no 
preconceptions as to what those issues may be. 
 
Glaser (1992:32) identifies that “grounded theory is for the discovery of concepts 
and hypotheses, not for testing or replicating them”. Grounded theory is an 
inductive/abductive methodology that uses a set process to develop a theory from 
the data collected (Birks and Mills, 2011:11, Glaser, 1998:117). The defining 
aspects of grounded theory are: the sample selection process, the concurrent data 
collection and analysis, constant comparison of the data and analysis, the creation 
of memos and the ultimate creation of a theory based on the data collated. A full 
description, and selection justification, of the methodology is undertaken in chapters 
3 and 4. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This document is structured in ten chapters. The next chapter provides an 
introduction to the research field, thereby providing the contextual background for 
this research.  
 
The following chapters, 3 and 4, provide an outline of the methodology utilised in the 
research. Chapter 3 focuses on the process of grounded theory, it explains the 
mechanics of undertaking a grounded theory study and the underlying philosophy of 
this research. In chapter 4 the mechanics are applied to this research and the 
chapter provides the details of how this research was undertaken.  
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Chapter 5 is the first of the chapters looking in detail at the data collected. This 
chapter uses the journey of the board pack, from creation to a Board decision, to 
look at the information flow within the Board. This flow was developed from the data 
collected from the interviewees. At the beginning of chapter 6, the codes and 
categories based on the data collected are further elaborated and gaps identified. 
The chapter then explains the further data collected based on those gaps. 
 
In chapter 7 the wider context of the data collected is discussed in relation to the 
governance literature, specifically in relation to the role of the Board. From this, the 
key storyline is developed in chapter 8, identifying the need for Directors to allocate 
effort in relation to the information they receive. Chapter 9 then investigates how this 
allocation of effort is externalised within the Boardroom context. Chapter 10 
concludes this research including highlighting further areas for study.  
 
It is important to note that throughout this dissertation the names of all individuals 
and organisations have been given pseudonyms to preserve confidentiality. In the 
case of the majority of interviewees this was a condition of the interview agreement. 
In order to assist the reader, vignettes describing each interviewee can be found in 
Appendix 11.1. 
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2 THE RESEARCH FIELD 
2.1 Introduction 
As outlined in chapter 1, the overall area of interest for this research is the 
relationship between the Director, individually and as a Board, and the information 
they utilise. This chapter provides an overview of the relationship between these two 
factors within the existing literature. However, with a grounded theory approach 
there is some debate as to where the review of the literature sits in relation to the 
methodology.  
 
A core basis of the grounded theory approach is that there should be no 
preconceptions in the research relating to potential theories (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967:185). Both Glaser and Strauss agree that the pre-existing literature is vital in 
the later stages of theory development (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:38, Glaser, 
1992:34). Corbin and Strauss (2008:22) identify that overviewing the literature at an 
early stage is useful to “stimulate curiosity about a subject” and “can lead to a study 
resolving [an identified] dissonance”. Conversely, Glaser (1992:32)  states clearly 
that “there is a need not to review any of the literature in the substantive area of 
study” (emphasis added); this is so as to avoid the contamination of the 
researcher’s thoughts and allow the data collected to ‘speak for itself’ during the 
analysis process. Nevertheless, both approaches recommend reading the technical 
(academic) literature surrounding the substantive area of research as well as 
reading non-technical literature (also known as ‘grey literature’), such as reports and 
newspapers (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:38, Glaser, 1992:37). 
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Whiteley (2000) argues that, within business research, researchers may not be able 
to approach the field as a “tabula rasa [blank state]” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:3) as 
organisational frameworks have existing meanings. She goes on to recommend that 
the implicit knowledge is exposed as part of the research design to ensure that the 
concepts and codes are truly emergent (Whiteley, 2000). Additionally, Charmaz 
(2006:17) specifically highlights that researchers with a background in the area of 
focus need to ensure they keep an open mind.  
 
Glaser (1998:120) provides a number of ways that a researcher can use to manage 
their pre-knowledge of the subject; undertake a self-interview; suspend knowledge 
of the literature; and/or write a literature review paper. In the case of this research, 
an extensive self-interview was undertaken prior to the data collection, this is further 
discussed in section 4.2.1. In addition, as a natural part of the PhD process, a 
literature review was written in part-completion of the transfer from MPhil status to 
PhD. That literature review provides a record of my understanding at the beginning 
of this research. Additionally, that literature review has been utilised to inform both 
this chapter and chapter 7, which addresses the Boardroom context. 
 
Nevertheless, Glaser and Strauss (1967:46) identify that  
“A discovered, grounded theory… will tend to combine mostly concepts 
and hypotheses that have emerged from the data with some existing 
ones that are clearly useful.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:46) 
Therefore, a grounded theory researcher must be “theoretically sensitive” 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967:46). Theoretical sensitivity is another core tenant 
of the grounded theory method. Theoretical sensitivity is a somewhat 
ethereal concept and many grounded theorists have expended considerable 
efforts to describe it since Glaser and Strauss (1967:48) first mentioned it (for 
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example see; Bryant and Charmaz, 2007c:17, Charmaz, 2006:135-140, 
Glaser, 1978:27-30, 1992). Gibson and Hartman (2014:36) define theoretical 
sensitivity as 
“the researchers should be aware of the different theoretical codes that 
could be used to explain what is happening in the field and, more 
generally, they should also know what a theoretical code is…This 
makes the researcher sensitive to known codes so that he or she 
recognises them when data is analysed. It also makes it possible for 
him or her to generate new ways of organising their data.” 
 
In 1954 Blumer described the notion of “sensitizing concepts” contrasting them with 
“definitive concepts [which] provide prescriptions of what to see, [whereas] 
sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer, 
1954:7). Charmaz (2006:16) goes further to specify that  
“These concepts give you [the researcher] initial ideas to pursue and 
sensitize you to ask particular kinds of questions about your topic” 
‘Sensitizing concepts’ are general ideas that maybe relevant to the area of study, 
but may lack precision and “instead,… rest on a general sense of what is relevant” 
(Blumer, 1954:7). Kelle (2007:208) provides the example of ‘identity’ as a “heuristic 
device” as it is difficult to operationalise the concept of identity, nonetheless, it can 
be used to sensitise the researcher to underlying issues with the research. For 
example, the notion of ‘being a Board member’ may be core to how an interviewee 
identifies themselves and, as such, provide an avenue for further data collection 
within the research.  
 
Nonetheless, as Charmaz (2006:17) goes on to clarify 
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 “Grounded Theorists use sensitizing concepts as tentative tools for 
developing their ideas about processes [codes] that they define in their 
data. If particular sensitizing concepts prove to be irrelevant, then we 
dispense with them.” 
Therefore, ‘sensitizing concepts’ provide a framework to begin considering the data 
without providing a fixed notion of the outcome of the research. As such, while this 
review of the literature, both here and in chapter 7, is utilised to provide possible 
directions in the research, it does not define the direction of the research; in short it 
provides ‘sensitizing concepts’ for the analysis of the data collected.  
 
It is also noted that; 
 “Theoretical frameworks differ in grounded theory from traditional 
quantitative research” (Charmaz, 2006:169) 
Quantitative research uses established theories from which to deduce testable 
hypotheses (Charmaz, 2006:169). In contrast, grounded theory uses theoretical 
frameworks to locate the resulting theory, derived from the data, in the current 
literature and identifies how that theory “refines, extends, challenges or supersedes 
extant concepts” (emphasis in original, Charmaz, 2006:169). Therefore, prior to the 
data collection and analysis a theoretical construct is not usual, this is so as to avoid 
imposing a pre-existing framework on the, yet to be collated, data (Birks and Mills, 
2011:24). Nonetheless, a review of the major corporate governance theories is 
undertaken in this chapter to understand the theoretical landscape. 
 
Consequently, the following literature review draws on academic literature from 
areas surrounding Directors, and Boards, under the section entitled ‘Corporate 
Governance’, and information, under the subsequent section. Additionally, non-
technical literature, particularly in the form of regulations, has been reviewed and 
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incorporated into the following discussions, both in this chapter and in chapter 7. 
This provides clarity as to the area of dissonance this study will investigate without 
risk of ‘contamination’ from pre-existing literature. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Theories 
There are a number of theories in relation to corporate governance (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001, Tricker, 2009). Roberts et al. (2005) argue that generally there needs 
to be a greater level of pluralism relating to corporate governance theories. 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) support this view and suggest that there is a time and 
place for each of these approaches and that they are not mutually exclusive across 
an organisation’s lifespan. As Judge (2012) identifies, context is a core issue when 
evaluating individual corporate governance theories, and in the development of new 
theories.  
 
This section provides a brief overview of each of the major theories. Each theory is, 
in simple terms, based around the actors involved, the information flows between 
them, the strength of influences between the actors and the basis of power for 
decision making.  
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is the most frequently cited theory within the corporate governance 
research context (Mallin, 2010:15). Agency theory is derived from the separation of 
ownership and control as described in section 1.2. In short, the agents act on behalf 
of the principals and have devolved responsibility for management decisions. The 
theory presupposes that the agents’ priority is their own best interest, which may be 
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at odds with the best interests of the organisation or the principals.  As such, in 
order to ensure that agents work in the best interest of the organisation, principals 
must put in place incentives for the agent (such as bonus packages), which will 
incur costs to the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These costs, and the 
residual cost caused by not directly managing the business themselves, are referred 
to as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Agency theory is based on information economics, as the theory assumes that if the 
principal has sufficient access to information the ability of the agent to deceive the 
principal is reduced (Eisenhardt, 1988). McNulty et al. (2011) argue that Agency 
theory is a theory of power, which is to say that the agents have power vis-à-vis the 
principals.  
 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory is based on the same agent and principal actors; however, it 
differs fundamentally on the assumptions around the agent’s motivations. The 
theory is based in organisational psychology and sociology (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). This theory posits that agents are motivated by a sense of duty and a need 
for positive recognition and, as such, their “motives are aligned with the objectives 
of their principals” (Davis et al., 1997:21). 
 
With regards to information asymmetry issues, the agent’s knowledge is still 
perceived to be superior to the principals, as in Agency theory. In contrast with 
Agency theory, the agent is deemed to be working in alignment with the principals’ 
aims and so they are using the information for the benefit of both parties. As such, 
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the principal requires less personal investment in information gathering and analysis 
(Nowak and McCabe, 2003).  
 
2.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
“Stakeholder theory is distinct because it addresses morals and values explicitly as 
a central feature of managing organizations” (Phillips et al., 2003:481). Whereas 
Agency and Stewardship Theories focus on the relationship between the agents 
and the principals, Stakeholder Theory widens the pool of actors to include others 
such as employees, customers, suppliers and the wider community (Mallin, 
2010:18). In essence, Stakeholder Theory posits that all decisions made within the 
organisation affect, and are affected by, these wider stakeholders and that all the 
stakeholders’ interests are of value (Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
 
Neely et al. (2002:1) believes that focusing just on the subset of stakeholders, (i.e. 
shareholders and customers), is “short-sighted and naïve in today’s information rich 
society”. As Rowley (1997:890) identifies, organisations do not  
“…respond to each stakeholder individually; … rather, to the 
interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set” 
As such, the information flows between the organisation and its stakeholders define 
both the power and the influence each has on the other.  
 
2.2.4 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource Dependency Theory could also be described as a power theory. In 
summary, organisations need resources to create value add and as such, whoever 
has these resources has the power, additionally, “organizations are viewed as 
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coalitions, altering their structures and patterns of behaviour to acquire and maintain 
needed external resources” (Ulrich and Barney, 1984:472).  
 
Information is deemed to be one of the major resources within an organisation. 
Under Resource Dependency Theory, the Board can be utilised as an information 
resource to reduce uncertainty in the organisations environment (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001:17). 
 
2.2.5 Institutional Theory 
“Institutional Theory addresses human behaviour within institutions 
… with respect not only to rational or formal rules but also to cultural 
variables like symbols, beliefs, and human will…[and] that 
organisations pursue legitimacy above economic efficiency.” (Carver, 
2010:150) 
 
Organisations are influenced by the people and environment both within and 
surrounding it. Institutional Theory posits that this pressure for legitimacy ensures 
that processes and structures become isomorphic with the norms of the particular 
organisation type (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
 
In Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) seminal paper on Institutional Theory they identify the 
issue of decoupling. That is to say that the value of information within the 
organisation is measured against the legitimacy of the organisation, with contrary 
information being ignored if it threatens the perceived legitimacy of the organisation. 
They give the example of hospital cure rate information being overlooked as the 
goal set is treatment, not cure, related.  
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2.2.6 Managerial and Class Hegemony Theories 
Managerial and Class Hegemony Theories look at the power balance within the 
Board. In both cases the CEO is deemed to have the power, though, in Managerial 
Hegemony Theory the CEO’s aim is to increase the management control over 
decision making (Rasmussen, 2010:21). Conversely, in the case of Class 
Hegemony, the CEO encourages the Board to work for the ruling elite class (Zahra 
and Pearce II, 1989). With regards to the information flow, in both cases the 
information is restricted to those who need to know, so as to reduce the input from 
others. 
 
2.3 Information as a Dissonance  
As can be seen in Table 1, most of the major corporate governance theories identify 
information as a dissonance between the parties involved. In many of the theories, 
information is perceived to be a source of power. Who has the information, how it is 
used and how it is shared are the keys to the effective use of the information (Ittner 
and Larcker, 2003). Culture, including the level of openness within the organisation, 
also plays a significant part in information systems. The organisation’s culture is 
likely to impact how information is gathered, processed, accepted (or rejected) and 
used (Kappos and Rivard, 2008).  
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Table 1 - Perspectives on Corporate Governance Theories and Information 
(adapted from Stiles and Taylor, 2001:11, Zahra and Pearce II, 1989:293) 
 
  The Research Field  
 
36 
 
Businesses spend a significant amount of time, and resources, identifying and 
measuring aspects of the business (Simons, 2000:16). According to Orna 
(2006:76), every organisation needs to know: 
 “What is happening inside its boundaries 
 What is happening in its ‘outside world’ of customers, member, clients… 
  How to recognize, interpret and act on significant change within and without 
 How to create appropriate ‘offerings’ 
 How to communicate, with itself and with its outside world” 
Additionally, this information is often presented to the Board for input into strategic 
decisions, and investments. Therefore, it is often relied upon by the Board, 
particularly Independent Directors, when making decisions on the sound 
management of the organisation (Clutterbuck and Waine, 1993:33). 
 
This information comes from many sources, both internal and external, and in many 
forms, both financial and non-financial. Ittner and Larcker (2003) identify the value 
of the information is in the outcomes of the decisions that are taken which have 
been made based on it. Therefore, the decision making processes, power and 
structure of a Board, that is to say the corporate governance of the organisation, is 
to an extent dependent on the information the Board receives. 
 
2.3.1 A Note on Information 
The defining of ‘information’ is complex, despite the daily usage of the term.  Rowley 
(2007:172) reviewed sixteen post-2003 textbooks and concluded that 
“Information is defined in terms of data, and is seen to be 
organized or structured data. This processing lends the data 
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relevance for a specific purpose or context, and thereby makes it 
meaningful, valuable, useful and relevant” 
Data is, therefore, facts without context or meaning. Within a business setting this 
could for example be the percentage turnover of staff, however, without knowing the 
norms for the company or industry this fact has no context. When this contextual 
data is added the facts become information. Information is then transmuted into 
knowledge when the interpreter views the information in light of their own 
“experiences, skills and values” (Rowley, 2007:174). This is illustrated in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3 - Information Hierarchy (Chaffey & Wood, cited in Rowley, 2007:167) 
Marchand et al. (2000:21) provides the following framework to further describe data, 
information and knowledge:  
Table 2 – From Data to Knowledge (Marchand et al., 2000:21) 
Knowledge
Information
Data
Meaning Value
High
Low
High
Low
Data Information Knowledge
Content Events Trends Expertise
Form Transactions Patterns Learnings
Information task Representation Manipulation Codification
Human element Observation Judgement Experience
Organizational 
intent
Automation Decision-making Action
Value test Building Block Uncertainty 
reduction
New 
Understanding
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This framework identifies that the organisational intent for information is decision 
making; that is to say that the data is contextualised into information to enable 
decision making. A common thread throughout much of the information literature is 
the requirement for the measures to be of high quality, timely and to be trusted by 
the recipient to facilitate effective decision making (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 2003, 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996, Phelps, 2004). This requirement is echoed within the 
corporate governance literature (e.g. Cadbury, 1992, Financial Reporting Council, 
2014). 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the research field in which this study 
sits, specifically in relation to corporate governance theories. It has identified the link 
between the existing theories and has highlighted information as a dissonance 
suitable for further research.  
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3 METHODOLOGY – THE PROCESS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the process of grounded theory and the processes used 
within this research; chapter 4 describes in detail the practical implementation of the 
methodology. Roberts et al. (2005:S20) identify the “necessity for qualitative primary 
research on the dynamics of governance relationships”. Huse (2007:3) adds that 
there are “few theoretical, empirical and methodological guideposts to assist 
researchers through this minefield”. This lack of coherence has led to many 
researchers using differing methodologies to investigate similar issues, adding 
complexity.  
 
The research area lends itself to a qualitative approach for a number of reasons. 
The primary reason for selecting this approach is based around the lack of research 
previously undertaken in this area which would be sufficient to create testable 
hypotheses (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:25). That is to say, there is a lack of data, for 
example, to clearly identify the relevant questions to ask in a survey or to select 
appropriate pre-existing data sets to analyse. This research is aimed more at 
generating hypotheses than testing them (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:25).  
 
A second reason for using a qualitative approach is to ensure a depth, and richness, 
in the understanding (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). The topic selected is under 
researched and, as such, there may be many significant, but as yet unidentified, 
erroneous influencers on the relationship between Directors and information.  This 
research aims to identify at least some, if not the majority, of these aspects.  
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There are precedents for this type of research in the work of Stiles and Taylor 
(2001:24) who applied a grounded theory approach to 51 Director interviews and 
four case studies. Furthermore, Stiles and Taylor (2001:30) identified that their 
chosen methodology “attempted to reflect and understand the complexity of the 
functioning of organizational elites”.  
 
Therefore, the methodological approach will follow the grounded theory tradition. 
This is appropriate as the following three conditions, identified by Birks and Mills 
(2011:16) are met: 
 “Little is known about the area of study. 
 The generation of theory with explanatory power is a desired outcome. 
 An inherent process is imbedded in the research situation that is likely to be 
explicated by grounded theory methods.” 
 
3.2 Grounded Theory Approach 
Grounded theory was originally developed in the 1960s by Professors Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Charmaz, 2006:4). The method is an 
inductive/abductive approach that uses data to create a theory (Birks and Mills, 
2011:11)1. The method allows the researcher to employ a range of data collection 
methods (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:18).  
 
It has been argued that the output of the grounded theory approach 
                                               
1
 See section 3.2.2.1 for a fuller discussion on this debate. 
   Methodology – The Process 
 
41 
 
“…is more trustworthy for consultations because both laymen and 
sociologists [researchers] can readily see how its predictions and 
explanations fit the realities of the situation” (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967:98) 
Glaser and Strauss (1967:98) go on to identify that, whilst a researcher has little risk 
related to the outcomes, that is to say their financial wellbeing is not predicated on 
the application of the findings, the layman will use it for action. As such, the layman 
must trust both the process and the outcomes. As this research is investigating the 
link between Directors and their use in practice of information, the application of 
grounded theory is appropriate. As Strauss and Corbin (1998:6) identify, 
researchers using this approach are most likely hoping that their research is 
relevant to both academics and non-academics alike. 
 
Grounded theory is a methodological approach that enables theories to evolve from 
the data to produce a theory which is grounded in that data (Charmaz, 2006:4, 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967:3, Strauss and Corbin, 1998:12). The aim is to collate 
data on a research problem to facilitate understanding and to develop a theory. The 
theory is expected to be smaller than a Grand Theory but larger than a minor 
hypothesis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:33).  
 
3.2.1 A Family of Methods 
“Anyone contemplating the GTM [grounded theory method] 
landscape must grasp the inherent complexity of what might be 
termed the ‘family of methods claiming the GTM mantle’” (Bryant 
and Charmaz, 2007c:11) 
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Glaser and Strauss’ 1967 book, “The Discovery of Grounded Theory; Strategies for 
Qualitative Research” (‘Discovery’) provided an outline of the method they had used 
for their research on patients’ awareness of dying (Glaser and Strauss, 1965). Since 
the publication of ‘Discovery’, much has been written about the grounded theory 
method (e.g. Birks and Mills, 2011, Charmaz, 2006, Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
Glaser, 1978, 1992, 1998, 2012). The books vary in style and level of guidance; 
some such as Charmaz (2006) provides more of a ‘how to’ approach, whilst others, 
such as Martin and Gynnild (2011) provides the contextual setting for the method. 
As Bryant and Charmaz (2007c) summarise 
“there is no ‘GTM for Dummies’. GTM is based around heuristics and 
guidelines rather that rules and prescriptions. Moreover, researchers 
need to be familiar with GTM, in all its major forms, in orders to be able 
to understand how they might adapt it in use or revise it into new forms 
and variations.” (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007c:17) 
 
A student of grounded theory has two distinct choices; to select a defined method, 
such as Classic Grounded Theory as defined by Barney Glaser, and use only that 
approach or to develop their own understanding and, therefore, their own approach 
to grounded theory. As Birks and Mills (2011:3) identify, in any research with an 
interpretive element “few things are ever black and white”. As such, this research 
will not follow one approach to the exclusion of all others but will draw from the 
“family of methods” (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007c:11) to inform the research as and 
when appropriate. This selected approach is due, primarily, to this researcher’s 
philosophical position. 
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3.2.2 Research Philosophy 
This research is predominately influenced by my personal philosophical position, 
that of pragmatism. It is interesting to note that Glaser came from a positivist 
tradition and Strauss a pragmatist tradition (Charmaz, 2006:6). Strauss’ personal, 
espoused, position extended to include symbolic interactionism. Conversely, Glaser 
is thought of as a critical realist, despite not personally labelling himself, as he 
believes this to reduce to the potential of grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 2011:5). 
Bearing this in mind, it is important to clarify my viewpoint so as to understand how 
it influences this research (Birks and Mills, 2011:50). 
 
Corbin and Strauss (2008:8) identifies that 
“There are no simple explanations for things. Rather, events are 
the results of multiple factors coming together and interacting in 
complex and often unanticipated ways.” 
They go on to explain that, due to this complexity, any methodologies used to 
explain and analyse real world issues are, by nature, complex (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008:8). In their view of qualitative research they draw on the pragmatist 
philosophies of Dewey and Mead (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:2). 
 
According to (Dewey, 1997:166) there are both human and environmental factors 
interweaved in the creation of truth. Strauss believed that humans are active agents, 
rather than passive recipients, of their life (Charmaz, 2006:7). Under the definition of 
pragmatism, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008:76) identify that “meaning structures … 
come from the lived experiences of individuals”. Additionally, Creswell (2009:6) lists 
four characteristics of pragmatism; consequences of actions, problem-centred, 
pluralistic and real-world practice orientated.  
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Pragmatism “orientates itself towards solving practical problems in the ‘real world’” 
(Feilzer, 2010:8). That is to say; it is how the tools are used, and the subsequent 
results integrated and interpreted, that is the valuable aspect of research. As such, 
“methods are matched to the specific questions and purpose of the research” 
(Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006), therefore, research tools that can be adopted come 
from all research philosophy backgrounds. 
 
This philosophy reflects itself in this research in two primary ways; choice of 
methods and interview approach. Pragmatism allows for multiple methods 
(Creswell, 2009:17) which supports the use of both interviews and observations. 
Additionally, within the interview approach it supports the notion of enquiring with 
regards to contextual factors. Peirce (5.196 (n.d.) quoted in  Burks, 1946:306) 
concludes that pragmatism “is nothing else than… the logic of abduction”; as such, 
the following section further articulates the debates on the Glaser/Strauss 
approached to grounded theory. 
 
3.2.2.1 Inductive, Deductive or Abductive 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), a noted pragmatist, identified three stages of 
enquiry: abduction invents the hypothesis; deduction identifies the consequences by 
which it can be tested; and induction tests the hypothesis (Burks, 1946). As 
Richardson and Kramer (2006:500) note 
“Peirce did not want to banish the concepts of deduction and induction 
and replace them by abduction. Abduction, induction and deduction 
refer to different stages of inquiry.” 
There is, however, significant debate within the grounded theory literature as to 
where exactly the methodology sits within these stages of enquiry, see for example 
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Nathaniel (2011:196) and Reichertz (2007:214). It is worth noting that the Glaser-
Strauss differences is believed to be illuminated to some extent by these differing 
viewpoints (Reichertz, 2007:215). 
 
Glaser (1978:37, 1998: 117) asserts that grounded theory is an inductive process. 
Nevertheless, he goes on to clarify that  
“deductive work in grounded theory is used to derive from induced 
codes conceptual guides as to where to go next for which 
comparative group… in order to sample for more data to generate a 
theory.” (empahsis in original, Glaser, 1978:37) 
As such, he labels grounded theory as “inductive-deductive” (1978:37) in which 
“deduction is in the service of further induction” (1978:38). The use of constant 
comparison of new data, from new samples, against the collated data provides a 
circulatory hypothesis testing/generation process. 
 
Nonetheless, other grounded theorists query Glaser’s definition and consider 
grounded theory in terms of an abductive process (for example Birks and Mills, 
2011, Charmaz, 2006:102, Reichertz, 2007:214, Richardson and Kramer, 2006). 
Reichertz (2007:224) identifies that the circular nature of grounded theory supports 
the notion of abduction. That is to say, the constant comparison of data, memos and 
initial suppositions which enable the inference of a scientifically reasonable and 
logical hypothesis  “exactly corresponds to the logic of ‘abductive’ research” 
(Reichertz, 2007:224). In summary, Bryant and Charmaz (2007a:602) define 
abduction as 
“A type of reasoning that begins by examining data and after scrutiny of 
these data, entertains all possible explanations for the observed data, 
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and then forms hypothesis to confirm or disconfirm until the researcher 
arrives at the most plausible interpretation of the observed data.” 
 
Reichertz’s (2007:225) treatise on the logic of grounded theory concludes that 
Strauss’ (and Corbin’s) variant of grounded theory resoundingly “contain[s] the logic 
of abductive reasoning”. Likewise, Nathaniel (2011:198) conclude that  
“Classical [Glaserian] grounded theory is highly consistent with Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s philosophy of pragmatism… and [Peirce’s basic 
philosophical assumptions] can prevent erosion and misinterpretation of 
the method” 
 
Therefore, despite Corbin (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:16) identifying that their work 
on grounded theory is based in the “Chicago style Interactionism and Pragmatism” 
philosophies; and Glaser as “dismiss[ing] the applicability of any specific 
philosophical or disciplinary position” (Birks and Mills, 2011) similarities can be 
drawn between the two ‘camps’; or, as Bryant and Charmaz (2007b:46) conclude, 
“Abductive reasoning resides at the core of grounded theory logic: it 
links empirical observation with imaginative interpretation, but does so 
by seeking theoretical accountability through returning to the empirical 
world” 
In other words the use of constant comparison and theoretical sampling, utilised in 
both approaches, provides a loop within the research between the data and the 
analysis which aligns with the abductive principles.  
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3.2.3 Unit of Analysis 
Glaser (1998:8) concluded that “All is Data”, as such the source of the data 
collected can, and does, come from many sources. The unit of the source varies 
from an individual to, in this case, the observations of entire Boards. At the 
beginning of the research it is important not to limit the research by specifying a 
particular unit of analysis (Gibson and Hartman, 2014:34). It is important to 
remember that; 
“The goal of grounded theory is to generate a theory that accounts for 
patterns of behaviour which are relevant and problematic for the 
participants. The core category is that pattern of behaviour which is 
most related to all the other categories and their properties in the 
theory which explain how the participants resolve their main concern.” 
(Glaser, 1998:117) 
Therefore, in many ways the unit of analysis is ‘behaviour’ rather than a defined 
individual, role or societal group (Glaser, 1978:69). 
 
3.3 Process 
Figure 4 (page 48) provides an overview of the grounded theory process used 
within this research, from the start of undertaking data-related activities, which is to 
say beyond the selection of grounded theory as the methodology. The process, by 
its nature as well as philosophical underpinnings is circuitous. One of the basic 
tenants of grounded theory is the constant comparison of data with data, codes with 
codes, categories with categories that leads to higher levels of abstraction and, 
ultimately, to a theory (Birks and Mills, 2011:11, Glaser and Strauss, 1967:101-116) 
It is, therefore, usual - and encouraged - for researchers to go backwards and  
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Figure 4 – Grounded Theory Process Used 
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forwards (and sideways) between the data, the codes and the categories during the 
process right up until, and including, the write up stage (Charmaz, 2006:154).   
 
Within this chapter the data collection and the data analysis are discussed in 
separate sections for clarity, however, it is the analysis of the data that informs the 
next step of the data collection (Charmaz, 2006:96). As such, they are a circular, 
interlinked process, with no clear dividing lines between the stages. 
 
3.3.1 Memos 
Memos “are records of thoughts, feelings, insights and ideas in relation to a 
research project” (Birks and Mills, 2011:40). The grounded theory process begins 
with the area of research, as identified in Figure 1 (page 20). However, from the 
moment that the area of research is identified the researcher begins to memo. Like 
constant comparison, memos are a core tenant of grounded theory. Memo types 
have been described in many way such as; “code notes, theoretical notes, and 
operational notes” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:118); in additional to this list Birks and 
Mills (2011:52) recommend that reflective notes on the grounded theory process are 
also written by the researcher; although they go on to say that the labels are not 
important, it is the habit of writing memos that is important.  
 
Memos are a written record of the mental processes that underpin the grounded 
theory method. The memos are utilised for many reasons for example; to prompt 
further data collection, to articulate an unseen gap, to reflect on understandings to 
date but most importantly to enable and facilitate conceptualisation of the theory. 
They are a tool to promote theoretical sensitivity and reduce the forcing of the data 
analysis (Birks and Mills, 2011:60). 
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Memos have no set format, are free flowing in terms of both structure and English 
(Glaser, 1998:178); memos can be both in written form and in diagrams. Memos 
vary in length, from one line notes to pages of reflection.  
 
In the case of this research, memos were written in many formats, for example; on 
scrap paper, on an iPad and in NVivo software. Even answerphone messages were 
used when paper could not be conveniently accessed and then transcribed at a 
more convenient time. Appendix 11.2 provides some illustrations of the memos. As 
Reichertz (2007:221) explains abduction often requires mental space in which to 
make connections and abstractions. Memos, therefore, were often written at 
inconvenient times, nonetheless they took priority over all other activities, with the 
one exception of during data collection interviews (Glaser, 1998:182). 
 
All memos were dated to enable the evolution of thought to be tracked. In addition 
to ‘standalone’ memos a reflective diary of the research process was also kept to 
understand the research ‘journey’ (Birks and Mills, 2011:54). All memos, ultimately, 
ended up in paper format thereby allowing physical sorting of the contents. 
Throughout the research the memos were sorted into groups of inter-connected 
memos (Glaser, 1998:118). This sorting happened at intervals throughout the 
research journey, with each sorting having a different conceptual view (see section 
3.4 for a fuller description). Memos were also written on the outcomes of sorting, 
which were then incorporated in the next sorting. 
 
Memoing continued up until to point that the theory was fully developed and written 
up.  
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3.3.1.1 Diagrams as Memos  
Diagramming is used to help identify, for example, the core concept, gaps in data 
and properties of categories (Birks & Mills, 2011:105). As they go on to identify, 
“[d]iagramming is the creative tool to use when operationalizing the logic of 
abduction” (emphasis in original Birks and Mills, 2011:105). As such, the diagrams 
can be used as a starting point for the discussions around the creation of theory. 
 
Visualisation through the use of diagrams, and other graphical tools, enables large 
amounts of data to be viewed easily (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013:217). NVivo 
provides a number of tools to assist the researcher, nonetheless, in the case of this 
research the diagrams were hand drawn; this was found to be both easier and more 
conductive to evolving the diagrams and, ultimately, the theory developed. 
 
The earlier diagrams are ‘messy’ and representative of the chaos of the early stages 
of grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 2011:105); the later diagrams are clearer, 
simplified illustrations as can be seen in Figure 5 (page 51). All diagrams were kept, 
for example those on the blackboard were photographed as they evolved, and were 
chronologically stored (Birks and Mills, 2011:106). 
 
Figure 5 - Diagrams 
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3.3.2 Sampling 
Sampling within grounded theory is separated into two types; initial purposeful 
sampling followed, swiftly, by theoretical sampling. The initial purposeful sample is 
suggested by the research area of interest; that is to say the first sample is directly 
relevant to the study (Birks and Mills, 2011:70). This initial data is then analysed and 
coded, as described in section 3.4. The coding then highlight gaps, further 
questions or avenues of interest for which theoretical sampling should be utilised to 
provide the data. 
 
“Theoretical sampling is unique to grounded theory research and is the 
essential method for making the process emergent” (Birks and Mills, 
2011:69) 
Theoretical sampling has two core aspects; “what you do next … [and] how you do 
it” (emphasis in original Birks and Mills, 2011:70). The ‘what’ looks at, for example, 
who is the source that may help the researcher to fill the knowledge gaps 
highlighted in the coding. In relation to the theoretical sample selection there are a 
number of considerations; however, as Stake (1995:4) identifies “the first [selection] 
criteria should be to maximize what we can learn”. The ‘how’ identifies the data 
collection method, for example, in this study much was said about what happened 
within the Boardroom during the unstructured interviews. Hence, to understand the 
theoretical gaps being identified within the interviews further, observations of Board 
meetings were undertaken. As such, the “process of data collection is controlled by 
the emerging theory” [italics in original] (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:45). 
 
Under purposeful sampling the researcher would normally set the sample size at the 
beginning of the data collection phase (Bryman, 2008:415). However, theoretical 
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sampling uses a more emergent process, as such, the sample size - and its nature - 
emerges as the data analysis processes develops. Thus it is not possible to predict 
the size or methods of data collection at the beginning of a grounded theory study 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967:61).  
 
Data collection finishes when theoretical saturation has been reached. Saturation is 
reached when further data collection does not add to the categories already 
identified in the data analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:61). That is to say, despite 
further collection of data from different sources no new properties are yielded for the 
identified category.  
 
In this research there are 42 samples. In total there were 33 unstructured interviews 
with 31 interviewees undertaken in two phases, see section 4.2.2.1 for further 
details. The first phase was used to generate initial data; the second phase was 
used to member-check and further explore early stage findings. Two of the 
interviewees were interviewed in both phases, with a further three only being 
interviewed in the second phase. In addition, five Board meetings were observed 
during the latter part of the first phase. In parallel with both phases, four technical 
meetings were undertaken to investigate specific aspects. After the final samples 
were analysed, as described in the following sections, no new codes, or dimensions 
of codes, were identified (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:263). Therefore, theoretical 
saturation had been reached (Birks and Mills, 2011:99) and no new data was 
collected. 
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3.3.3 Data Collection 
Under Glaser’s (1998:8) “All is Data” concept, four types of data collection were 
undertaken; unstructured interviews, technical meetings, Board observations and 
member-checking interviews (the latter is described in section 3.4.2.1). Surrounding 
that is ‘grey’ literature such as the Board packs of the observed Board meeting and 
the 2013 Annual Reports of a selection of FTSE100 companies.  
 
3.3.3.1 Unstructured Interviews 
“The grounded theory interview is dependent upon the ability of the 
researcher to travel a path through the interview with the participant. 
The greater the level of structure imposed, the less able the interviewer 
will be able to take the optimal route” (Birks and Mills, 2011:75) 
Therefore, unstructured, conversational, interviews are widely used within grounded 
theory research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:28). Unstructured interviews are a style 
of interviewing designed to elicit the interviewee’s perceptions of an issue without 
the interviewer’s preconceived notions influencing the discussions (Firmin, 2008). 
The use of unstructured interviews enables the interviewees to direct the 
conversation and facilitated the identification of hitherto un-researched aspects 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008:28). As Birks and Mills’ (2011:75) goes on to explain, the 
interviewer’s role is to coordinate the conversation and enable it to develop.  
 
Each interview within a grounded theory study is an evolution of the previous one. 
After each interview the data gathered is analysed and compared with the data 
already analysed (Birks and Mills, 2011:94). The aim of the interview is, not only to 
develop coding and categories, but to provide both explanations and context for the 
   Methodology – The Process 
 
55 
 
categories to enable understandings to be identified (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008:148).  
 
Within unstructured interviews 
“guides are not as relevant as they are to structured forms of 
research because they tend to evolve and change over the 
course of the research” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:152) 
That does not mean that there should be no pre-considered questions but that the 
questions should be of an open nature allowing the interviewer to initially prompt 
discussion then follow the interviewee’s lead (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:153). The 
examples they provide are; “’Tell me what you think about’ or ‘What happened 
when’ or ‘What was your experience with’” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:152). They go 
on to advise that using only the initial interview guide without the flexibility to learn 
as the analysis of the gathered data progresses limits the value of the data 
collection exercise.  Nonetheless, an aide-memoire is a useful tool in the interview 
situation; this guide assists the interviewer by providing prompts for the 
conversation but it must be used with caution and reviewed after each interview is 
coded (Birks and Mills, 2011:75, Corbin and Strauss, 2008:28).  
 
In the case of this research, two questions were regularly - though not always - 
asked of the interviewees: 
 “Can you tell me about a time when the Board worked well together?” 
o This question was often used as a first question to help the 
interviewee feel comfortable in the interview setting and provided 
them with an opportunity to feel positive with regards to sharing 
information 
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 “Can you tell me a time when the Board did not work so well together?” 
o This question was used to help the interviewee reflect on the 
differences between when the Board worked well together and when 
it did not 
These two questions had the additional advantage of providing anecdotes for the 
interviewee to return to throughout the rest of the interview.   
 
The interviewer is, inevitably, part of the conversation and, therefore, develops a 
relationship with the interviewee – even if only for the short time of the interview 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005:33). This relationship is the key to eliciting the data from the 
interviewee, Rubin and Rubin (2005:34) suggest that the interview should be an 
agreeable experience for both parties. The style of the interview should be, and 
was, relaxed and open thereby enabling the interviewer to make the interviewee feel 
comfortable to open up (Corbetta, 2003:274). The key activities for the interviewer 
during the interview are; listening; prompting through the use of both the aide-
memoire questions and follow on questions; as well as note taking (Mason, 
1998:46). The aim is to engender trust, gain a rapport and enable the information to 
flow from the interviewee (Corbin and Morse, 2003), thus ensuring that value is 
derived from the time spent. 
 
The interviews evolved as the interviewing skill improved with practise; as the 
interviewer became more skilled at the interviewing process, and reflected on the 
interview process, iterative improvements were made in the skill. Birks and Mills 
(2011:75) recommend a pilot interview to test the interviewer’s technique. In this 
research the pilot was done with Prof Cherry, a highly respected academic with 
Boardroom experience.   
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The phase one interviewees included: nine Board Chairs; ten Non-Executive 
Directors; four Board level Executives; three information providers to Boards; one 
Board advisor and one industry/academic expert; a full description of the 
interviewees can be found in section 4.2.2.  The phase one interviews were 
conducted over eleven months from January 2013 to November 2013. Throughout 
that period 28 interviews were conducted.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Distribution of Phase One Interviews in 2013 
The ebb-and-flow of the interviews were a consequence of both the need to analyse 
the data throughout and constantly comparing it with previous data - this by 
necessity taking longer as further data was located – as well as the complexity of 
accessing the interviewees. As can be seen from Figure 6 (page 57), there were 
three key peaks in the data collection, at times this meant that the interviews could 
not always be fully analysed prior to the next interview, though in all cases memos 
where written prior to the next interview. This is contrary to grounded theory 
processes but reflects the complexity of accessing managerial elites (Pettigrew, 
1992), as such, during the peak periods priority was given to access over 
methodological processes.  
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The interviewees were identified through personal contacts, LinkedIn, the ‘Women 
on Boards’ organisation and by recommendations from previous interviewees. The 
interviewees were in two categories; Board member and advisors to Boards. In the 
initial sample considerations Board members were considered to be the most likely 
source of data.  However, as the interviews progressed the question of why the 
Board members received various pieces of data became important, therefore, the 
interviewees sample grew to incorporate Board advisors. 
 
Glaser (1998:107) argues that ‘tape’ recording an interview is counter to grounded 
theory for a number of reasons; recording creates waste in terms of too much data; 
delays the process whilst it is transcribed and quality checked; it records the words 
but not what is observed; and it constrains skill development. Conversely, Birks and 
Mills (2011:76) argue that recording the interview is supportive of the overall 
process, especially for novice grounded theorists. Recording the interview allows 
both for the review of the contents and the evaluation of the interview process (Birks 
and Mills, 2011:76, Charmaz, 2006:32). 
 
All of the phase one interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed within 
three days of the interview. The transcripts were then checked for accuracy. In 
addition, field notes (memos) were written immediately after the interview, these 
included a richer picture of the interview than the transcription could provide 
(Mason, 1998:52). During this process all of the data was fully anonymised with 
both the participants and their organisations being allocated pseudonyms, see 
appendix 11.1 for vignettes describing the interviewees.  
 
Prior to beginning the research it had been anticipated that most interviews would 
be conducted face-to-face. However, it quickly became apparent that scheduling 
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such meetings with Board-level individuals was significantly more complex than 
scheduling telephone calls. Therefore, 19 of the interviews were conducted by 
telephone, seven were conducted face-to-face and the remaining two were 
conducted using ‘Skype’ video conferencing facilities.  
 
The interviews lasted an average of 42 minutes each varying from 25 to 85 minutes 
in length. This is comparable with Leblanc and Gilles (2005:272) who noted that 
their interviews ranged from eight minutes to over 90 minutes with the majority 
being between 30 and 60 minutes in length.  
 
3.3.3.2 Technical Meetings 
These meeting were held with the aim of further understanding specific issues 
raised by the interviewees in the unstructured interviews. These meetings are 
defined as technical meetings for two reasons; firstly the interview style was much 
more conversational in terms of a two way dialogue between interviewer and 
interviewee, as such they are referred to as a ‘meeting’. Secondly, they focused on 
a single issue highlighted by the coding of the unstructured interviews. The aim of 
these meetings was to provide an in-depth, technical, understanding of the 
specialist area of the interviewee. The technical meetings were held with the 
following;  
A. The CEO of a recruitment firm specialising in Board level recruitment 
B. A Consultant working for a provider of specialised software for use in the 
Boardroom  
C. The CEO of a provider of specialised software for use in the Boardroom 
D. An entrepreneur in the process of setting up an organisation designed to 
enable smaller organisations to gain access to experienced NEDs 
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These meetings averaged 52 minutes in length, two were face to face and the 
remaining two were conducted by telephone. The meetings spanned both phase 
one and phase two of the data collection. During the meeting brief notes were taken 
and these were expanded upon immediately after the meeting (Birks and Mills, 
2011:78). These field notes were then coded in the same manner as the 
unstructured interviews.   
 
3.3.3.3 Board Meeting Observations 
Under the UK’s Health and Social Care Act 2012 all NHS Trusts’ “constitution[s] 
must provide for meetings of the board of directors to be open to members of the 
public” (HMG, 2012). As such, the Board meetings can be observed by any 
members of public. It should be noted that not all of the meeting can be observed by 
the public due the confidential, patient centric, issues discussed; nonetheless, more 
than three-quarters of the meetings’ contents were observed. Two different Trusts 
were observed; ‘Curie’ NHS Trust for three meetings and ‘Pasteur’ NHS Trust for 
two meetings. 
 
Both Trusts are large Home Counties (UK, South East) based organisations. The 
Board Secretary was contacted by email prior to the first attendance to gain 
permission for observation out of courtesy. At the first meeting, I made myself 
known to the Board Secretary at the beginning of the meeting and was, in both 
cases introduced to the CEO and Chair. The research was explained during these 
conversations as well as the confidentiality measures to be put in place to assure 
anonymity. Other Board members also expressed interest in the research. 
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The Trusts both published the Board papers online a week before the meeting, 
these were read in advance of the meeting. Throughout the meetings the behaviour 
of the Board was observed and extensive field notes were made. The field notes 
were typed up as soon as possible after the meeting. The field notes observed, for 
example: how the individuals on the Boards interacted; the level of preparedness 
the Directors exhibited; how they approached individual agenda items; as well as 
the progress and manner of the discussions. These field notes were then coded in 
the same manner as the unstructured interviews.   
 
The limitations of these observations must be noted, the main limitation being, as 
stated above, only the public part of the meeting was observed, not the private 
session. Therefore, it was not possible to clearly identify what is ‘normal’ behaviour 
for the Board and what behaviour was for the ‘audience’s benefit’. As such, within 
this dissertation the analysis of the observations has been restricted to the factual 
aspects of the observations, for example observations of the timeliness of the 
meetings and the contents of the Board pack. Nonetheless, great benefit was 
gained by the researcher in being able to contextualise the interviewees’ comments, 
which ultimately added value in the coding and analysis phases of this research.  
 
3.3.3.4 Grey Literature 
Throughout the data collection a number of documents were utilised; these 
included;  
 Board reports 
 Annual reports 
 Internal documentation provided by the participants 
 Other publically available information such as news reports 
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This wealth of information added to the rich picture of both the participant and their 
organisations. Nonetheless, it was important to understand the context of each 
document in terms of, for example, its production, timings and reason for sharing 
(Bryman, 2008:522). Each text was evaluated in terms of its; authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Bryman, 2008:516). The grey literature was then 
coded in the same manner as the unstructured interviews.   
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
As Glaser and Strauss (1967:254) identify, the researcher’s job is “to transform 
insights into relevant categories, properties, and hypotheses”. As such, the process 
of analysing the data is core to the grounded theory approach. Unlike most 
quantitative research, data analysis can, and must, begin from the point the first 
data is collected (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:47).  
 
It is important to note that there is much contention between the major grounded 
theorists with regards to the data analysis phase. As such, within the varying 
approaches to this phase of grounded theory there are a variety of terms and 
language used to describe the processes. In the case of this research, for simplicity 
Birks and Mills’ (2011:94) terminology of initial, intermediate and advanced coding 
will be used to describe the coding process. Birks and Mills (2011:116) map their 
terminology to other major grounded theory work as illustrated in Table 3. 
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Table 3 - Phases of Coding (Birks and Mills, 2011:116 Table 7.1) 
As with the data collection section, the coding phases will be described in a linear 
manner. However, the reality is that the researcher “alternate[s] between phases of 
coding throughout the study as they concurrently generate or collect data and 
analyse these” (Birks and Mills, 2011:95). 
 
3.4.1 Initial Coding  
Coding is a form of indexing that enables connection and a narrative to develop 
between the information (Mason, 1998:144). Gibson and Hartman (2014:91) 
describe the process of coding as  
“…you take a lot of different examples that seem to be quite similar and 
you summarise them by calling them the same thing. You label them 
with a word or set of words that typically captures the content they have 
in common. It is not complicated.” (emphasis in original) 
 
That being said, the various renowned grounded theorists have suggested differing 
approaches to how researchers should question the data when doing the initial 
coding. Corbin and Strauss (2008:90) suggest a structured paradigm, with 
 
Initial Coding Intermediate 
Coding 
Advanced 
Coding 
Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) 
Coding and 
comparing 
incidents 
Integrating 
categories and 
properties 
Delimiting the 
theory 
Glaser (1978) Open coding Selective coding Theoretical 
coding 
Strauss and 
Corbin (1990; 
1998) 
Open coding Axial coding Selective coding 
Charmaz 2006 Initial coding Focused coding Theoretical 
coding 
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formulated questions relating to “conditions”, “strategies” and “consequences” 
identified by the interviewee, as a tool with a matrix to locate events. Glaser 
(1992:4) raises concerns that this forces the data, therefore, preventing the 
development of a true grounded theory. In contrast, Charmaz (2006:51) takes a 
more constructivist view and recommends that the researcher asks such questions 
as, but not limited to: 
 “What processes(es) is at issue here? How can I define it? 
 How does this process develop? 
 How does the research participant(s) act while involved with this process 
 What does the research participant(s) process to think and feel while 
involved in this process? What might his or her observed behaviour 
indicate? 
 When, why and how does the process change? 
 What are the consequences of the process?”  
She also recommends “looking for tacit assumptions” and “explicating implicit 
actions and meaning” (Charmaz, 2006:50).  
 
Prior to beginning the coding, each of the recorded interviews was listened to again 
to ensure the nuances and inflections the interviewee used throughout the interview 
were captured. All other data sources were re-read prior to coding. The document 
was then coded line by line by the researcher. Glaser (1978:58) stresses the 
importance of line by line coding as it ensures that the data is read in depth and to 
avoid superficial coding. On occasions, the line may be coded multiple times as it 
may contain multiple aspects; conversely some lines may not indicate any codes at 
all. In addition, memos were written as and when thoughts occurred. 
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This process fulfilled Glaser’s (1992:57-58) four rules of coding: 
1. Ask questions of the data 
2. Code the data line by line 
3. Coding must only be done by the researcher 
4. Always interrupt the coding to write memos as the ideas appear 
 
The codes themselves are short words or phrases that describe the content or main 
feature of the data slice (Gibson and Hartman, 2014:91,158). Code labels are 
usually gerunds (-ing); this helps to prevent being too descriptive and to ensure 
focus on the actions (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007c, Charmaz, 2006:136). 
Additionally, it is usual to use in-vivo titles for the codes, that is to say the actual 
words of the interviewee are used to represent the data (Birks and Mills, 2011).  
 
To assist in the coding process a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software tool (CAQDAS) was utilised (Lewis, 2004). The selected software was 
NVivo, a well-known and widely used qualitative software program. NVivo was 
utilised to assist in the process of coding, that is to say, the coding was done 
interactively, i.e. ‘by hand’ utilising the software to facilitate the process not through 
the use of auto-coding features (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013:108, Birks and Mills, 
2011:39). 
 
In support of the coding, a code book was developed (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967:106). Initially this was done within NVivo, however, it soon became apparent 
that the moving backwards and forwards between screens was cumbersome and 
unnecessarily time consuming. Therefore an index card was created for each code, 
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as illustrated in Figure 7, which was developed from Bernard and Ryan’s (cited in 
Saldana, 2013:25) list of code specifications. 
 
Figure 7 - Coding Card Developed from Bernard and 
Ryan (2010:99 cited in Saldana, 2013:25) 
The coding cards allowed for easy constant comparison of the codes as new data 
was coded (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:106). Throughout the process the codes were 
adjusted, discarded or rephrased as the data indicated (Glaser, 1978:60). During 
the course of these initial coding phases memos were written; as the coding evolved 
this was memoed also. 
 
Through the coding process two aspects emerged; firstly, gaps in the data which 
are filled by collating further data. Secondly, categories of codes began to emerge 
and intermediate coding was begun. 
 
3.4.2 Intermediate Coding 
There is no clear dividing line between the initial and intermediate coding stages, as 
codes are created then begins the process of organising them. Figure 8 illustrates 
the linkages between the coding stages. 
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Figure 8 - A Streamlined Codes-to-Theory Model for Qualitative 
Inquiry (adapted from Saldana, 2013:13) 
 
In this intermediate phase, the categories and their sub-categories will be identified 
and their characteristics fully explained (Birks and Mills, 2011:98). They go on to 
explain that the “properties of categories and sub categories should be considered 
in terms of their dimensions, or the range of variance that the property 
demonstrates” (Birks and Mills, 2011:98). To illustrate, Birks and Mills (2011:98) 
provides an example: 
 
Figure 9 - Dimensions of Categories; Example 
Developed From Birks and Mills (2011:98) 
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During this phase it is usual that not all of the properties, dimensions and 
influencers can, or need to, be identified. Researchers then undertake theoretical 
sampling to fill the gaps, as described in section 3.3.1.1. However, it is not possible 
to fill all the gaps on all the categories, therefore, the researcher must begin the 
process of identifying the core category. This core category evolves out of the 
memos that have been written throughout the earlier stages (Glaser, 1978:89). The 
memos are sorted in to conceptual groupings over and over again, with each sort 
being memoed. The aim is to move beyond describing the issue to a level of 
conceptual abstraction. Glaser (1978:78) clarifies the “conceptual specification is 
the focus of grounded theory, not conceptual definition” (emphasis in original).  
   
In the case of this research, the earlier phase of sorting codes into categories was 
done by hand then transferred into NVivo, see Figure 10 (page 69). Each sort was 
memoed and the structure captured for future reference. Additionally, an export of 
the NVivo structure was kept for future audit purposes. Gaps in the data were 
identified and further data collection was undertaken. 
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Figure 10 - Manual Sorting of Codes 
The memos identified three major areas and three minor areas that needed further, 
focused data collection. This was undertaken through member checking.  
 
3.4.2.1 Member Checking 
Member checking “refers to taking the ideas back to the research participants for 
their confirmation… [or] to elaborate your categories” (Charmaz, 2006:111). 
Charmaz (2006:111) goes on to identify that within the recursive nature of grounded 
theory data collection, member checking is not necessary but she acknowledges 
that it is a useful term. Nonetheless, in this research it is used as a term to delineate 
the unstructured interviews from the interviews focused around the emerging 
categories. 
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A one page summary was produced of the research and the six areas requiring 
further investigation, see Figure 21 (page 117). This was emailed to the 
interviewees and the Company Secretaries of the observed Boards for onward 
circulation. It was additionally emailed to further potential interviewees. Four of the 
interviewees provided email responses, two phase one interviewees agreed to have 
follow up interviews and three interviews were conducted with additional 
interviewees. 
 
The interviews focused specifically on the contents of the one page review, the aim 
being to understand how they resonated with the interviewees (Bowen (2008) cited 
in Birks and Mills, 2011:99). The aim was not to ‘count’ the number of people who 
agreed but to further stimulate conversation and, therefore, generate further data. 
As such, the interviewees also spoke about wider, related issues. This enabled the 
categories to be more fully developed and the ideas conceptualised. Further detail 
of this process is discussed in chapter 6.  
 
The initial and intermediate coding phases continued until theoretical saturation was 
reached. Theoretical saturation is a key concept within grounded theory, as 
discussed in section 3.3.2. This is reached when each piece of data analysed 
provides the same properties for a category and there is no new development to the 
category as more data is analysed, even when outlying examples are analysed 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967:61); or as Corbin and Strauss (2008:263) describe it; 
“All categories are well developed in terms of properties, dimensions, 
and variations. Further data gathering and analysis add little new to the 
conceptualization, though variations can always be discovered”  
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At this stage a core category is clearly identified. Gibson and Hartman (2014:96) 
summarise Glaser’s (1978:95) list of considerations for identifying the core category 
as (see Table 4) 
 
Table 4 - Selecting the Core Category (Gibson and Hartman, 2014) 
“The generation of the theory occurs around [this] core category” (Glaser, 1978:93)  
 
3.4.3 Advanced Coding 
“Advanced coding is at the heart of theoretical integration. It is through these 
processes that data ultimately become[s] theory” (Birks and Mills, 2011:116). 
Storyline writing is a tool for advanced coding that provides an order and narrative 
from which to develop the theory (Birks and Mills, 2011:118). It should be noted 
that, whilst many authors see the process of storyline development as assisting the 
grounded theory process (for example Birks and Mills, 2011:117, Dey, 2007:183), 
Glaser (1992:82) argues that they force the data to fit pre-conceived ideas.  
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Storylining is “[a] narrative framework provid[ing] a vehicle for contextualizing and 
integrating the various elements… which characterize the social process” (Dey, 
2007:183). A storyline enables the actors to be identified and their relationships 
articulated within an overarching plot (Dey, 2007:185). 
 
Storylining has five guiding principles (Birks et al., 2009:408) 
 “Theory Takes Precedence” – the theoretical constructs are the foundation 
of the story  
 “Allows for Variation” – variation, such as data that does not fit, adds depth 
and richness to the story 
 “Limits gaps” – gaps are identified and the researcher returns to the data (or 
even the field) to limit them 
 “Evidence is grounded” – the storyline is based in the data 
 “Style is appropriate” – the tone and language used must be appropriate to 
ensure readability 
 
The storyline is developed through the sorting, and resorting, of memos. The 
earliest storylines are in the form of memos which are subsequently developed into 
a coherent whole (Birks and Mills, 2011:117). The story provides a narrative through 
the grounded data and subsequent conceptualisation (Birks and Mills, 2011:117). 
 
The final stage is that of theoretical coding this is where “advanced abstractions that 
provide a framework for enhancing the explanatory power of your storyline and its 
potential theory” (Birks and Mills, 2011:123) is developed. Glaser (1978:73) 
identifies 18 coding families to consider when developing theoretical codes; 
nevertheless Charmaz (2006:66) explains that these are limited and many are 
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missing from the list. In this research, a broad range of coding families were 
considered and the most relevant ones, as they are not mutually exclusive (Glaser, 
1978:73), were applied to the storyline to develop the substantive theory.  
 
Theory development is the end point, or goal, of the grounded theory methodology. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967:114) distinguish between two types of theories; 
substantive and formal. Substantive theories are theories that ‘stand up’ in relation 
to the population (or substantive area) studied. Formal theories go beyond that and 
are relevant to a conceptual area. For example, in this study, the population from 
which the data is drawn is predominately UK organisations, therefore the 
substantive theory will be relevant to all firms in this population. If the data were 
then cross referenced with other research and further data samples included, the 
theory could be proven to be relevant to other populations. Nonetheless, it is rare for 
substantive theories to be broadened to a formal theory (Birks and Mills, 2011:157). 
Glaser (2012:23) cautions to stay within the substantive boundaries of the data 
collection when developing the conceptual analysis. 
 
At this stage the researcher can review the relevant literature to identify any other 
studies and theories which could enable the theory to be extended to a formal 
theory. For example, this literature includes works by Stiles and Taylor (2001), 
Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) as well as Nowak and McCabe (2003). Other 
literature will also be reviewed to selectively further explain the dimensions of the 
theory (Glaser, 1978:138).  
 
Glaser (1992:16) identifies that the end of grounded theory is a theory or 
hypothesis. The evaluation of the theory is discussed in section 10.4., in summary,  
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“A well constructed grounded theory will meet its four most 
central criteria: fit, work, relevance, and modifiability … when new 
data presents variations” Glaser (1992:15) 
 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
As with any major research project, there are a number of areas that require ethical 
consideration. The most significant ethical issue is the maintaining confidentiality of 
the information. As such, it was important to work with the interviewee to manage 
with what he or she felt they could release in terms of information, about both 
themselves and their organisations. This relationship with the interviewee was 
delicate and, whilst further information was elicited through questioning, the 
interviewee was never pushed to provide further details when appearing to be 
uncomfortable about an issue. 
 
The data gathered often contained highly confidential, commercially sensitive data, 
as such it needed to be handled with care, ensuring that all conditions of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 were complied with as well as the Economic and Social 
Research Council (2012) ethical guidance. 
 
Additionally, Economic and Social Research Council grant holders are required to 
offer their data to the ESRC Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS) 
(Economic and Social Research Council, 2010). This creates two issues; 
informing the interviewee and ensuring it is suitable for archiving. These issues 
were addressed as part of the interviewee consent form, see Appendix 11.2.  
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the methodological approach undertaken in this 
research. The chapter outlines the author’s philosophical standpoint and the 
resulting approach to grounded theory. It also details the process that was followed 
in the data collection and analysis phases as well as the ethical considerations. 
Chapter 4 progresses this theoretical discussion in to the reality of the processes 
undertaken to complete this research.  
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4 METHODOLOGY – THE PRACTICE 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is not to provide a ‘blow by blow’ account of the data 
collection process, rather to highlight the narrative that evolved through the data 
collection. The chapter aims to provide reassurance to the reader of the integrity of 
this grounded theory research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:297) and provides a 
descriptive summary of my data collection and analysis process. 
 
This chapter also identifies some of the limitations of grounded theory in relation to 
the practical implementation of the processes and how this was managed within this 
research. 
 
4.2 Prior Preparation  
4.2.1 Self-Interview 
As identified in section 1.5, a core tenet of the grounded theory approach is that 
there should be no preconceptions in the research relating to potential theories 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967:185). However, I came to this research with a practical 
understanding of Boards and corporate governance, from previous work 
experience. In addition, I undertook studies on corporate governance as part of the 
preparation work for undertaking this research. As such, I did not come to this 
research as a tabula rasa (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:3) but with preconceptions; 
therefore I undertook a self-interview to ensure clarity of my position as suggested 
by Glaser (1998:120). 
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My self-interview was the first step in my data collection process or, to be more 
accurate, the final step of my preparation. As Birks and Mills (2011:59) state 
“By identifying your baseline position before you begin, you can work at 
consciously developing your theoretical sensitivity during the research 
process” 
The aim of the exercise is to illuminate the researcher’s prior knowledge and 
assumptions (Glaser, 1998:120).  By understanding one’s own pre-conceived 
knowledge and understanding, it becomes easier to, keep an open mind (Charmaz, 
2006:16). 
 
The self-interview was based around seven questions: 
 How did you come to be interested in this area? 
 What assumptions do you have? 
 What impact has the literature had upon you so far? 
 Philosophically, where do you stand? 
 What is your biggest fear about this research? 
 What are you struggling most with in regards to grounded theory? 
 What has been your biggest mistake to date? 
These questions were inspired by the required preparation for attending the 
Grounded Theory Institute’s “Trouble Shooting” course in Cork in February 2013 
(Scott, 2012). The questions were combined with Birks and Mills’ (2011:20) self-
interview questions.  
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Figure 11 - Assumptions Section of Self-Interview 
Figure 11 provides a sample of the overall self-interview memo. The initial memo 
was written over a number of days. It was added to during the early interview 
phases as the initial interviews were coded and the questions asked of the 
interviewee were reflected upon for pre-conceived biases in the questions. Over the 
coding phases this memo was referred back to so as to ensure unconscious bias 
was recognised and managed, as far as is possible (Glaser, 1998:120).  
 
As discussed in section 1.3, there is doubt within the grounded theory scholars as to 
whether it is possible for researchers to truly be a “tabula rasa [blank state]” 
(emphasis in original Glaser and Strauss, 1967:3). The use of this self-reflection 
memo enables  
“’triple loop’ learning to capture the notion of continual reflection on the 
learning [research] process, the contexts within which learning occurs, 
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and the assumptions and values motivating the learning and 
influencing its outcomes” (Yuthas et al., 2004:239) 
The articulation of my views and assumptions enabled me to reflect on my 
deeply held beliefs and their impact on this research. The process of self-
reflection also enabled me to identify my own philosophical stance and how 
that influences my approach to grounded theory, as discussed in section 
3.2.2. 
 
4.2.2 Interviewee Sampling 
In November 2012, I wrote to 122 UK Directors requesting interviews. These 
Directors were identified using the FAME Database searching for: 
 UK mainland based private companies with 
o Older than five years 
o Minimum of 100 employees 
o Five or more shareholders and a high independence rating, as 
assessed by the data provider BvD 
 A random selection from the 591 Directors in the sample frame 
I anticipated that this would provide me with a starting point for accessing Directors. 
Six of the letters were ‘returned to sender’ and four people replied. All four replied to 
apologise that they could not help with the research. As such, it was felt that this 
may not be the most productive method for recruiting participants to the study. 
 
Having worked in industry prior to beginning this research, I decided that a 
convenience sample might be a more effective way of recruiting participants. “A 
convenience sample is one that is simply available to the researcher by virtue of its 
   Methodology – The Practice  
 
80 
 
accessibility” (Bryman, 2008:183). As such, the initial contact list for interviewees 
was developed through a trawl of personal contacts. This provided a list of potential 
interviewees who were contacted; a proportion of whom agreed to be interviewed. 
To supplement this personal requests for interviewees, messages were placed on 
six LinkedIn groups, Facebook and Twitter. This resulted in a further four 
interviewees.  
 
In many cases, interviewees then provided contact details of other potential 
interviewees; thereby generating a ‘snowball’ method of recruiting participants 
(Bryman, 2008:184). Nonetheless, each interviewee was considered on the basis of 
theoretical sampling; that is to say before an interview was arranged consideration 
was given as to whether this interviewee was a suitable source to fill the identified 
data gap. On occasions this meant that potential interviewees were either not 
contacted or contacted later in the data collection phase when it was identified that 
there was a gap that they may be able to fill. 
 
In total 28 participants agreed to be interviewed in phase one of the data collection. 
A further three were identified during phase two of the data collection, utilising the 
same approaches. Two interviewees from phase one also agreed to be re-
interviewed in phase two.  
 
4.2.2.1 Interviewee Demographics 
Prior to beginning the discussion on demographics is it important to note that 
absolute confidentiality was an important factor in gaining access to the 
interviewees, as discussed in section 3.4.3 (Ethics). As such, this section deals with 
the overall demographic of the interviewees in both phase one and two together. In 
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addition, the data has been collated in such a way as to minimise the possibility of 
identification of an individual. To support the understanding of readers of this 
dissertation, vignettes of each of the interviewees are provided in appendix 11.1. 
The data taken for this section, and the vignettes, wherever possible came from the 
interviewees either during the interviews or during the process of arranging the 
interviews. Additional details were identified through; their company’s website, their 
LinkedIn profile or other career management websites. 
 
Across the two interview phases there were twleve female and nineteen male 
interviewees. The age range of the interviewees was estimated from publically 
available data, where not volunteered during the interview. Figure 12 illustrates the 
age demographics by gender. 
 
Figure 12 – Age Range of Interviewees by Gender 
The interviewees had an average of 12.53 years Board level experience, ranging 
from two to 37 years, as illustrated in Figure 13 (overleaf). 
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Figure 13 – Board Level Experience 
The interviewees’ primary roles included nine Board Chairs, eleven Non-Executive 
Directors, four Board level Executives, five information providers to Boards, one 
Board advisor and one industry/academic expert. Many of them also concurrently 
hold multiple Directorships in a variety of different organisations, as illustrated in 
Figure 14, thereby being able to draw on 68 current roles during the interview 
process. In addition, many of them also had prior experience of working on or for 
other Boards and overall they represented experiences from more than 100 Boards 
during their careers.  
 
Figure 14 – Interviewee Current Roles 
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In regards of the organisations for which the interviewees’ primary role was 
connected too, Figure 15 identifies both the organisation type and the industry. It 
should be noted that six of the interviewees were connected with one pension 
scheme for a major FTSE100 company, Picasso Trustee Board. In addition, two 
further interviewees were connected to one manufacturing organisation, Monet 
PLC.  
   
Figure 15 – No. of Interviewees by Organisation Type and Industry 
All of the interviewees had UK experience, additinally, a number of them also drew 
on international experiences from throughout their careers. The following brought 
specific overseas knowledge to the interview process, though it should be noted all 
of these interviewees’ used their international knowledge as a ‘foil’ for discussions 
about UK Boards: 
 Two Directors had extensive USA experience; one as a citizen who had 
moved between the UK and USA; and the other as a Director for a 
Fortune500 company 
 One interviewee was a recent immigrant to the UK from Australia and had 
Board experience in both countries 
 One Director (a UK national) specialised in enabling Chinese firms to list on 
the UK Stock Exchanges 
   Methodology – The Practice  
 
84 
 
In summary, the interviewees came from a wide variety of background and 
experiences. This adds breadth to the research finding as the data was drawn from 
a variety of sources, nonetheless, it does reduce the depth of the research within 
anyone arena. This compromise enabled the research to follow a natural path 
through the theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:45). 
 
4.2.3 The Pilot 
Birks and Mills (2011:75) advises grounded theorists to “[p]repare for your 
interviews by pilot testing your technique with a trusted colleague or supervisor”. In 
the case of this research, Prof Cherry was interviewed for pilot study, prior to 
beginning the formal interview phase. Prof Cherry is an academic and practitioner 
within the corporate governance field. He has extensive experience in both arenas 
and, as such, was a willing candidate for my pilot interview.  
 
As identified by Birks and Mills (2011:75) the aim of the interview was to test my 
technique. I have undertaken thousands of ‘consultancy-style’ business interviews, 
however, academic unstructured interviews require a slightly different technique. 
This is partly due to the motivation of the interviewee; in a consultancy exercise the 
interviewee is predominately there at their organisation’s request, conversely in this 
research the interviewee had self-selected to partake in the research. As such, the 
interviewees for this research tended to be more open, and giving, with information 
than I usually found in consultancy interviews. Additionally, in consultancy 
interviews I generally had an understanding of the interviewee’s background and 
organisational context, however, in these interviews I had only a limited 
understanding of the interviewee’s context. This contextual understanding allowed 
for more focused questioning in the consultancy interviews, whereas the interviews 
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for this dissertation relied significantly more on listening in the interview, thereby 
enabling quality questions to be developed throughout the interview. 
 
The interview was undertake in the café at Prof Cherry’s university. Initially, this was 
a quiet environment and the interviewee was easy to hear. However, half way into 
the interview was the break time between lectures, at this point it became extremely 
difficult to hear him as multiple classes of students arrived for coffee. This provided 
my first learning lesson; be sure of the environment for the duration of the interview.  
 
For this interview, I developed an interview protocol with a guide to be used 
throughout. This approach is in line with Leblanc and Gilles’ (2005:270) approach, 
where they identified four initial questions, with sub-questions, for their pilot. The 
guide was designed to reflect Prof Cherry’s unique academic and practitioner roles, 
it contained the following questions: 
1. What is your view on the role of the Board? 
2. What is your view on the role of the Independent Director? 
3. What information do you think an Independent Director needs, outside of the 
accountancy data, and why? (Definition: “information created outside the 
formal accounting system”) 
4. What issues do you perceive around non-financial information? 
5. What governance theory(ies) do you agree with and why? 
During the interview, it quickly became apparent that these questions were neither 
helpful nor useful in the interview. The guide contained too many assumptions in 
relation to the topic; for example that there is a difference between how Directors 
interact with financial and non-financial information.  
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During the interview the discussion was recorded and notes were taken. However, 
during the interview I realised that I was attempting to write the interview verbatim in 
my field notes. This gave the interview a stilted tone as I paused to write comments 
down. It quickly became obvious that I needed to focus more on the interviewee and 
less on the notes. The original field notes can be seen in appendix 11.4 - note, 
these have been edited for confidentiality only. 
 
Upon returning home after the interview, the aim was that the recording would be 
uploaded to my laptop and transcribed. Unfortunately, my digital recorder was old 
and the download software was no longer available. Eventually, with significant 
assistance, the recording was transferred from the recorder to the computer. The 
next lesson learnt was to upgrade my recorder, which was done, and the newly 
purchased machine was checked to ensure that the recordings could be easily 
transferred to a computer.  
 
Initially I attempted to transcribe the interview. During the transcription process I 
realised that I regularly typed what I thought Prof Cherry has said and not what he 
actually said. In addition, I discovered that I am very slow at transcribing. As such, a 
low cost transcription service was sourced, who provided a mid-quality transcription; 
the transcript was then checked through, amended where necessary and 
anonymised as required. This approach enabled the bulk of the work to be 
outsourced but the fine details to be managed by me. This ensured that I stayed 
close to the data but that it was accurate representation of the interview. As the 
turnaround time for transcription service was three days this proved to be only a 
small delay in the data process. 
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After the interview a memo was written reflecting on the process. The initial memo 
was supplemented with a further memo after the transcript had been completed. 
This highlighted a number of key areas for improvement of my interview technique. 
Firstly, I needed to concentrate more on listening to the interviewee, in contrast with 
the amount of both notes taken and comments made during the interview. 
Secondly, I needed to be more careful with the questions, not just the questions on 
the guide, as discussed above, but the follow on questions.  
 
The field notes were imported into NVivo and coded. This was in line with Glaser 
(1998:113), who states that “field notes in the researchers own words are enough 
for illustrating generated hypothesis”. This produced 46 codes with a total of 96 
references, see list in appendix 11.5. Upon reflecting on the codes, it was clear that 
many of them were descriptive and not insightful. At this point, I tried coding the 
transcript, which created 76 codes and 142 references. Nonetheless they were still, 
in many cases, descriptive. In short, I had forgotten that code labels are usually 
gerunds to focus on the action and that this helps to prevent them being too 
descriptive (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007c:136, Charmaz, 2006). 
 
At this point I stopped and spent some time reflecting on the issue. It became clear 
that I was, as Glaser (1998:126) describes it, “studying the wrong problem”. I had 
assumed two significant variables:  
 Executive and Non-Executive Directors information engagement was 
different 
 The Directors engaged with financial information differently from non-
financial information. 
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Prof Cherry (January 2013) clearly identified that, under UK law, a Director holds 
the same legal responsibility whether they are Executive or Non-Executive. This, as 
he identified, has been the case “for a good hundred years.  It’s been reinforced 
hugely in the 2006 Company’s Act” (Prof Cherry, January 2013).  
 
Prof Cherry went on to identify that Executive Directors have a significantly more 
information than Non-Executive and this, in its own way, prevents the Executive 
Directors from looking strategically at the organisation and keeps them looking at an 
operational level. He also acknowledged that Non-Executive Directors often have 
full time Executive roles outside of the organisation. Directors are often provided 
with extremely large packs of Board reports, as well as supplementing that with 
external information, and Prof Cherry asked “How on earth can they begin to make 
any sense, get any patter, any gestalt out of that data, so they can turn it into 
information?” (January 2013). 
 
With regards to the financial/non-financial split, Prof Cherry explained that 
“I’m not sure it’s wise to even split it up like that because I’m not sure 
most Boards actually deal with the financial information very well either. 
It is assumed that everybody must know it but there are an awful lot of 
people sitting around the table who are bluffing. All talking [expletive]. 
And I see this all the time.  So I personally think it’s much easier [for 
Directors] to just agree with everybody. But for the most part we don’t 
know much about the financials.”  (January 2013) 
 
In summary, my pilot interview identified that, with regards to technique I needed to 
focus more on listening during the interview. I also needed to ensure I coded more 
effectively, specifically ensuring that I looked at processes and activities. Therefore, 
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the codes created at this stage were deleted. Finally, and most importantly, that I 
was looking at the wrong problem and that the issue is far broader, and more 
complex, than first thought (Glaser, 1998:129).  
 
4.3 Phase One 
4.3.1 Data Collection - Interviews 
The first data collection phase began with Mr Poplar in February 2013 and 
continued through to Mr Pine in November 2013. The first five interviews, Mr Poplar, 
Ms Maple, Mr Ironwood, Ms Willow and Mr Cedar were general fact-finding 
interviews. The aim of these interviews was to understand the landscape of the 
problem area.  
 
After each interview, and all subsequent interviews, the recording was transcribed, 
verified, anonymised and coded. On a small number of occasions the next interview 
was undertaken prior to the coding of the previous interview. In all cases this was 
due to the interviewee’s availability in relation to the previous interviewee, in short, 
access to interviewees was given priority over the detailed coding process. 
Nonetheless, the field notes and memos written after each interview were consulted 
prior to the next interview in each of these cases.  
 
Mr Ironwood was a former information provider to a FTSE100 pension Board, 
Picasso Trustee Board. The pension Board was a legal entity in its own right and 
had seven members of the Board. Through Mr Ironwood, access was granted to 
interview four Trustee Directors, Mr Hawthorn, Mr Boxelder, Mr Chestnut and Ms 
Magnolia, as well as one further current information provider, Mr Elm. This provided 
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the opportunity to see one Board from multiple perspectives, thereby enabling 
triangulation within the theoretical sampling process (Glaser, 1978:49).  
 
In parallel with this, two interviews were conducted with people from organisations 
with unusual company structures. Mr Hickory is an information provider to a Board 
which is responsible for both a Limited company and a charity. Mr Hemlock is a 
CEO of a newly formed spin-off company that was in the process of creating a 
Board. Both of these interviewees were selected for their ability to provided different 
viewpoint on the research area.  
 
At this stage, time was taken to reflect on the process so far and to review the 
coding. The first memo sorting was undertaken and a number of key issues were 
identified. The codes that had been created through the coding of Prof Cherry’s 
(January 2013) interview were deleted prior to Mr Poplar’s (February 2013) 
interview. This enabled a coding book to be developed for the sampled 
interviewees, free from the previous assumptions. The coding for each interviewee 
was iterative, as such, Mr Poplar generated approximately 25 codes, however, by 
the time that Mr Elm (March 2013) was coded, Mr Poplar’s interview was linked to 
over 30 codes. This was due to the constant comparison of each interview with the 
previous interviews, whereby, when a new code was generated it was checked 
against previous interviews to identify if this topic had previously been raised. The 
use of coding cards, as illustrated in Figure 7 (page 66), facilitated the constant 
comparison of the codes.  
 
After the first twelve interviews a number of the 70 or so codes generated had 
started to group together to form categories. However, most of the codes, and all of 
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the categories, lacked clear dimensions and properties. As such, further data 
collection was required. 
 
In May 2013, a campaigning organisation focusing on increasing diversity on the 
Board allowed me access to their recruitment website. This website allowed 
members to post basic CV’s of their Board experience for potential Board recruiters 
to view. The organisation gave me permission to approach a small number of 
suitable candidates for interview. Eleven potential interviewees were approached 
and six agreed to be interviewed. The interviewees were chosen for their diversity of 
experience, Board roles and Board types. Whilst it is usual in grounded theory to 
select data sources (interviewees) one at a time, given the limited window of 
opportunity it was felt best to arrange the interviews allowing for as much variety as 
possible, then focus on the data gaps. As such, Ms Juniper, Ms Elderberry, Ms 
Ginkgo, Ms Persimmon, Ms Camellia and Ms Lilac were all interviewed in May 
2013. These interviews were both general, to ensure that no problem areas were 
overlooked, and specific to help fill gaps within the data collection phase. 
 
Ms Silverbell is an Executive Director for a large NHS Trust and, upon hearing 
about this research from third party, volunteered to be interviewed in July 2013. This 
interview proved to be a pivotal point in the data collection phase. As well as 
providing useful information in term of the codes, Ms Silverbell noted that the NHS 
Chirico Trust “has regular Board meetings that are formal and held in public” (July 
2013). From this it was established that the NHS are required to hold all Board 
meetings in public and that they can be observed. This provided me with the 
opportunity to see Board meetings in practise; which is further discussed in section 
4.3.2. 
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The 21st interview was with Mr Buckeye, who had also heard about this research 
from a third party. This interview, whilst interesting, provided little further data. As 
such, the data collection effort was paused briefly for reflection.  
 
The next interviewee, Mr Fothergilla, is a Chair of a major FTSE100 company. His 
experience and knowledge enabled a number of gaps to be filled within the 
categories and codes. Nevertheless, there were still outstanding gaps. A number of 
potential interviewees were contacted via LinkedIn – an online professional 
networking site. This resulted in a further, final six interviews with; Mr Mulberry, Mr 
Linden, Mr Cedrela, Mr Larch, Mr Oak and Mr Pine.  
 
4.3.2 Data Collection - Observations 
Ms Silverbell’s (July 2013) comment that NHS Boards meet in public provided an 
opportunity to understand the dynamics of the Boardroom in action. The 
observations not only provided new data but offered the opportunity to verify some 
of the comments made by interviewees. As Glaser (1998:8) identifies “All is Data”, 
as such this facilitated the gathering of alternative data. 
 
NHS Boards conduct the majority of their business in public. Two large local NHS 
Trusts were selected for observation. Curie NHS Trust meets monthly with three 
hours of the meeting being open to the public and the final hour in private. The 
private session is reserved for sensitive discussions, for example named patient 
issues. Pasteur NHS Trust, in contrast, meets in public every alternate Board 
meeting. Over a three month period from September 2013 to November 2013 five 
meeting were observed; three of Curie NHS Trust’s and two of Pasteur Trust’s. A 
full description of the access process can be found in section 3.3.3.3. 
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During the initial observations at Curie NHS Trust, the Directors were initially 
conscious of being observed, however, this lessened once the Board meeting was 
in full flow. During these observations there were usually only one to two other 
observers. In contrast, Pasteur NHS Trust Boards had ten to 15 observers and 
appeared comfortable with the open nature of the meetings. 
 
In the meeting every Board member was allocated a code based on where they sat 
in the first observed meeting and their role, for example, 1 DF was Seat 1 - Director 
of Finance. The agenda and papers were published on the internet seven days 
before the meeting in all but one case, the second Pasteur Trust’s were posted four 
days before the meeting. These were reviewed prior to the meeting, however, only a 
copy of the agenda was taken to the meeting itself.  
 
The meeting was observed for; discussion, interaction, apparent preparedness and 
body language. During the meeting copious field notes were made. Immediately 
upon returning home the notes were typed up. The notes for each agenda item 
were separated in to notes about the agenda item and notes about what was going 
on in the Boardroom (in italics), see Figure 16, overleaf, for a sample of a field note. 
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Figure 16 - Observation Memo Sample from Curie NHS Observation 1 
The observations provided the opportunity to not only verify the previous 
interviewees’ comments but to see Directors undertaking their role in context; 
acknowledging the limitations discussed in section 3.3.3.3 (page 60). The Board 
meetings had 12 or 13 attendees in the case of Curie NHS Trust and 16 or 18 in the 
case of Pasteur NHS Trust. At the meetings there were a small number of people 
engaged in the conversations, this was particularly evident in the case of Pasteur 
NHS Trust.  
 
The meetings contained standing agenda items, such as the review of the minutes. 
Reports were presented by both Board members, such as the Director of Finance, 
and invited guests, internal and external to the NHS Trust. The Board’s level of 
engagement varied in relation to the report and the presenter.   
 
The field notes were coded in line with the interviewee process. The observations in 
some cases strengthened or clarified the interviewees’ points. In contrast, the 
observations contradicted the interviewees’ comments; for example, Mr Fothergilla 
(September 2013) asserted that Board members “came prepared, having read the 
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paperwork”, however, in the observed Boards this did not appear to always be the 
case. 
 
4.3.3 Data Collection – Technical Meetings 
Across phases one and two of the data collection, four technical meetings were 
undertaken, as described in section 3.3.3.2. These meetings were, as previously 
described, unstructured conversations with subject matter experts who specialised 
in a particular aspect identified within the coding. The interviews straddled the first 
and second phases of the data collection. The meetings were not recorded and field 
notes were used to record the key points of the conversation. These were expanded 
on immediately after the meeting and then coded. 
 
The first technical meeting was with Mr Yellowwood, with the specific objective of 
understanding why individuals chose to be on a Board. The aim was to further 
understand what attracts, and retains them on the Board. This was to provide 
context to the interviews. 
 
The second, Mr Fir, and third, Mr Cypress, both are experts in Board software. The 
use of ‘Tablets’, e.g. iPads, within the Board was a regular topic mentioned by 
interviewees. These meetings, straddling phases one and two, were designed to 
provide further insight into the software on offer and how it works.  
 
Finally, Mr Walnut is in the process of setting up a company to provide smaller 
organisations with access to experienced Non-Executive Directors. This 
conversation was particularly focused on the value of experience in relation to Non-
Executive Directors. 
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4.4 Phase Two – Further Clarification 
Phase one culminated in a number of issues and potential storylines. As these 
storylines started to emerge further clarification was sought from the interviewees 
and a one page feedback report was developed for the interviewees. This phase is 
further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Comments were received via email from four of the phase one interviewees. 
Additionally two of the initial interviewees were re-interviewed based on the findings. 
A further three interviews were conducted at this stage, using the one page report to 
structure the interview. All of this data was coded as per the process outlined 
previously.  
 
4.5 Next Steps 
This chapter has described the methodology in terms of the steps undertaken in this 
grounded theory study by this researcher to generate the data for this research. The 
rest of the dissertation focuses on the data collected and the evolution of the theory. 
However, prior to developing the theory, chapter 5 follows the journey of a ‘Board 
Pack’ to provide the context for the theoretical development and chapter 6 provides 
an insight into the context of the Boardroom.  
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5 THE JOURNEY OF A BOARD PACK 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the journey of a ‘Board Pack’ to provide the context 
for the rest of this dissertation. This chapter is drawn from the initial interviews, 
meetings and observations undertaken prior to the member checking stage. The 
Board pack is a colloquial term for the collated reports that are provided to the 
individual Board members (Directors) in advance of the Board meeting. These 
packs will usually include reports such as; previous minutes, the financials, the 
CEO’s report and items of note. The Board pack is the Board’s, in particular the 
Non-Executive Director’s, primary source of information about the organisation. 
 
This section splits the journey of the pack into three 
distinct phases; pre-distribution, individual 
processing and Board processing. Each phase has 
a number of individual stages within it, as illustrated 
in Figure 17. 
 
This chapter uses data collected and grey literature 
to highlight the key aspects and issues of the 
journey. 
 
 
 
Figure 17 - The Journey of a Board Pack 
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5.2 Pre-Distribution 
5.2.1 Need for Individual Papers Identified 
The Board pack development begins well in advance of the Board meeting. The 
reports vary in nature and include: regular reports; cyclical reports; specific reports 
requested by the Board; and reports identified within the organisation that senior 
employees identify that the Board needs to understand.  
 
The first action is for the agenda to be set, Mr Oak (November 2013) describes how 
this process begins 
“Well there are two ways really. One is there is actually a sort-of rhythm 
and a calendar and the drum beat is often financial results. So that 
sort-of provides one frame of reference. There is then undoubtedly 
periodic reflection of strategy that needs to be woven in and then what I 
like to do is make sure there is an opportunity to reflect, to scan back 
on particular businesses and reflect on them as businesses and maybe 
also key functions. Then finally there are the inevitable topical issues 
that come up that the Board needs to think about and you need to 
weave all that together and make sure that during the course of the 
year you’ve covered all that ground, in a sensibly balanced way.”  
 
It is this cycle of annual activities, such as the annual report, that provides the 
rhythm to the meeting. Whilst this cycle provides the core of the meeting, there are 
judgements to be made for each meeting as to the exact contents of it. Mr Larch 
(November 2013) identifies how he goes about this process 
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“I sat down [today] as I would ordinarily ahead of a Board meeting 
coming up in two weeks’ time actually…and set the agenda. [I] Look at 
the agenda, look what needs to be on it, what we need to be covering 
off.  What the outstanding issues are.  And the level of the detail again 
that we need to have on that agenda to keep it punchy, to keep it 
appropriate from a strategic perspective and any operational issues 
that they need to be aware of and performance indicators, etc., that the 
Board needs to be considering.”  
 
Under the UK Corporate Governance Code “the chairman is responsible for 
setting the agenda” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:8). However, Mr Pine 
(November 2013), a Chairman, identifies that he sets the agenda with the 
Company Secretary. Alternatively, Mr Poplar (February 2013) and Ms 
Juniper (May 2013), both Chairs, set the agenda in conjunction with the 
CEO. In contrast, Ms Persimmon (May 2013), as a CEO, sets the agenda on 
her own. In summary, from the interviews, there are three key players; the 
Chair, the CEO and the Company Secretary; in almost all cases, there is a 
three-way discussion to finalise the agenda, usually undertaken by 
telephone. Other Directors do have the opportunity, and the authority, to 
request that items to be added to the agenda, however, this very rarely 
happens (Ms Magnolia, March 2013). 
 
At this stage, the paper type is identified, these are generally separated into, 
for example; ‘for decision’, ‘for report’, ‘for approval’ and ‘for note’ (Ms 
Ginkgo, May 2013; Pasteur NHS Trust; Currie NHS Trust). This classification 
is dependent on the desired outcome from the Board and the appropriate 
time is then allocated to each paper within the meeting. 
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5.2.2 Papers Created 
Once the agenda is agreed upon, the relevant individual papers are created. 
Ms Camellia (May 2013) identifies that 
“the content of Board papers will vary, depending on the organisation 
and the person who’s preparing it.  So different people will take 
different approaches so, for example, the Finance Director will 
generally provide a very factual kind of objective, cost benefit analysis, 
that kind of thing and sometimes understanding a bit more colour of 
where the proposal fits, so for example if it’s a proposal for a capital 
expenditure or it’s a strategic paper for discussion, depending on who 
has prepared it, there will be enough information in it for you to 
understand fully kind of, or at least in advance of the Board meeting, 
where it fits within the company’s thinking strategy.” 
 
The author of the paper may be either a member of staff or an external supplier; it is 
very rare for a Non Executive Director to author a paper.  
 
The format of the papers varies widely. Ms Gingko (May 2013) identified that the 
papers she received had a very set format with a “covering page, the background 
papers, the purpose of it, and what the presenter is asking the Board to do...  And at 
the very end that person’s contact details if you have any questions”. In contrast, 
others had no set format and received the papers in a variety of mediums including, 
for example, MS Excel, MS Word and MS PowerPoint documents. Some papers, in 
particular performance reports, often report trends; whilst others may be more 
narrative in format. Ms Maple (February 2013) noted that the papers have evolved 
over the years as both needs and styles have changed. Cadbury (2002:85) 
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recommends that “[r]eports should be presented in a consistent form to save the 
time of the Board members and to enable straight forward comparisons to be 
made”; though he goes on to express that Board members should “be encouraged 
to express their views on presentation” (2002:85). 
 
The papers, once drafted, in most cases had an approval process to pass through 
before being included in the final pack. For example, Ms Silverbell (July 2013), an 
Executive Director, identified that she would “proof read and sign off papers that 
come from my [her] team”.  
 
Many of the Chairs interviewed noted that they ran the Board on the basis of “no 
surprises” (Mr Poplar, February 2013; Ms Juniper, May 2013). As such, if the paper 
contained anything “controversial or difficult [then]… often we’ll [they’ll] see 
iterations of papers before they get finalised” (Ms Silverbell, July 2013). 
 
5.2.3 Pack Collation and Distributed 
Once individual papers have been approved, the pack is collated in readiness for 
distribution. Changes in technology are influencing the structure and style of the 
papers (Mr Fir, October 2013; Ms Yew, February 2014). The papers traditionally 
were printed and posted to the Board members (Mr Ironwood, February 2013). 
However, the study has found that an increasing number of directors request the 
papers to be provided in electronic format (Mr Buckeye, August 2013; Mr Hemlock, 
March 2013). This varies from simply attached to an email to the use of a bespoke 
Board management software package. The move to electronic Board packs has two 
drivers as Mr Ironwood (January 2014) identifies 
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“It started because of wastage, so I was concerned that we were 
printing I think it was 16 packs of about 2 inches worth of 
documentation and of those packs all bar one were being shredded 
after the meeting and so I had a two-fold [motivation], one was I didn’t 
like the wastage and the paper and secondly I didn’t like the cost of the 
printing and the binding, the time taken and I felt that going for an 
electronic medium would be cheaper for the company in the long run 
and also environmentally better.”   
 
The move to electronic distribution has allowed Board members to access the 
papers quicker (Mr Birch, January 2014). This is due to not needing to allow for the 
postage time. Typically, the Board pack is posted, or couriered, seven days before 
the meeting date (Mr Larch, November 2013). Though this is not always the case, 
as Mr Cedar (February 2013) highlighted that sometimes it is "far too short notice, in 
a panic at the end”. Mr Fothergilla (October 2013) requires that the Board members 
should receive the papers prior to the weekend in advance of the meeting; thereby 
assuming that the Board members will read the pack over the weekend.  
 
The size of the board pack varies considerably, for example Mr Ironwood (January 
2014) described them as being two inches thick but in contrast, Mr Cedrela 
(October 2013) describing his as a “dozen sheets of the key things”. The largest 
pack described was by Mr Oak (November 2013) who identified his as being “1,200 
pages and it is crazy!” he went on to note that “it’s not done deliberately at all but is 
has the effect of burying the Non-Execs”. 
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In regards to format, Ms Elderberry (May 2013) stated that she did not “have any 
particular hang ups about particular formats … I’m really not interested”. However, 
Ms Maple noted that the Board packs for one of her Boards were  
“the most beautiful Board papers I’ve [she had] ever met, … they’re 
colour coded, so strategic papers are blue, regular reporting is pink, 
finance is green, everything else is white, helps keep it all together, 
they’re beautiful...” 
  
It is important to note that; 
“Under the direction of the chairman, the company secretary’s 
responsibilities include ensuring good information flows within the 
Board and its committees and between senior management and non-
executive directors” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:13) 
In the case of Mr Hickory (February 2013) the CEO acted as the “gate keeper” and 
managed the paper production process. The CEO, in this case, was the focal point 
for all communication with the Board members. However, in most cases the 
Company Secretary undertakes this gate keeper role. As such, it is usually the 
Company Secretary that formally distributes the Board pack.  
 
5.3 Individual Processing 
5.3.1 Pack Read and Annotated 
Upon receipt of the pack, each interviewee approached the processing phase 
uniquely. Some interviewees highlighted specific routines and processes; where as 
others were more laissez-faire. For example, Ms Elderberry (May 2013) described 
her process as 
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 “I read all the papers twice and I read them the first time just to get a 
feel for them and I read them fairly quickly and then I go back and re-
read them in detail”  
In contrast, Mr Chestnut (February 2013) stated that he 
“would certainly [sic] to make sure I understood all the papers and why 
they were and the purpose of them being on the agenda but I might not 
read literally them all verbatim, word for word, I would pick up things I 
thought I needed to question or challenge”  
 
Ms Persimmon (May 2013) specified that she planned in advance to ensure that 
she had sufficient time in her diary to fully read the papers as “you're not doing 
yourself or the organisation justice if you don’t get through them all”. Ms Juniper 
(May 2013) for example will 
“typically take them somewhere and sit and read them over a period of 
an hour.  So getting out of the office and the distraction of emails and 
just focussing on them, yeah, so in a stand-alone setting”  
Ms Silverbell (July 2013) noted that her, and most of her fellow Executives, 
usually read the papers at home as there was not time during office hours to 
focus on them.  
 
The order and focus placed on individual papers varied by interviewee. Mr 
Boxelder (February 2013) noted that he “read through the papers in 
chronological order”, which was common to many of the Chairs interviewed. 
In contrast, Mr Cedar (February 2013), a Non Executive Director, stated that 
“I obviously pay particular interest and attention to things that would be 
most in my area of interest …I tend to look more carefully at those and 
sometimes do a bit of additional research to see if I can find out more, 
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… so through other means I tried to find out as much about it as I 
could.”  
Mr Elm (March 2013) also identified that other Directors have an expectation the 
Board member who is experienced in that area will have a more thorough 
understanding of the paper.  
 
Ms Gingko (May 2013) highlighted the importance to her of thoroughly 
reading the papers though. She explained that she 
“read them properly because if I don’t I won’t get the gist, and then 
when they talk about it I can’t put an informed decision through or an 
answer, or ask appropriate questions if I don’t really know what they’re 
talking about.”  
Mr Fothergilla (October 2013) stated that he read the pack for two purposes; firstly 
to be informed and secondly to ensure the suitable allocation of time to the 
discussions. 
 
During the process of reading through, most of the interviewees revealed that they 
made notes in advance of the meetings. Ms Juniper (May 2013) identified that she 
makes her “own notes and comments about what I want to question or any points I 
want to make”. The method of note taking varied by interviewee, for example Ms 
Elderberry (May 2013) described her process 
“I usually make notes, not electronically, on the [printed] agenda of 
specific points or questions or whatever that I have got that I want to 
make and I do that on the agenda rather than in the papers and then I 
mark the papers, I put on the Board agenda, item 3 might be page 3 or 
section twelve or whatever it is just to remind myself of where it is.”  
 The Journey of a Board Pack 
 
106 
 
Others, such as Mr Linden (October 2013) made notes on the electronic copy. This 
appeared to be personal preference, with the main decision being based on 
personal convenience.  
 
Once the papers have been read some of the interviewees highlighted that they 
occasionally have questions which require further information before the Board 
meeting.  
 
5.3.2 Further Data Sourced  
Under the UK Corporate Governance Code Directors are required to “seek 
clarification or amplification where necessary” (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014:13). Ms Camellia (May 2013) stated that she regularly requested further 
information 
“One of my tactics is often to have an offline conversation with the 
member of the executive team who is presenting a paper, just to make 
sure that I really understand what they’re talking about.  And that allows 
me also just to get a bit more of an informal feel for things that they 
might not have put in the paper.”  
In contrast, Ms Juniper (May 2013) identified that her Board members would very 
rarely request further information.  
 
Conversely, Mr Fothergilla (October 2013) explicitly elicits the need for further 
information from his Directors. His process is to allow the Directors time to read the 
pack then 
“Having read the paperwork properly, digested it and thought about 
what they want to talk about and my usual practice, … is to ring all the 
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Non-Executive Directors and have a sort of pre-Board meeting chat 
about what they thought was important, what particularly fussed them, 
what they thought the Board papers missed out on, not in any sense in 
order to rig the discussion but so that I can then alert the Executives 
about the fact that ‘Fred’s a bit worried about such and such and 
‘Elizabeth’ thought that maybe you should of given us a paper on X 
because she is a bit worried about it’, that sort of thing, so that the 
executive is prepared about the big things that are going to be raised at 
the Board meeting.”  
 
Directors also noted that they would incorporate information from outside the Board 
pack and the organisation itself. Ms Camellia (May 2013) noted that whilst the 
Directors “all have our own specialism’s,… [they] keep an eye on the news and that 
kind of thing to … input into those decisions”. This broader knowledge and the 
“various skills and disciplines and backgrounds relevant” (Mr Cedar, February 2013) 
to the organisation that the Directors bring supports them in interpreting the Board 
pack. 
 
The use of bespoke Board pack software has also provided an efficient method for 
requesting information. Some Board pack software provides a ‘chat’ style area 
within the software where Directors can post comments and the paper’s author can 
respond for all the Board members to see (Mr Fir, October 2013). 
 
At this stage, the Directors are usually prepared for the Board meeting with 
sufficient knowledge, in their personal opinion, to contribute to the discussion (Mr 
Poplar, February 2013). 
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5.4 Board Processing 
The majority of Boards discussed by the interviewees meet in person, with some 
using telephone calls either for the meeting, especially where the Board members 
are international, or for between meeting catch ups. Though, most Directors noted 
that they had little contact with each other between meetings (Mr Cedar, February 
2013).  
 
The number of Board meeting per year varied from once every six months (Mr 
Hemlock, March 2013) to monthly (Ms Camellia, May 2013). The majority of the 
Boards represented by the interviewees met either quarterly or bi-monthly. The 
length of meetings varied between Boards with most describing their meetings 
lasting between two and four hours. The observed meetings all lasted approximately 
three hours, except Pasteur NHS Trust’s first observed meeting which lasted two 
hours as it followed the Annual General Meeting (AGM). Mr Poplar (February 2013) 
noted that Board meetings should be “[i]deally a maximum three to four hours, if 
they go beyond that then that [is] when they get lost.” 
 
5.4.1 Processing in Meeting 
Pasteur NHS Trust and Currie NHS Trusts’ meeting agendas clarified the action 
expected for each item on the agenda, for example; ‘to note’, ‘review’, ‘discuss’. Mr 
Elm (March 2013) highlighted that the Board pack has  
“a number of sections, so we have a section which is just documents 
‘for noting’ so those don’t typically get discussed, but they’re an 
opportunity to share sort of governance items or information that 
trustees probably should have or might find useful, but it’s not 
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necessarily for them to sort of formally review it as part of the meeting. 
And almost some of it is just the fact that there isn’t an issue, you know, 
so it’s sort of... and if there were issues in that we would raise them, but 
otherwise the papers are just ‘for noting’.” 
 
This separation of types of papers allows the Board discussions to be focused and 
for all Directors to be clear on the expected outcome or action. This is translated in 
to the time allocated for each paper during the meeting, as Mr Fothergilla (October 
2013) explains 
“each item on the agenda has a time slot allotted to it… at the start of 
the meeting is [I] say, ‘look you have got a big agenda, I think the 
things we really need to focus on are A, B, C and D’ and I hope that 
they are going to get through the other ones very quickly, so I try and 
steer it, so you don’t spend long going through the minutes of the last 
meeting, you don’t have hours on matters arising, you don’t spend too 
much time on the boiler plate stuff and make sure that you do focus 
on the areas where you know you need to spend the time.” 
This enables the Chair to manage the meeting effectively. Nonetheless, on 
occasions the discussion go on longer than timetabled and “it's down to me [Mr 
Fothergilla] as a Chairman to sense that” (Mr Fothergilla, October 2013). In all of the 
observed meetings the agenda over ran with the latter topics, usually the 
subcommittee reports, rushed through or not discussed.  
 
In the meeting the style of paper delivery varied, for example; 
“it will sometimes be presented or it will be taken as read and maybe 
some additional comments added.  There’s then a fairly general 
discussion around the table.  The [Holbein Ltd] is an interesting 
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example, because quite often what's being discussed will be industry 
specific and there are some industry experts around the table, so quite 
often we’ll ask for their input and we’ll listen to what they have to say.” 
(Ms Camellia, May 2013)  
The presenter of the report will sometimes be a Board member, on other occasions 
a non-Board member may be invited to present. In the case of Picasso Trust PLC 
the presenters at various times included lawyers, advisors and suppliers (Mr 
Ironwood, February 2013). During observations of Curie and Pasteur NHS Trust 
Boards the presenter was, in most cases, sat at the open end of the ‘horse shoe’ of 
the Board table and they presented from there.   
 
The term “taken as read” was used often when referring to papers under discussion. 
During the Board observations, this usually caused a bout of page turning as the 
Directors read/refreshed themselves on the papers content. It was observed that, 
when this phrase was used, less attention was paid to the presenter compared to 
when the presenter précised the paper’s contents.  
 
During the meetings a variety of technologies were observed. Mr Linden (October 
2013) noted that he takes his tablet, in his case an iPad, into the meeting. During 
the observations tablets and laptops were used by the Board members in the 
meeting, as well as the occasional smart phone. Nonetheless, most observed 
Directors still referred to the paper copies in the meeting.  
 
5.4.2 Outputs 
The outputs from meetings included;  
 Noted but not mentioned, e.g. the Director’s conflict of interest report 
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 Mentioned and noted – sometimes with minor queries - e.g. financial report 
 Discussed and an action identified e.g. staff survey and resulting actions 
 A request for further information e.g. strategic review 
 
In the case of a request for further information, this was usually for one of two 
reasons, either; the information provided was insufficient or it was a complex issue. 
In the case for the former, this was generally identified early in the discussion and 
the discussion was terminated at that point. However, in the case of a complex 
issue the discussion often filled the allotted time and many of the Directors 
contributed to the discussion. Mr Chestnut (February 2013) described how one such 
issue was managed 
“The way that particular project has worked and most others is that it 
effectively gets together a sort of sub-group so that the heavy lifting is 
done by three or four people and then any recommendations or 
decisions are taken before Board for discussion and if they need 
clarification.” 
A number of interviewees mentioned the use of sub-groups or, as Mr 
Hawthorn (February 2013) described them “ad hoc committee created for 
that [a] specific purpose”, to assist the Board in coming to a conclusion (e.g 
Ms Maple, February 2013; Mr Linden, October 2013; Mr Larch, November 
2013). 
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5.5 Summary 
The journey of a Board pack has three distinct phases with stages within each one. 
The journey has a number of inputs and one set of outputs as summarised in Figure 
18.  
 
This journey provides the backdrop for the categories and conceptualisation 
identified within this research. It begins the process of identifying the core category 
and the grounded theory of this research.  
 
 
Figure 18 – The Journey of a Board Pack with Inputs and Outputs 
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6 RETURNING TO THE DATA 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5 the journey of the Board pack was defined utilising the data collated 
through this research. This chapter will expand on the data collected by looking 
initially at the codes and categories identified in phase one of the data collection. 
This chapter will then go on the look at specific areas of the data collection where 
the early analysis identified gaps in the understanding.  
 
6.2 Codes and Categories 
As discussed in section 4.3, in phase one of the data collection there were 
interviews, observations and technical meetings. The interviewees included nine 
Board Chairs, ten Non-Executive Directors, four Board level Executives, three 
information providers to Boards, one Board advisor and one industry/academic 
expert. The observations were of two NHS Trusts’ Board meetings, for a total of five 
meetings. In addition, there were two technical meetings in this phase looking at 
specific issues identified in the interviews and observations.  
 
The data was coded after each data collection activity, as described in section 3.4. 
At the height of coding there were in the region of 110 codes, which were regularly 
reviewed, and amalgamated into 71 final codes. All of the code titles were either 
gerunds or in vivo titles. Through a series of sortings, that is to say grouping and re-
grouping of the codes, they were collated in to ten categories. These were then 
overlaid onto the ‘journey of a Board pack’ diagram, as can be seen in Figure 19 
(page 114). 
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Figure 19 – Journey of a Board Pack overlaid with Codes and Categories 
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As illustrated in Figure 19, there are a significant number of codes and categories. 
During the data collection, memos were written on; the codes, the categories and on 
groups of categories, as illustrated in appendix 11.2. These memos were sorted and 
resorted, with more memos written throughout the sorting phases (Glaser, 2012:31). 
These memos provide the starting process to identify the core category and, 
ultimately, the theory. The eventual aim is to move from the codes up to a 
conceptual level that identifies the underlying issue. As such, this chapter does not 
focus on individual codes, or even categories, but the higher level conceptualisation, 
as developed throughout the rest of this dissertation. 
 
During the latter stages of phase one, storylining began, as described in 3.4.3, 
utilising both written stories and diagrams. The storyline technique has two valuable 
attributes; as a process for developing the theory and as a tool for presenting the 
outcome of the grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 2011:118). Initially the 
developmental storylines were a combination of short memos and diagrams which 
evolved extensively over the early stages, as illustrated below. 
 
Figure 20 - Early Storyline Memos and Diagrams 
During the advanced coding stage, a number of gaps in the data were highlighted. 
As such, a return to the field was necessary to look at a small number of areas that 
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appeared to be underpinning key elements of the draft stories. These issues were 
around six specific codes: 
1. “Accessing Methods” – what impact is technology having on the individual’s 
process for accessing the Board pack? 
2. “Supporting Subcommittees” – How does the use of both standing and ad 
hoc subcommittees influence the Board’s processing? 
3. “Reading Through” – was there a gender difference in the reading through 
process? 
4. “Chairing Style – Perceiving the Role” – how critical was the relationship 
between the CEO and Chair? 
5. “Decision Making Method” – what was the impact of voting on the Board’s 
processes? 
6. “Enjoying the Role” – how much did being content in the role contribute to 
the individual’s level of preparation within the role? 
In order to gather more data on these six aspects, a one page summary sheet was 
produced (Figure 21, page 117) and sent to the phase one interviewees for 
comment. The summary focused primarily on codes one to three, as early storylines 
had identified them as being potentially important to the theory. The code titles were 
transformed into easily accessible language and described using quotes from the 
interviewees.  
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Figure 21 – Participant Feedback One Page Summary 
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As a consequence of the one page summary the further data was collected: 
 Three round one interviewees provided feedback on the summary via email 
– Mr Chestnut, Mr Cedar and Ms Camellia  
 Two round one interviewees agreed to have follow up interviews – Prof 
Cherry and Mr Ironwood 
 Three additional people were interviewed – Mr Birch, Ms Eucalyptus and Ms 
Yew 
 Two further technical meetings were undertaken; one with a Board software 
provider, Mr Cypress, and another with an entrepreneur setting up a Non-
Executive Director skills sharing scheme, Mr Walnut. 
All of this data was coded as per the process outlined previously.  
 
6.3 Further Data  
6.3.1 “Accessing Methods” - Disruptive Technology 
In the phase one interviews over half of the interviewees mentioned that either they 
themselves, or other members of their Board, used an iPad or other Tablet device. 
Almost all interviewees had the option of receiving the Board papers electronically. 
A number identified that they received them both electronically and in paper format.  
 
Nonetheless, the ability to have them in a format other than paper in itself created 
issues. As Interviewee Mr Larch (Nov 2013) identified that “it’s not a case of just 
issuing iPads … or anything else, it’s actually about a cultural change”. This cultural 
change stretches throughout the organisation from the Board members to the 
information providers. As one information provider identified, even simple aspects 
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such as the orientation of the page - landscape or portrait - needs to be considered 
when presenting electronic formats (Ms Yew, February 2014). Nonetheless, for the 
majority of interviewees the Board papers contents, size and style has not 
significantly changed as a result of the transfer to electronic versions.  
 
The interviewees identified a number of both positive and negative issues with 
regards to the incorporation of technology. Mr Birch (January 2014) highlighted that 
the use of electronic Board papers enabled him, as an information provider, to issue 
the papers to the Board two days earlier as he no longer had to allow for postage 
time. This allowed the Board members to have more time to read the papers prior to 
the meeting; however, it had the consequence of increasing Mr Birch’s expectations 
with regards to their level of preparedness.  
 
The issue of security was a major concern to a number of the interviewees. For 
many of the interviewees these security issues were solved by use the of a Third 
Party software solution that facilitated the management and distribution of the Board 
papers. As Mr Ironwood (2nd Interview, January 2014) explained one of the reasons 
for converting to an electronic Board pack software system was the increased data 
security compared with “just emailing documents”. The software is usually in the 
form of an electronic portal, hosted on a highly secure IT platform, where papers are 
uploaded to and the Directors can then access remotely. The access is, usually, 
controlled via a secure logging-in process (Mr Cypress, January 2014). Access to 
the papers is usually via laptops or Tablets and, occasionally, by mobile phone. 
 
The use of Third Party software, for some, also provided the solution of how to 
make notes on the papers themselves. All of the Board member interviewees 
identified that, when reviewing the Board papers in preparation for the meeting, they 
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made notes of thoughts, issues and questions they wished to raise. For some of the 
interviewees they found technology too restrictive to do this effectively (Ms 
Persimmon, May 2013). The majority of interviewees found that there was a 
compromise of having electronic papers and printing certain pages, for example “set 
of comparative graphs, [as] you can’t look at them on the same page because 
they’re separate pages of the report” (Mr Hawthorne, February 2013). 
 
The interviews and observations confirmed the increasing prevalence of technology 
within the Boardroom. This is consistent with the ‘grey literature’, such as trade 
journals, where there is extensive discussion of the use of, and value of, technology 
within the Boardroom, especially in relation to costs (for examples see Governance 
Institute of Australia, 2012, Skalkotos, 2011, Steinert-Threlkeld, 2013). 
Nevertheless, there has been relatively little academic research into how changes in 
technology affect Board members and their role at a governance level. 
 
Abraham (2012) asserts that information technology (IT) enables, and supports, 
governance processes. In her paper she identifies that IT can empower four aspects 
of decision making; gathering, storage, manipulation and transmission of 
information. Furthermore, Brandas (2011) concludes that with the complex 
information requirements of a governance system IT can provide effective support. 
Mr Cypress (January 2014), when describing the software his firm sells to Boards 
noted that, in his opinion, there are the following advantages: 
1. Better informed decisions due to better access to information 
2. More information of a relevant nature can be provided 
3. Audit trail of decisions and access to past precedents on issues 
4. Speed of decision making as items do not need to wait for the next meeting 
5. Efficiency of information distribution 
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He went on to note that the software enables decisions to be grouped by type, for 
example “financial decisions”. Mr Fir (October 2013) also demonstrated that his, 
competing, software product stored the papers by type. This use of paper types 
supported the structure of the Board pack, and agenda, reflective of those 
discussed in section 5.2.1. 
 
6.3.2 “Supporting Subcommittees” - Utilisation of Sub-Groups 
As discussed in section 7.3.5, many Boards have defined, standing, sub-
committees. For those regulated by the UK Corporate Governance Code these are 
the nominations, audit and remuneration sub-committees. However, these 
permanent standing committees are not the only sub-groups to be found within the 
governance structures of Boards. When particularly large or complex issues are 
brought before the Board it is common for a sub-group of Board members, often 
supported by the Executive, to create a temporary, ‘ad hoc’ committee to look in 
more detail at the issue. This may include strategic reviews, major investments or 
other significant Board level decisions. 
 
The interviewees were asked to describe a time when the Board worked well 
together; a common theme in the responses can be summed up by the following 
quote from interviewee Mr Boxelder 
“a sub-group of the Board [was formed] to discuss the sort of nitty gritty 
of it [a specific issue] and then once they’d reached certain stages and 
there was something of substance to discuss with the Board it came 
back to the Board.” (February 2013) 
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This was echoed across a third of the Board member interviewees. Mr Chestnut 
(February 2013) identified that these ad hoc groups allowed the “heavy lifting” 
around an issue to be “done by three or four people”. The people involved were 
usually a mix of both Executive and Non-Executive Directors occasionally joined by 
subject matter experts from within, or external to, the organisation.  
 
Ms Maple (February 2013) and Ms Ginkgo (May 2013) both described these ad hoc 
committees as temporary groups which form for a specific purpose and disband 
once a solution is agree upon by the main Board. In all the cases the interviewees 
described creating ad hoc groups when there was a large issue, which was complex 
and usually involved multiple actors, options and/or solutions.  
 
In general the interviewees identified the creation of ad hoc sub committees to be a 
positive activity for the Board. Nonetheless, a negative example was also 
highlighted by Mr Boxelder (February 2013) where he identified that an ad hoc 
committee was set up to appoint an outside organisation to undertake some work 
and the appointed did not go smoothly. Upon reflection he felt that this was due to a 
lack of “direct involvement” by the Board because, though they had regular reports, 
there were no formal discussions between the Board and the ad hoc committee.  
 
The use of formalised sub-committees is well documented within both academic 
and non-academic literature (e.g. Rezaee, 2010, Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Many of 
the regulations and codes either recommend, or mandate, the use of specified sub-
committees (Leblanc and Gilles, 2005). Rezaee (2010:243) identifies that the use of 
sub-committees makes “efficient use of time and expertise” of Board Directors.  
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Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) identifies that sub-committees within the Board 
structure create information asymmetry between the Board members. This is 
manifested within the interviews by references to the requirement for the ad hoc 
committee to have a clear structure and boundaries for responsibilities as well as 
agreed upon reporting processes. 
 
In summary, the use of ad hoc committees appears to be a significant, and 
common, tool within the day-to-day management of Board processes. They provide 
a method to improve effectiveness within the Board’s process. The interviewees 
highlighted three key aspects in relation to the effective use of ad hoc groups:  
 The issue needs to be large and time consuming causing it to be beyond the 
practical scope of a standard Board meeting 
 The issue needs to be complex with a number of facets to be considered 
and different solutions identifiable 
 The ad hoc committee needs to have a clear outline of their responsibilities, 
decision making powers and reporting process 
 
6.3.3 “Reading Through” - Meeting Preparation 
In the early stages of data collection there appeared, potentially, to be a difference 
between how the male and female interviewees prepared for the Board meeting. In 
data collection phase two this was further explored, noting that the sample sizes are 
not large enough to be generalised.  
 
Overall, the process of preparation was different for every interviewee, for example 
Ms Elderberry described her approach to the Boards papers 
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“I think I am slightly unusual, I read papers twice, I read all the papers 
twice and I read them the first time just to get a feel for them and I read 
them fairly quickly and then I go back and re-read them in detail. Then 
from that, with the agenda, if I print anything out, it's the agenda, and… 
I usually make notes” (May 2013) 
 
In contrast, Mr Chestnut identified that since the introduction of subcommittees the 
size of the Board pack has reduced. Nonetheless, he notes that he 
“would be a little bit more selective in my reading, I would certainly … 
make sure I understood all the papers and why they were [included] 
and the purpose of them being on the agenda but I might not read 
literally them all verbatim, word for word, I would pick up things I 
thought I needed to question or challenge” (February 2013) 
Mr Chestnut did go on to qualify that “[t]here might be papers which I need to 
spend more time on and I go back to them” (February 2013).  
 
In terms of coming to the Board meeting prepared, Mr Fothergilla identified that  
“you can always tell in a meeting, if somebody really hasn’t read the 
papers, because they will make comments that indicate that they 
haven't.” (October 2013) 
In her interview Ms Camellia (May 2013) noted that she put time aside in her diary 
to read the papers. Likewise, Ms Persimmon identified that  
“unless you plan, unless you know when those papers are going to 
arrive and you can plan to read them, you're not doing yourself or the 
organisation justice if you don’t get through them all.” (Ms Persimmon, 
May 2013) 
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During the phase two interviews Ms Eucalyptus (January 2014) strongly identified 
with the gender split on preparation; additionally, Ms Yew (February 2014) intuitively 
felt it to be true. In contrast both Mr Birch (January 2014) and Mr Ironwood 
(Interview 2, January 2014) had not observed a difference between the genders in 
relation to preparation.  
 
Prof Cherry (Interview 2, January 2014) discussed the concept of ‘imposter 
syndrome’ as a potential, partial, explanation of the issue. Imposter syndrome is 
defined as where an individual does not believe that they deserve credit for their 
own success, e.g. attributing it to luck rather than their own intelligence (Pedler, 
2011). In general they fear being found out as being unsuitable for the role and, 
therefore, risk being exposed as a fraud (Clance and Imes, 1978). It is usually, but 
not exclusively applied to women (Pedler, 2011). One of the methods used by 
sufferers to overcome the feeling is “diligence and hard work” (Clance and Imes, 
1978), though as Ms Eucalyptus identifies it can be seen as “uncool …it’s almost an 
admission of weakness that you actually have to do the prep.” (January 2014).  
 
6.3.4 “Chairing Style – Perceiving the Role” - Mentoring 
Mr Fothergilla stated that one of his primary roles as Chair was  
“to build a close and effective and trusting working relationship with the 
Chief Executive, so he feels able to share with me what's going on in 
his head, what his worries are, talk about his senior people issues, any 
strategic thoughts that are going through his mind, not with a view 
necessarily to discussing it elsewhere, but just so that I am up to date 
with where he is heading on things.” (October 2013) 
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Mr Larch (November 2013) added that a significant part of his role was to be 
available to the CEO. This was echoed by Mr Oak (November 2013) who identified 
that there is coaching role for the Chair in relation to the CEO. These views were 
supported by all of the interviewees who held either a CEO or Chair role. 
 
Mr Oak highlighted a time when the relationship between the CEO and Chair was of 
poor quality, he explained that  
“the Chair ended up feeling quite isolated and the Board become 
slightly fractionalised and I think what we got into was quite a 
dysfunctional situation … it led to was, us, as Non-Execs, asking that 
Chair to stand down and appointing a new Chair who was able to do 
the job well.” (November 2013) 
 
In the second interview with Mr Ironwood, he highlighted the key aspect of the 
relationship was that “there were never surprises.  If either of them [the CEO or 
Chair] was going to raise something that was likely to cause trouble, the other 
person was aware of it before the meeting” (January 2014).  
 
Given the perceived importance by the interviewees of the relationship between the 
CEO and Chair, surprisingly little academic research focuses on this area. In Stiles 
and Taylor (2001:107) they note that the relationship is “of crucial importance”. Their 
interviewees argue that the relationship must have; respect, understanding of role 
boundaries and an understanding of each other’s working style to be effective. 
Nonetheless, Cadbury (2002:121) concludes that the relationship is vitally important 
but it should not be to the exclusion of the rest of the Board, or the Senior 
Executive, and it is important that all parties are included in the Board’s processing. 
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6.3.5 “Decision Making Method” – Voting  
Voting in a Board meeting falls into two categories: to make a decision where there 
is no clear consensus or to formally confirm an agreed decision. The latter is usually 
procedural and relates most often to items such as confirming the minutes. In 
contrast, the former is a much rarer occasion, as Mr Cedar explains 
 “we don’t vote often, but from time to time.  It isn't often we have a 
vote, where we need a vote [it’s] because there’s any dissent.” 
(February 2013) 
Mr Cedar went on to explain that on a previous Board  
“[the decision making process] was driven by the attitude [of the] 
chairman, and he was a peer of the realm and he made it his business 
never to have a vote.  He didn’t want to have a vote and we tried to sort 
things out, and the only vote we ever took was when the rest of us 
outvoted him to put the company into liquidation before it went bust.” 
(February 2013) 
As these two examples illustrate, the use of voting as a decision making tool is 
complex. In most of the interviews the aim was to have a collegiate decision making 
process, where all parties agree on the outcome. Nonetheless, occasionally voting 
is required and “it’s usually reasonably unanimous.” (Mr Elm, March 2013). As Ms 
Eucalyptus explains  
“it’s a last resort to be honest, you want to try and get the Board all 
thinking on the same hymn sheet but of course you do need to 
challenge” (January 2014) 
 
Malenko (2014) in his study of open and closed voting in Boards concludes that in 
open votes, that is to say where Directors see how others vote, Directors are likely 
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to vote with the majority even where their information supports them voting the other 
way.  As such, voting may not provide an effective decisions making tool. 
Nonetheless, the Boardroom software that was discussed in the technical meetings 
facilitates the voting process under the guise of enabling Boards to make timely 
decisions outside of the Board meetings (Mr Cypress, January 2014).  
 
6.3.6 “Enjoying the Role” – Engagement  
Mr Larch identified that enjoying the role was an important part of an individual 
Director’s contribution to the Board. He explains that his former Board 
“was really made up of individuals to a large extent, and individuals 
who had been there for eight [years]…and they were getting tired.  And 
they needed to recognise that actually they weren’t enjoying it as much 
as they were previously.  They were not contributing to much, as they 
were previously.  And in fact it was becoming almost tedium for them to 
be there.  So there needed to be change” (November 2013) 
Ms Eucalyptus adds that  
“it’s also about dynamic[s] as well because you can have a lot of 
frustration, if you’ve got a chairman who’s just saying well I don't want 
to hear what everybody else says then that’s going to be hopeless, 
you’re not going to enjoy that. If you’ve got a Board where it’s a point 
scoring exercise you won’t enjoy that.  If you’ve got one where actually 
people don't conduct it with great politeness which I think is quite 
important in a Board, you’re not going to enjoy that either” (January 
2014) 
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In addition, Ms Eucalyptus (January 2014) clarifies that enjoyment is linked to an 
understanding of the role and that, if you understand the role, you will undertake the 
preparation work to make the process an enjoyable experience.  
 
Engagement in the Board processes is linked to the need to feel important and that 
the individual is adding value (Guerrero and Seguin, 2012).  Virtanen (2012) 
concluded that women take more enjoyment than men from being on the Board due 
to the opportunity to exercise power.   
 
6.4 Summary 
This additional data collection provided clarity on a number of key issues for the 
interviewees. The supplementary interviews and meetings enabled a more detailed 
understanding of how six key areas impact on their understanding and approach to 
their role. As such, at this stage  
“All [the] categories are well developed in terms of properties, 
dimensions, and variations. Further data gathering and analysis add[s] 
little new to the conceptualization, though variations can always be 
discovered” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:263) 
 
The data has identified a number of key issues for the participants; however, they sit 
within a complex environment with both internal and external pressures relating to 
how they undertake their roles. The next chapter looks at the role of Director in the 
wider context in which the Boardroom decisions are made. 
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7 BOARDROOM CONTEXT 
7.1 Introduction 
The journey of the Board pack is one aspect of the information engagement by the 
Directors; the other part is the corporate governance context within which the 
Directors operate. This chapter steps away from the data and looks at how the 
Board works in relation to the expectations and constraints within which the 
Directors undertake their role. The aim of this chapter is to provide clarity on the 
mechanisms that influence, and to an extent, control the Board’s processes.  
 
This chapter is in two parts; firstly the perceptions of the Board’s role and secondly 
rules, regulations and best practice. The former identifies how the Board sees its 
role in relation to the organisation with the latter section discussing the constraints 
and expectations within which they are expected operate. In this chapter the 
corporate governance literature, both academic and grey, has been combined with 
the interviewees’ perceptions. This approach enables an interlink of the theoretical 
and practical aspects of the issues influencing the Board. 
 
7.2 Perceptions of the Board’s Role 
As identified in section 1.2, the Board has a number of roles which they may be 
expected to fulfil, including: providing direction, monitoring progress, guiding senior 
management, enhancing the organisation’s reputation, bringing resources, as well 
as creating legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2000, Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Additionally, 
the Boards’ decision making role varies dependent on the Board’s characteristics, 
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which can “range from working with management to develop strategic direction to 
merely ratifying management's proposals” (Stiles, 2001:631).  
 
Prof Cherry (January 2013) perceives the role of the Board as trying “to resolve a 
perennial imbalance.  On the one hand driving the other guys [the Executive] 
forward, and the other keeping an element of control”, he refers to this balancing act 
as the “Board’s dilemma”. He went on to explain further, paraphrasing Sir Brian 
Pitman, that the Boards need to  
“…deliver the reasonable short-term demands of the owners, to always 
assess the cost of capital in any proposed way forward and then to 
ensure their fiduciary duty by ensuring the long-term health of the 
business” (Prof Cherry, January 2013) 
Alternatively, Mr Mulberry (October 2013) had a broader understanding of the 
Board’s role 
“[T]he Board is there to develop the vision of the business and 
understand where it needs to go or where it should be, and then it’s to 
deliver that vision or strategic direction for that business to either 
themselves or to the employees should it have some.  …  Ideally it’s 
about the looking forward part, being able to stabilise a business in a 
way that sits between the visionary leadership and the day to day 
administration and management of the business from sort of middle 
management down to ensure that the employees get it and want it too.  
And then that business can be stable and profitable going forward.” 
 
With regards to the Board’s role there were a variety of definitions, as illustrated 
above. Almost all of the interviewees agreed that there is a controlling role for the 
Board. The greatest variety could be found in how far into the operational work of 
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the organisation the Board strayed, for example, Mr Larch (November 2013) noted 
that there were areas “[w]hich actually they [The Board] weren’t even needing to 
make decisions on because they were operational matters as opposed to strategic 
matters.”  
 
The role of the Board is a significant area of focus within the academic literature 
;(see for example Bongjin et al., 2009, Huse, 2007:36, Stiles and Taylor, 2001:11, 
van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Furthermore, many of the corporate governance 
theories are predicated on differing assumptions of the Board’s role (see Table 1). 
Jonsson (2005) classified the Board’s role into four types, based on power and 
involvement, see Figure 22; though he notes that Boards can sit in more than one 
quadrant and that they move between quadrants over time.  
 
 
Figure 22 - The Role Model of the Board (adapted from Jonsson, 2005:712) 
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Regardless of the specific roles that the Board undertakes, Mr Chestnut (February 
2013) identified that “like any team - and that's effectively what the Board of 
directors [is] - it is important you have a clear understanding of one's role”. That is to 
say, a clear, common, agreed vision of the Board’s role. The role is often laid out in 
the ‘Articles of Association’ for the organisation (Mr Linden, October 2013). “The 
Articles of Association are the ‘rules’ of the company” (Young, 2007) and, in the UK, 
are a legal requirement under the Companies Act 2006; these rules include the 
decision making power, responsibility and processes of the Board (House, 2014). 
The law, and therefore the organisation, is supported by rules, regulations and best 
practice guidance. 
 
7.3 Rules, Regulations and Best Practice  
As noted in section 1.2, there are a significant number of regulations, and codes of 
conduct, in place for organisations to comply with depending on their location, 
industry and ownership status. Each of these regulations provides an insight into the 
social norms, historical scandals and the role organisations play within that 
environment. This nuanced context influences the corporate governance structures, 
approaches and priorities within the organisation. Organisations themselves are 
also individual; they have their own history, traditions, norms and strategies, all of 
which influence both the corporate governance philosophy and structures they 
create. 
 
In January 2014 the European Corporate Governance Institute listed 409 corporate 
governance codes worldwide (European Institute for Corporate Governance, 2014). 
This is an increase from 264 in October 2009 (Rasmussen, 2010:4). This increase 
in codes has many reasons including the recent economic down turn and a number 
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of large scandals, such as the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008. 
These have caused both the renewal of existing codes and the development of new 
codes.  
 
The target audience of the codes varies from: those listed on a country’s stock 
exchange, a particular company ownership structure through to all companies 
operating in a jurisdiction. They also vary in strength of enforcement from best 
practice guidance to laws with penalties for non-compliance. For example, UK listed 
companies must comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code issued by the 
Financial Reporting Council in 2014. In this case a “comply-or-explain” model is 
applied to this code (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). This model requires the 
organisations bound by the code to 
“[S]tate whether they are complying with the Code and to give 
reasons for any areas of non-compliance. This requirement will 
enable shareholders to know where the companies in which they 
have invested stand in relation to the Code.” (Cadbury, 1992:10) 
This approach allows for organisations to provide clarity on their compliance, and if 
they deviate, why and to what extent. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the UK’s approach to corporate governance is not 
universally supported, for example Mr Poplar (February 2013) believes that “[s]ome 
of this corporate governance stuff, … just gets in the way of business” he goes on to 
explain that organisations have “got a tick box mentality to all of this stuff”. Likewise, 
Hampel (1998:17), in his committee’s report, identified that  
“Public companies are now among the most accountable organisations 
in society…But the emphasis on accountability has tended to obscure 
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a Board’s first responsibility - to enhance the prosperity of the business 
over time.” 
 
Mr Poplar (February 2013) believes that effective corporate governance “comes 
down to the absolute quality and integrity of the individuals who you have in the 
organisations”. Prof Cherry (January 2013) notes that under English law there are 
only statutory Directors and, through the development of the regulations, “we [have] 
managed to create a nonsense corporate governance framework”. Bloomfield 
(2013:203) notes that the issues around corporate governance mechanisms, in the 
widest sense, may be due to the underpinning theories upon which they are based 
being “incorrect or inadequate”. These issues may also help to explain why so many 
codes exist, however, there are aspects that are common to many of them, such as: 
 The role of the Board 
 The leadership of the Board 
 The composition of the Board 
 Expected behaviours of Board members 
 The Board and subcommittee structures 
 Remuneration of Board members 
 Relationship with stakeholders  
 The information requirements of the Board members 
 Risk Management 
 
For clarity, only the UK Corporate Governance Code is referred to in the following 
sections as the majority of organisations discussed in the interviews were based in 
the UK. Whilst not all of the UK organisations were listed, thereby subjected to the 
code, many of the codes and best practice guidance are based on similar principles 
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to the UK Corporate Governance Code. The UK Corporate Governance Code is 
utilised in the following sections as the framework within which to discuss the 
context of the Board.  
   
7.3.1 The Role of the Board 
The Board has a number of roles which they may be expected to fulfil, though each 
Board will have its own individually defined terms of reference. According to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2014), in summary, 
these should include: 
 Providing entrepreneurial leadership – as Mr Mulberry (October 2013) 
described “there’s got to be the aspect of innovation and creativity” in the 
leadership of the organisation.  
 Risk management – Prof Cherry (January 2013) notes that “it’s about taking 
risk not avoiding it.” 
 Setting the organisation’s strategic aims – for example “strategically getting 
to think what business are we in, what business aren’t we in, what business 
do we want, what business don’t we want” (Mr Cedrela, October 2013). 
 Ensuring financial and human resources are available – though, as Ms 
Maple (February 2013) noted “if you don’t have the money you can’t do it”. 
 Reviewing management performance – this might, for example, include 
‘inviting’ the CEO to retire (Mr Cedar, February 2013). 
 Setting the organisation’s values and standards – In Mr Larch’s (November 
2013) “view it’s about setting the standards, about setting the moral 
direction” 
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 Ensuring shareholder and other stakeholder obligations are understood and 
met – or as Mr Poplar (February 2013) described it “I’m there to create a 
value for shareholders and I’m also there for a wider responsibility in terms 
of stakeholders”. 
 
During the interviews, all of the roles listed were mentioned, though ‘setting the 
organisation’s values and standards’ was rarely explicitly mentioned. In contrast, 
almost all of the interviewees mentioned risk management, as will be discussed 
further in section 7.3.9. 
 
7.3.2 The Leadership of the Board 
There are two roles at the head of an organisation; the management head of the 
organisation, normally referred to as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who is 
responsible for managing the enterprise, and the Chairman of the Board (Chair) 
who is responsible for managing the Board. In the UK and Europe it is usual to have 
these roles separated so that “no one individual should [can] have unfettered 
powers of decision” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:5). In contrast, in the USA 
the majority of organisations have a unified CEO/Chair position.  
 
The separation of Chair and CEO has been a topic of debate within the literature for 
a number of years. Davis et al. (1997) identify this as one of the areas of difference 
between Agency and Stewardship Theories. Their analysis identifies that a joint 
CEO/Chair is “dysfunctional” under Agency Theory; in contrast, Stewardship Theory 
encourages the “high authority and discretion” of the joint role. Daily and Dalton 
(1997) identify that the empirical evidence does not strongly support either joint or 
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separate CEO/Chair. Their own research identifies that there may be a time and 
place for either option dependent on the organisation’s financial health. 
 
Proponents of the joint role identify that the CEO, by nature of their executive 
position has more access to organisational information, therefore a joint CEO/Chair 
has greater internal knowledge with which to make decisions. Whereas, an 
independent Chair, by the nature of their independence, has less knowledge of 
internal information; however, given their independent status, they may have access 
to greater external information with which to influence the decisions. This 
information asymmetry continues to be an ongoing debate in the literature (for 
example Nowak and McCabe, 2003). 
 
In only one case in the data collection was the CEO and Chair the same person (Mr 
Poplar, February 2013 – in one of the companies discussed). However, the 
relationship between the CEO and Chair was a noticeable topic of discussion. Mr 
Fothergilla, a prominent FTSE100 Chair, noted that one of his key functions was, as 
explained in the previous chapter 
“[T]o a build a close and effective and trusting working relationship with 
the Chief Executive, so he feels able to share with me what's going on 
in his head, what his worries are, talk about his senior people issues, 
any strategic thoughts that are going through his mind, not with a view 
necessarily to discussing it elsewhere, but just so that I am up to date 
with where he is heading on things.” (October 2013) 
Mr Oak, similarly identified that the relationship between CEO and Chair 
“[H]as to be a blend of trust, some challenge so you absolutely don’t, 
and shouldn’t be, bosom pals but I do think it’s got to work chemically 
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otherwise there won’t be the trust … If it doesn’t work then it can 
jeopardise the whole working of the Board.” (November 2013) 
 
The style of the Chair elicited a number of comments within the interviews. Both 
good and bad chairing styles were noted, with good described in terms such as; 
“Non-threatening, very supportive” (Mr Cedrela, October 2013); “always allows 
plenty of time to debate” (Mr Chestnut, February 2013); “able to give everyone a 
chance to talk” (Mr Ironwood, February 2013).  
 
Mr Larch sums up the role of the Chair as 
“I see it very much as leadership.  As actually being that, not just 
inspirational we’ll fight on the beaches or whatever, but actually giving 
the Board the confidence to be able to make the decisions it needs to 
make and understand the potential implications of those decisions.” 
(November 2013) 
 
7.3.3 The Composition of the Board 
A Board is made up of two distinct groups; Executive and Non-Executive Directors, 
of which the latter can be separated, as previously discussed, into Independent and 
Non-Independent. Executives, generally, work full time within the organisation 
normally undertaking such roles as CEO, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or Chief 
Operating Officer (COO). The Non-Executive Directors, generally, work part-time for 
the organisation and are focused on the Board’s activities and separate from the 
day-to-day operations of the organisation (Young, 2007:54). Nonetheless, as noted 
previously by Prof Cherry (January 2013), all of the Directors are statutory Directors 
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under English law; that is to say, the 2006 Companies Act makes no such 
distinction.  
 
The majority of large companies will also have a Company Secretary. The 
appointee will work with the Board in relation to its statutory duties, corporate 
governance as well as managing communications, reports and meetings (ICSA, 
2011). Whether the Company Secretary is a full member of the Board, which is to 
say has voting rights, will depend on the individual organisation. Nonetheless, they 
are in most cases the conduit between the Board and the organisation (Mallin, 
2010:168). Mr Pine (November 2013) noted that he, as a Chair, spoke at least twice 
a week to both the CEO and the Company Secretary to ensure that he has a full 
picture of the organisation. As such, regardless of their voting status, the Company 
Secretary undertakes a crucial role within the organisation and the Board’s 
processes.  
 
Many of corporate governance codes contain a requirement for Independent 
Directors to be appointed to the Board. The codes may also prescribe the proportion 
of Board members that must be independent, for example, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code specifies that for FTSE350 companies over half the Board must 
be independent (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). In addition, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code identifies the position of a  
“senior independent director to provide a sounding board for the 
chairman and to serve as an intermediary for the other directors when 
necessary” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:7) 
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The Institute of Directions (IoD) identifies that an Independent Director on the Board 
“can help in focusing the Board on the corporate interest” (Institute of Directors 
2010:23). This independency can enable the Director to “bring an independent 
judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources…and standards of 
conduct” (Cadbury, 1992:4.11).  
 
Board members are expected to have 
“the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and 
knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their 
respective duties and responsibilities effectively.” (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2014:5) 
Mr Chestnut (February 2013) noted that “in the last couple of years it [the Board] 
has worked particularly well” and he ascribed that to having “the right mix in terms of 
skills, experience and personalities” on the Board. Mr Hemlock (March 2013), who 
was at the time of interview setting up a new Board for a divested company, noted 
that he had requested of the recruitment agency to 
 “if at all possible to have a lady as a Chair, the reason being we 
employ a lot of ladies and the management team are old, bold, middle 
aged white haired men.”  
Ms Magnolia (March 2013) noted that, in her opinion, she was “not sure that men 
think in the same way”.  Mr Fothergilla (October 2013) “sense[d] that having two 
women on the Board is better than just one, because it makes the role of both of 
them easier”. 
 
Diversity, particularly gender diversity, has been extensively researched in relation 
to Board composition (for example Geiger and Marlin, 2012, McCann and Wheeler, 
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2011). The diversity in corporate governance research includes a range of issues 
including: gender, ethnicity, age, faith and education (Hudson, 2011, Hyndman and 
McDonnell, 2009). Nonetheless, Board diversity is not limited to just these issues as 
Ms Magnolia (March 2013), a Director for a Pensions Board, illustrates; “the majority 
on the Board are rich … these people are seriously rich and I sometimes think they 
lose sight of the ‘little man’ [the pension members]”. 
 
There have been a number of benefits identified from a diverse Board including; an 
increase in creativity, reduction in group think, access to resources and conferring of 
legitimacy (Ferreira, 2012:227). Conversely negative issues have also been 
identified such as: ineffective communication, lack of experience and conflicts of 
interest (Ferreira, 2012:228). Ferreira (2012:238) goes on to conclude that there is a 
relationship between diversity and performance in the corporate world; although 
there are a number of characteristics of the organisation that might influence this 
such as the size of the organisation and the size of the Board (de Andres-Alonso et 
al., 2009, Ostrower and Stone, 2010). However, in our research on diversity in the 
nonprofit environment, we concluded that 
 “Diversity and representativeness on a non-profit Board may have 
additional functionality. Firstly, the conveyance of legitimacy, in a sense 
providing the authority for the individual non-profit [organisation] to be 
in the sector. Secondly, it provides a signal to individuals [such as 
benefactors] related to the non-profit that the Board values the 
relationship, whether that is in terms of time or money.” (Palmer et al., 
2014:14) 
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Conversely, the need for diversity in the composition of the Board is not 
uniformly supported, whether related to the roles the individual holds or their 
personal diversity, as Mr Poplar noted 
“it comes down to the integrity of the individuals that you have at Board 
level and their ability to know the difference between what’s right and 
wrong and in terms of risks; you should have Board members on your 
Board that actually understand the risks of the business that you’re in”  
(Mr Poplar, February 2013) 
 
It is important to note that, whilst the code require the Board members to 
have suitable “skills, experience, independence and knowledge” (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2014:5) there is no explicit mention of competency to 
undertake the role. In Lee and Phan’s (2000:207) research in to Director’s 
competencies, they define competence as “underlying traits, attitudes or 
skills that lead to superior job performance”. They utilise Dulewicz and 
Herbert’s (1999:15) twelve “supra-competencies” which were deemed to be 
important when rating senior management, which are: 
1. Strategic Perspective 
2. Analysis and Judgement 
3. Planning and Organising 
4. Managing Staff 
5. Persuasiveness 
6. Assertiveness and Decisiveness 
7. Interpersonal Sensitivity 
8. Oral Communication 
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9. Resilience and Adaptability 
10. Energy and Initiative 
11. Achievement-motivation 
12. Business Sense 
These twelve competencies are seen as “core competencies of a Director” 
(Lee and Phan, 2000:207). Nontheless, whilst the regulations go on the 
identify that the nominations committee should specify the “capabilities” of 
any potential new Board member (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:11), 
there is no further definition of what is meant by this requirement. In short, 
the competency to undertake the role of Director is assumed in the 
regulations to be of a suitable level for the role undertaken. Additionally, 
throughout the interview process, none of the interviewees explicitly 
mentioned competency of individual Board members though, for example, Mr 
Mulberry (October 2013) noted that the leaders of an organisation should 
“have the ability to take risk, there’s got to be the aspect of innovation 
and creativity, they’ve got to be passionate, they’ve got to instil 
confidence and trust in those around and below them, without a doubt.  
They’ve got to have a tenacity and self-belief” 
 
7.3.4 Expected Behaviours of Board members 
“All directors must act in what they consider to be the best interests 
of the company, consistent with their statutory duties” (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2014:9) 
Under the UK Companies Act 2006, the key statutory duties are listed as (Young, 
2007:55): 
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 Duty to act within powers (in accordance with the company’s 
constitution/Articles of Association) 
 Duty to promote the success of the company 
 Duty to exercise independent judgement 
 Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 
 Duty to avoid conflict of interest 
 Duty to declare interests in proposed transition or arrangement 
 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties 
 Other duties such as; ensuring proper record keeping of accounts, timely 
payments of liabilities and submission of accurate data to Companies House 
Additionally, the recent Kay Report, issued on behalf of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skill (BIS), emphasised that it is “the obligation of 
Directors to promote the success of the company and that such success is to be 
measured over the long-term” (Kay, 2012:57).  
 
As well as their legal responsibilities, Directors are expected to have a wider duty to 
the organisation, for example, attending meetings, preparing for meetings and being 
available as and when for ad hoc issues. As Mr Oak explained, as Chair it is his  
“…duty to actually to find the right way of saying that if they haven’t got 
time to read the papers then they probably shouldn’t be on the Board” 
(November 2013) 
 
The balance of power within a Board of Directors is dependent both on the structure 
and the personalities within the group. The power balance within the Board will, to a 
large extent, dictate the behaviours and norms within the Board and its decision 
making processes. McNulty et al. (2011:93) describe power in terms of “creating 
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intended effects” and is “likely to be a product of awareness, possession, control 
and tactics”. Power can belong to either an individual or group of individuals. In the 
case of Ms Juniper, she identified that she is 
“… quite a powerful personality who's used to being in charge, I would 
have, from my perspective, I would have got to a good conclusion one 
way or the other [on the issue being described].  So I think in that 
respect, the Chair is in a slightly different position in that they can 
control a good outcome” (May, 2013) 
 
In parallel with power comes trust. Trust is a key ingredient in the behaviour of 
Boards, in terms of both team interactions and decision making. Schoorman et al. 
(2007:347) define trust “as the willingness to be vulnerable to another party”. Mr 
Oak identified that “the right level of trust and mutual understanding” was required 
within the Board to ensure that they were “able to get the right levels of 
conversations happening” (November 2013). Schoorman et al. (2007) identifies that 
there is a positive relationship between trust and the strategic actions of the 
organisation or, as Ms Juniper summaries “a Board operates best when people 
know each other” (May, 2013) 
 
Roberts et al. (2005) argue that the conduct of the Independent Directors in relation 
to the Executive Directors is the key to determining the effectiveness of the Board. 
Whilst the rules and regulations may require a proportion of the Board to be 
independent, their value is dependent on how they behave, for example, seeking to 
act as an Executive within the organisation dilutes their credibility. Mr Linden 
explains that he sees the Non-Executive role as being 
“a critical friend … and you have the same legal responsibility but 
you’re not as hands-on. It does mean that you can step away for a bit 
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and just ask the questions, do the probing and offer support, guidance, 
help, introductions and a different paradigm.” (October 2013) 
 
7.3.5 The Board and Subcommittee Structures 
Boards normally delegate some tasks to subcommittees, of which the most 
important are generally accepted as being the nominations, audit and remuneration 
sub-committees (section 7.3.6 addresses remuneration). Occasionally an 
organisation may also have specialist standing committees, such as at Pfizer, which 
has a committee for Science and Technology responsible for the company’s 
research and development direction (Pfizer, 2013).  
The subcommittees form a significant part of a Board member’s role. Mr Boxelder 
explained that, within his Board 
“Everybody sits on at least one committee, as do I … I would say, probably I 
spend twice as much time outside the Board meetings as I do around the 
Board meetings.” (February 2013)  
Mr Chestnut noted that since they introduced subcommittees “the volume of paper 
for the main Board has reduced” (February 2013). He went on to clarify that the 
“sub-committee[s] deal with issues and then most of them are dealt with 
unless they need a full Board decision and in that particular case we would 
either wait for the next Board meeting or [the Chair] would call a conference 
call” (February 2013) 
As such, the introduction of subcommittees has, in many ways, changed the role of 
the Board and the individual Directors in relation to the decision making processes 
as well as how the Board works on a practical level. Mr Ironwood explained that 
“each of the committees had specific terms of reference and that included [the] 
delegated powers that they had” (January 2013). The subcommittee meeting 
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minutes are, usually, included in the full Board’s pack (Ms Willow, February 2013). 
In the case of both Pasteur NHS and Currie NHS Trusts’ meeting agendas, the 
subcommittees had time allocated to them in the main Board meeting agenda, at 
the end of the main meeting, for any questions from other Board members.  
 
The nominations committee is charged with finding suitable candidates for the 
Board. This committee should ensure that there is a process to fill any knowledge, 
skill, experience or independency gaps (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). Mr 
Hickory explained that they utilised the nominations committee “to make sure we 
[the committee] engineer the right skill sets across that with the Trustee body 
[Board]” (February 2013). However, Ruigrok et al. (2006) identifies that nominations 
committees are unlikely to increase the gender or educational variety within the 
membership of the Board.  
 
Allegrini et al. (2009:2) explains that 
“since the issue of the Treadway Commission report in the USA in the 
late 1980s, it has generally been recognized that one of the major 
causes of corporate bankruptcies lies in the lack of a sound internal 
control system. As a consequence, corporate governance codes now 
explicitly require disclosure by companies on the soundness of their 
internal control system” 
As such, audit committees are usually utilised to monitor and review both the 
internal and also external auditors; in addition they also usually review the financial 
controls and monitor the organisations financial report (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014). The UK Corporate Governance Code also lists the responsibility “to review 
the company’s…risk management systems” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:14) 
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as being part of the Audit committees responsibilities, where there is not a separate 
Risk committee. Overall, the audit committee 
“exercise[s] a greater degree of focus and challenge, I suppose, to the 
financial performance and they’re [the members] people with, I suppose, with 
even more [financial] experience within that trustee Board.  So they’re able, 
they’re in a position to be able to interrogate the data even more effectively 
and we meet twice a year and that audit committee will then report back up 
into the main Board as well, so there’s that extra level of scrutiny, if you like, of 
the more detailed areas of performance.” (Mr Hickory, February 2013) 
Nevertheless, Spira (1999) concludes that the evidence that the Audit committee 
effectiveness and their ability to detect fraud is inconclusive.  
 
Ms Elderberry (May, 2013) was the only interviewee to mention a separate Risk 
committee; all other mentions were in conjunction with either Administration or Audit 
committees. However, most of the interviewees explicitly mentioned the managing 
of risk, predominately through the use of risk registers. The 2014 update to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code “focussed on the provision by companies of 
information about the risks which affect longer term viability.” (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2014:2). In a number of the interviews risk management was raised as an 
ongoing issue with the management of the process being an evolving issue (Mr 
Boxelder, February 2013).   
 
In addition to the standing committees, many of the interviewees described the 
creation of a “working party, so that’s, if you like, an ad hoc committee created for 
that specific purpose” (Mr Hawthorn, February 2013). Mr Hickory explains that 
“We’ve done that several times actually, over the last four or five years 
when we’ve got particularly major decisions to take or you know, a 
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particular challenge and then we’ve convened a small group to work 
very directly with management team and that might be facilitated by an 
external, normally has been but not necessarily and so yes, it is kind of 
part of the way we operate, so it’s, that’s a tool that’s always available 
to us.” (February 2013) 
These temporary, ad hoc, committees are usually created on instruction from the 
main Board with a focus on a specific task or issue that is deemed too complex for 
discussion within the main Board meeting. 
 
7.3.6 Remuneration of Board Members 
Remuneration of Directors has been a controversial issue for a number of years and 
had risen in prominence during the recent financial crisis, particularly in relation to 
public companies. The Guardian reported that FTSE100 CEO’s pay rose 55% in the 
year to June 2010 (Goodley and Wearden, 2010). It rose on average a further 12% 
in 2011 (Treanor and Neville, 2011). Prof Cherry explained that remuneration is 
“[A] can of worms.  We have [handled] remuneration policies most of 
the time with kid gloves.  I think Jonathan Charkham, who used to do 
the corporate governance for the Bank of England, had it right when he 
said … "Dear boy, remuneration, yes, that’s very easy.  If you’ve got a 
remuneration committee with a loaded wallet and a chief executive with 
a loaded revolver - guess who wins every time?” (January 2013) 
 
In October 2010 the UK’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skill (BIS) 
launched a consultation on the Long-term Focus for Corporate Britain, (known later 
as the Kay Review).  The report, amongst other aspects, asked questions about the 
remuneration of the Board. The majority of the respondents supported  
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“…the idea that executive pay has risen to unacceptable levels in 
some or all cases and that this often has no correlation to an 
increase in talent or success.” (Department for Business Innovation 
& Skills, 2011:6)  
 
The remuneration committee is required to ensure that pay is consistent in relation 
to comparable organisations and that the pay is “designed to promote the long-term 
success of the company” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:6). It is, therefore, in 
the interests of both the Directors and Stakeholders to ensure that all aspects of 
performance, both financial and non-financial, are monitored to facilitate decisions 
on pay levels, regardless of the companies’ form of incorporation. Throughout the 
interviews there was very little mention of the remuneration policy with only Mr Oak 
(November 2013) mentioning that ensuring there is a “proper remuneration 
framework” in place is part of the Board’s role. 
 
7.3.7 Relationship with Stakeholders 
The relationship with stakeholders is a key part of a Board’s role. The main, 
formalised, process for stakeholder communication is the annual report. Historically, 
this has been aimed at the shareholders. However, Stakeholder Theory identifies 
the stakeholders are a broader group than just the shareholders (Mallin, 2010:18) 
including, for example, employees and local residents. Additionally, worldwide there 
is an increased focus on sustainability and the impact organisations have on their 
surroundings as well as the development of the concept of a ‘Corporate Citizen’ (for 
a fuller discussion on this concept see Matten and Crane, 2005). However, as Mr 
Poplar noted 
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“My roles and responsibility - I’m [as the Chair] ultimate custodian of 
shareholder value.  I’m there to create a value for shareholders and I’m 
also there for a wider responsibility in terms of stakeholders but my 
primary responsibility is to protect and increase shareholder [value].” 
(February 2013) 
 
The Chairman is, under the UK Corporate Governance Code, required to “ensure 
effective communication with shareholders” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:8). 
As Mr Pine explains, as the Chair “you’ve got to be able to be a good communicator 
with all stakeholders” (November 2013).  
The Board is required to report on the organisation’s: strategy, accounts, risk 
management review and confirm that the organisation is a going concern (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2014). Nonetheless, there is increasing pressure on 
organisations to provide more rounded annual reports. Prof King, in his third report, 
theorises that 
“By issuing integrated reports, a company increases the trust and 
confidence of its stakeholders and the legitimacy of its operations. It 
can increase the company’s business opportunities and improve its 
risk management. By issuing an integrated report internally, a 
company evaluates its ethics, fundamental values, and governance, 
and externally improves the trust and confidence which stakeholders 
have in it.” (Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2009:12) 
 
The change in thinking relating to corporate governance and stakeholders has also 
influenced how companies are increasingly expected to integrate the stakeholder 
opinions into business decisions. For example, under the King III requirements 
South African organisations are required to take into account the legitimate 
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concerns of stakeholders when decision making (Institute of Directors Southern 
Africa, 2009). Ms Maple provided an example of stakeholder engagement 
“When we engage in strategic planning processes... the last time we did a 
really big one we actually commissioned somebody to do scenario planning 
for us and to interview external stakeholders and compile a report” (February 
2013)  
Many of the interviewees also mentioned engagement with stakeholders, either on a 
formal or informal basis. From the interviews, there appears a clear pattern of 
constant dialogue between the organisations and their stakeholders; however, the 
impact of these discussions was less clear. 
7.3.8 Information Requirements  
Chapter 5 looked in detail at the journey of the Board pack, in this section the focus 
is on the contents of the pack. As previously stated, Sir Adrian Cadbury identified 
that to enable Directors to undertake their duties they need accurate, timely and 
valid information (Cadbury, 1992). Additionally, under the UK Companies Act 2006, 
in the case of insolvency the Directors need to be able to show that they had up to 
date information (Young, 2007:137).  
 
This information comes from many sources, both internal and external, and in many 
forms, such as financial, non-financial and narrative. Financial information, in the 
main, has standard, pre-determined formats that, whilst tailored to each company’s 
reporting preferences, are well known across organisations. Additionally, financial 
information management is highly regulated with standards such as the 
International Accounting Standards Board’s framework. As Mr Hickory noted, in 
relation to the finance report his Board 
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“tr[ies] to make sure that we are as standardised as possible, so that 
the trustees are able to engage and understand as quickly as possible 
and one of the things we’re very acutely aware of with our trustees is 
that they’re all very busy people with professional lives” (February 
2013) 
 
Non-financial information has no such equivalent framework; there are two types of 
performance measures and narrative reports. This lack of framework stems from the 
individuality required within each company to identify the non-financial performance 
measures that support their strategy (Ittner and Larcker, 2003). This requirement for 
individuality provides a level of complexity in developing and interpreting non-
financial measures; for example Kaplan and Norton identify that their Balanced 
Scorecard “should be considered a template, not a strait jacket” (1996:34). This 
level of complexity is problematic and often proves a barrier to the use of non-
financial performance measures. Nonetheless, non-financial measures do have a 
clear definition as “quantitative data created outside the formal accounting system” 
(Simons, 2000:234). Examples include performance measures such as customer 
satisfaction, orders processed within schedule and staff turnover as well as risk 
management. Non-financial measures are a significant proportion of the non-
financial information Directors receive.  
 
Leblanc and Gilles (2005:70) interviewed almost 200 Directors and identified that, 
on occasion, Independent Directors were unable to understand financial reports Ms 
Ginkgo identified that she was in this position as she explains 
“In fact, with the director of finance I told him I didn’t understand a 
word… and he said if you call me I’ll clarify anything you want, and I 
said, I don’t understand what I was reading to be able to call you to 
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clarify anything.  So what happened there, they sent me on a training 
course, and I went to London for a financial thingamabob [training] for 
trustees.” (May, 2013) 
 
Additionally, Leblanc and Gilles (2005:70) identified that  new Independent Directors 
knew very little about the organisation whose Board they had joined. As a 
consequence, “their effectiveness turns to a considerable extent on the quality of 
the information which they receive and on the use which they make of it” (Cadbury, 
1992:4.14). 
 
Horner (2010) suggests that the better the quality and quantity of information 
provided about the organisation the more ‘independent’ Independent Directors are 
able to be. The high speed turnover of information has also facilitated the quantity of 
information available to Directors though this increase in quantity is not always 
perceived as an increase in quality. As Ms Lilac explains 
“We were getting none of the background information that you really 
need to put things in context, so we were getting an awful lot of 
information that didn’t really tell us very much at all… We were getting 
swamped with all the operational information and not enough strategic 
information” (May 2013) 
Mr Chestnut summarises by saying that “the most important thing is the 
papers that you are being asked to read and consider are relevant to the 
subject matter” (February 2013). 
 
Information is commonly perceived to be a source of power. Who has the 
information, how it is used and how it is shared are the keys to the effective use of 
the information (Ittner and Larcker, 2003). Culture, including the level of openness 
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within the organisation, also plays a significant part in information systems. The 
organisation’s culture is likely to impact how information is gathered, processed, 
accepted (or rejected) and used (Kappos and Rivard, 2008).  
 
The information provided to the Board is often managed and collated by a 
‘gatekeeper’. In this case, the gatekeeper’s role is to manage the information flow 
between producer and recipient. This gatekeeper varies by organisation from the 
CEO to the information producer within the organisation (Eccles, 1991). Whilst the 
Chair is responsible for ensuring that the Directors have the information they need 
to reach an informed decision, the Company Secretary is responsible for ensuring 
that the information flows effectively (Mallin, 2010:168). In practise, who governs the 
flow of information is rarely clear, as the information often represents power (Eccles, 
1991). As such, within Boards one way this power can be exercised is through both 
the sharing and withholding of information (Nadler, 2004), or as Ms Juniper put it “I 
took quite a lot of control over what information do we need to provide the Board, to 
make this a useful meeting”.  
 
However, the information that they receive is the ‘glue’ that enables the Board to be 
effective, or as Ms Lilac summarises  
“We’ve got the right people in the right roles with the right skills really 
and now we’re starting to see some really good reports coming to the 
Board about their [the organisation] activities for us to make strategic 
decisions on” (Ms Lilac, May 2013). 
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7.3.9 Risk Management 
“The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the 
principal risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The 
board should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2014:5) 
This is echoed in the Institute of Directors (2010) guidance to unlisted companies. 
There are many types of risk, the most commonly known is financial risk. In 
addition, businesses face risks relating to; operations, reputation, environment, 
pensions, and people as well as health and safety.  As Mr Pine explains  
“The risk is a major issue today, especially political risk.  There’s 
political risk, there’s financial risk, there’s reputational risk and all these 
issues today unfortunately play a part, especially in the emerging 
markets.” (November 2013) 
 
In regards to the variety of risks facing an organisation, the Institute of Risk 
Management (2002:9) identifies that a Board of Directors should:  
 “Know about the most significant risks facing the organisation  
 Know the possible effects on shareholder value of deviations to expected 
performance ranges  
 Ensure appropriate levels of awareness throughout the organisation  
 Know how the organisation will manage a crisis  
 Know the importance of stakeholder confidence in the organisation  
 Know how to manage communications with the investment community 
where applicable  
 Be assured that the risk management process is working effectively  
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 Publish a clear risk management policy covering risk management 
philosophy and responsibilities”  
 
The risks are usually assessed using a matrix of likelihood (probability) against 
severity (impact). This information is normally presented to the Board in the form of 
a risk register detailing: the impact, probability and mitigating actions. Mr Boxelder 
described the process of creating the register 
“Well we have quite a detailed risk register which has evolved.  It 
evolved, first of all we were given a template by one of our consultants.  
We then discussed the major risks that we thought the scheme faced at 
an away day a couple of years ago.  We broke into groups and we 
pooled all that.  We then brought that back and sort of put it into the risk 
register.  This was done on the [Administration and Risk] committee … 
and having got that, we review it, well we used to review it twice a year, 
we’ve now decided that we’ll review it once a year.” (February 2013) 
 
Additionally, it is the Board’s responsibility to set the ‘risk appetite’. The risk appetite 
is the amount of risk a company is willing to accept to enable it to achieve its 
strategic goals (KPMG, 2008). This risk appetite must encompass both positive and 
negative risks. Though, as Mr Mulberry highlights, the Board may not all agree with 
the risk appetite 
“So when I come in with my sort of new-fangled entrepreneurial ideal, they 
nod and they like it, but then when I’ve gone they become very risk averse 
again and then nobody moves forward and you sort of - you can come back to 
the same conversation again a week, two weeks later” (October 2013) 
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7.4 Summary 
Using the rules and regulations as a framework, it can be seen that there are a 
significant number of constraints and influencers affecting the Board as a whole and 
individual Directors.  The processes, procedure and actions undertaken by the 
Board are an amalgamation between their understanding of their role and the 
external expectations of their role. It is this balance of understanding that allows a 
Board to understand and undertake its role.  
 
At this stage, it is possible to overlay the perceptions, expectations and regulations 
onto the journey of the Board pack. As can be seen in Figure 23 (page 160), most 
focus is in the ‘Board Processing’ phase, nonetheless, the context influences all 
stages of the Board pack’s journey.
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Figure 23 – Boardroom Context’s Influence on the Journey of a Board Pack 
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8 KEY STORYLINE 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the identification of the core category through to the 
development of the substantive theory. This chapter moves from the concrete to the 
abstract; the aim of the chapter is to identify the underlying problem that the 
Directors face in relation to engaging with the information and to conceptualise that 
into how they resolve their issues and, ultimately, develop a supporting theory.  
 
The first activity in this chapter is to identify the core category. Glaser and Holton 
(2004, summarised in Holton, 2007:280) explains that the 
“criteria for establishing the core variable (category) within a grounded 
theory are that it is central, that it relates to as many other categories 
and their properties as possible, and that it accounts for a large portion 
of the variation in a pattern of behaviour. The core variable reoccurs 
frequently in the data and comes to be seen as a stable pattern that is 
increasingly related to other variables. It relates meaningfully and easily 
with other categories. It is completely variable and has a ‘carry through’ 
within the emerging theory by virtue of its relevance and explanatory 
power” 
It is important to note that “there are many different stories that can be constructed 
from [the] data”, as such, there is no one ‘right answer’ but many options which all 
need to be reviewed before selecting one which “reflects the ‘essence’ of what the 
participants are trying to convey” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:47).  
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This chapter utilises the storylining technique, as outlined in section 3.4.3., to 
identify the core category. The next section provides a short vignette of the storyline 
to introduce the underlying problem faced by Board members.  
 
8.2 Storyline – Vignette 
“It’s busier than the one I signed up for” laughed Mr Hawthorn (February 2013) 
when asked if the role of Director was a busy job; he went on to note that he is 
“sending emails to people most days”. As Ms Persimmon (May 2013) noted “I don’t 
do it full time.  Well, I say I don’t do it full time but there are weeks...  But that wasn’t 
the plan”.  
 
In response to being asked about how well his fellow Directors engage with the 
Board papers, Mr Chestnut (February 2013), the Chair of a FTSE100 Pension 
Board, noted that 
“they are all very good at it because obviously it takes a lot of time and 
particularly when you’re [working full time]…I’m now retired and so I 
arguably have more time.  When you’ve got a very busy job and you’re 
travelling a lot finding the time to get your head round all the papers 
can often be a challenge so I have to say that I put my trust in the 
Directors to find the time and they come to the Board pretty well armed 
with important questions and suggestions.” 
 
This issue of time available to Directors is also recognised by the information 
providers, for example Mr Hickory (February 2013) identified that 
“one of the things we’re [the organisation] very acutely aware of with 
our Trustees is that they’re all very busy people with professional lives 
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outside of Richter Trust and so we get very little of their attention span, 
so we need to make sure that we get and use that attention span as 
effectively as possible.”  
As Company Secretary, Mr Birch (January 2014) saw one of his main roles being to 
decide when the Board needed to be informed of an issue within the organisation, 
particularly between Board meetings. That is to say, he made decisions on their 
behalf as to how best to allocate their time. This is not to say he did that alone, 
rather in conjunction with internal experts, external experts, the CEO and/or the 
Chair as was relevant to the issue at hand.  
 
Likewise, when setting the Board meeting agenda, Mr Larch (November 2013) 
highlighted that he ensured that agenda for the meeting was “punchy”. He went on 
to note that he has restructured the agenda to be “sharper” with the emphasis being 
to talk about the detail of an issue outside of the Boardroom meeting, not in the 
meeting. Ms Silverbell (July 2013) identified that  
“the agenda might have between 12, usually between 12 and 16 items I 
would say, and it’s divided into strategy and policy and performance 
management and there’s a set of items for information which are… for 
noting.” 
As such, the process of writing the agenda, and the supporting papers, assists the 
Directors to identify the primary focus of their time allocated to the Board’s work.  
 
8.3 What is the Real Problem? 
“The grounded theorist researcher starts with an area of interest, not a 
professionally preconceived problem… [and]  has no preconceived 
 Key Storyline  
 
164 
 
view of what problems they may encounter in the research or how the 
participants resolve their problem or main concern” (Glaser, 1998:118) 
 
In the case of this research the main concern of the Board member interviewees 
was the ability to focus their time, and energy, into providing effective support for the 
organisation. Likewise, the interviewees who played a supporting role in relation to 
the Board were also focused on assisting the Board members to ensure that their 
time was well spent in relation to the organisation’s needs. As such, the 
conceptualisation of the underlying problem is that of ‘Allocating Effort’.  
 
‘Allocating Effort’ incorporates almost all of the codes and categories identified in 
Figure 19 (page 114), as Glaser and Holton (2004, cited in Holton, 2007:280) 
identified would be the case. It also underpins many of the principles discussed in 
Chapter 7; that is to say, many of the rules and regulations around corporate 
governance relate to Directors taking an active role in the organisation. Finally, 
effort is required at each stage of the Board pack’s journey to ensure that the 
Directors are able to make the necessary decisions for the organisation.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 9 (page 67), all categories, including the core category, have 
properties. These properties have dimensions which, in their turn have influencers. 
In the case of ‘Allocating Effort’ there are two distinct properties: complexity of the 
issue and perception of risk. 
 
8.3.1 Issue Complexity 
Schweiger et al. (1986:51) succinctly summarises Mason and Mitroff’s (1981) work 
on the characteristics of complex issues as having the following dimensions: 
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1. “Numerous complicated linkages among organizational and environmental 
elements; 
2. Dynamic and uncertain environments; 
3. Ambiguity of available information; 
4. Lack of complete information; and 
5. Conflicts concerning the outcomes of decisions among interested parties” 
Schweiger et al. (1986) go on to identify that these issues make for a complex 
decision environment where there is rarely a single correct answer. When these 
characteristics are applied to this research, it is clear to see that many of the issues 
identified by the participants are related to the area of complexity.  
 
In the pre-distribution phase, the complexity is related predominately to the 
gathering of the data. This extends from setting the agenda to sourcing the data and 
on to presenting the data. Mr Chestnut (February 2013) identified that a Board 
paper sometimes “cannot be very, very brief because the subject matter is complex 
and you wouldn’t be doing it justice”. As Ms Maple (February 2013) identified, some 
issues are so complex the “data doesn’t exist”.     
 
When it comes to individual processing, Mr Chestnut (February 2013) noted that 
“some papers that you have to go back over and over again [when preparing] and 
some cases it’s the complexity of the subject matter” which he identifies as the 
issue. Complexity is also an issue when the Director lacks the cognitive skills and 
experience to understand the issues, for example, Ms Ginkgo (May 2013) identified 
that she “didn’t understand a word” of the finance report. As such, she needed 
further training to enable her to understand the nuances of the issues presented.  
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However, much of the complexity is related to the contextualisation of the 
information received. The context includes many variables such as: internal to the 
organisation; competitors’ actions and wider industry issues; as well as political, 
economic, social and technological issues. These complexities sit within the 
individual Directors ability to process such a wide variety of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. This ability is as much about their individual cognitive ability as it is the 
skills, and background, that they bring to interpreting the issues (Mr Poplar, 
February 2013). Ruigrok et al. (2006:120) summarise that 
“According to the behavioural view of the firm, decision-making may be 
intendedly based on rational motives but is also influenced by cognitive 
human limitations… Hence, organisational decisions are limited first, by 
the cognitive limits of decision makers, such as limited knowledge of 
the factors relevant to the decision or the influence of personal values, 
preference and previous decisions and second, by not considering and 
evaluating all possible alternatives” 
 
Within the Board Processing phase, much of the complexity revolves around the 
nature of the individuals involved in the decision making. The Board needs to 
understand its role, and have a common vision of that role, before it can make the 
required decisions. Boards also need to understand the stakeholders, their 
interactions and power, and how any decision will impact on their relationship with 
them. As Mr Larch (November 2013) summarises “this is part of getting the Board to 
understand the decisions it’s got to make”. 
 
Mr Birch (January 2014) identified that issues put before the Board vary in 
complexity, with some being simple but most being highly complex. However, much 
of the Board’s agenda contains standard, non-complex items such as policy items, 
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standing committees’ minutes, conflict of interest reports, all of which are low 
complexity (Mr Chestnut, February 2013; Ms Silverbell, July 2013). Therefore, the 
issues presented to the Board for decisions are often of a highly complex nature 
requiring a significant amount of information, often requiring further research; in 
contrast, much of the information they receive in their Board packs are of a non-
complex nature.  As such, the individual Director, the Board and the organisation 
need to make a judgement for each piece of information as to how much effort they 
must make in relation to the paper, thereby ‘Allocating Effort’ in relation to the 
perceived complexity of the information.  
 
8.3.2 Risk Perception 
A significant amount of academic literature has been written with regards to risk 
perception in the fields of, amongst others: philosophy, psychology, sociology, 
finance and management. Definitions of risk vary from: objective - probabilities and 
measureable outcomes; to subjective - events relating to uncertain outcomes 
(Adams, 1995:7, Aven and Renn, 2009). However, Knight (1921:19) notes that a 
risk is materially different from uncertainty as a risk can be quantifiably measured, 
unlike an uncertainty where it is not possible to specify all of the variables. 
Nonetheless, Knight (ibid) acknowledges that the term risk is used in common 
parlance to describe both quantifiable and unquantifiable aspects. 
 
Regardless of the definition of risk is it intrinsic in human behaviour, as all decisions 
carry some form of risk, however, as Adams (1995:15) identifies behaviours are a 
balance of: propensity to take risks, the reward gained from taking the risk, the 
perceived danger of the taking the risk and the negative consequences of taking the 
risk.  
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Aven and Renn (2009:6) identify that “that risk perception does not only cover 
perceived seriousness of risk but also acceptability of risk”; that is to say risk and 
risk perception are not the same as the latter has a value judgement attached to it. 
Individuals “construct reality out of their experience[s]” (emphasis in original Adams, 
1995:9) when making value judgements about risk. Therefore, an individual’s 
perception of risk is multifaceted based on their experiences, background and 
cultural norms. In summary 
“risk perception is socially constructed, … it is psychological elements 
which guide peoples' responses to a particular hazard rather than the 
technical risk estimates traditionally provided by experts” (Frewer, 
1999:569) 
 
Risk perception in relation to the Board has three aspects: the individual’s 
perception of risk; the Board as a group’s perception of risk; and the organisations 
perception of risk. These three aspects are not mutually exclusive, for example the 
balance between the Board controlling an organisation and providing a service to 
enable it to drive forward (Prof Cherry, January 2013) is correlated with the Board’s 
powers and the trust an organisation (represented in Zhang’s research by the CEO) 
places in the Board (Zhang, 2013). Nonetheless, as  Sjöberg (2000:2) summarises 
“people do not make the same estimate when they rate the risk to themselves, to 
their family, or to people in general”.  
 
The role of the Board can be seen in each of the aspects in relation to the risk 
perception. As Figure 22 (page 132) identifies, there are four classifications of 
Board role types; ‘Rubber Stamper’, ‘Watchdog’, ‘Advisor’ and ‘Pilot’ (Jonsson, 
2005). Each of these roles can be correlated to the level of risk accepted, or 
avoided, by each of the aspects; for example, a ‘Rubber Stamper’ Board may have 
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a very low risk threshold and are therefore unwilling, or unable, to make decisions 
beyond approvals. In contrast, a ‘Pilot’ Board may be willing to take a higher level of 
risk in order to lead the organisation. As Jonsson (2005) conclude, these roles are 
not mutually exclusive and vary over time.  
 
In relation to risk perception, the Director’s individual perception of their role may 
differ from that of the Board, as a collective, and the organisation. That is to say 
there may be a miss-alignment between:  
 The individual’s perception of their role and their perception of risk in relation 
to the role 
 The collective Board’s unified view of their role and risk perception 
 The organisation’s perception of the Board’s role and the amount of authority 
allocated to the Board either through controlling of the information or through 
the authorities granted to the Board to make decisions 
For example, Mr Boxelder (February 2013) noted that on one Board they  
“get pretty poor information flow.  The Board is treated much more as a 
rubber stamp… So we’re forever having to ask for more information 
and saying: ‘no we want more time to think about this’.  We’re 
presented with things as though they’ve been agreed or they’re fait 
accompli, whereas the Board needs to make its own decision about 
things and have the information to do it.” 
 
This miss-alignment is also illustrated by Mr Fothergilla’s (October 2013) process of 
telephoning each Board member in advance of the meeting to identify areas of 
concerns raised from the Board papers. This process enables him to align the risk 
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perception between the individuals, the Board and the organisation in relation to a 
particular issue in the Board pack. 
 
The majority of the Board members interviewed referred to their background when 
discussing their contribution to the Board’s discussions. Mr Elm (March 2013) 
identified that individuals bring “their own personal experience” to their “reading and 
understanding” of the Board packs in advance of the meeting. This fits with the 
concept of risk being socially constructed, however, the format of risk-based 
information, e.g. frequencies versus probabilities, presented to an individual may 
have a greater impact on risk decisions than their culture or background (Fraser-
Mackenzie et al., 2014). As such, the information providers are also playing a part in 
controlling the individual’s risk perception, either consciously or unconsciously.  
  
Weber at al’s (2002) research into risk perceptions identified that women are less 
likely to engage in risk-taking behaviours in most environments, except in a social 
context. In contrast, Adam and Funk’s (2012) research identifies that having women 
on Boards does not correlate with more risk-averse decision making. In the context 
of individual preparation for the Board, Ms Eucalyptus (January 2014) identified that 
she could not “fully participate” in the meeting unless she had read all of the Board 
pack. That is to say, she reduced the risk of being perceived, either by herself or 
other Board members, as being inadequate for the Board by ensuring that she was 
fully prepared for the meeting. In the context of the Board’s decision making the 
lower risk taking behaviour is counterbalanced by the individuals’ level of 
preparation for the decision. 
 
Dixon and Dogan (2003:54), in their philosophical treatise on Board decision making 
identify that “good corporate governance” requires Directors to: 
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“Recognize the limitations of their cognitive map…seek out and engage 
with those who disagree with their cognitive map … [and] treat all 
knowledge claims skeptically, accepting that there are multiple 
standards by which they could be justified” 
 
Ms Camellia (May 2013) identified that “taking your own point of view and holding 
with that view if you think it’s important” is part of the Director’s role. In contrast, Ms 
Juniper (May 2013) identified that the Chair’s role is “to try and find the common 
ground and focus people on what the organisation is trying to achieve”. This 
requires the Board to be able to communicate effectively in an open, fair and 
trusting environment, therefore, enabling each Board member to freely debate. That 
does not mean to say that there will always be consensus, as Prof Cherry (January 
2014) notes there is a  
“tension deliberately built into the [UK] Companies Act which is you 
have to discuss debates around the Board room table, but it should be 
a collegial activity doing that and you need to push for a consensus.  
However, there will not always be consensus and the Companies Act 
allows for that and that’s where voting can come in.  If there is a vote 
then that’s fine and if there [are] people who disagree that’s fine, but 
once that vote taken then the law says that decision goes ahead and 
then those people who voted against go with it or … they should 
consider their position.” 
 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, Adams (1995:20) identifies that risk 
behaviours are a balance, he goes on to identify that the balance is also influenced 
by others risk balancing behaviour. As such, individuals are part of a greater 
feedback loop that influences their own risk-balancing behaviours; dependent upon 
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the individuals within the Board, this can lead to a vicious or virtuous circle in 
perceiving the risks. Likewise, this can be extended into the organisation in relation 
to how they interact with the Board.  
 
Risk perception is core to the decision making processes within a Board. The 
perception of risk is at the individual, Board and organisational levels; it is 
intrinsically linked with how they perceive their individual role and the Board’s 
collective role. 
 
8.4 Theoretical Development 
The concept of effort in relation to the work of Boards is not a new research area. In 
Forbes and Milliken’s (1999:Fig. 1) highly cited paper on cognition and corporate 
governance, they identify that there is a complex interdependency with regards to: 
effort norms, cognition, knowledge and skills, cohesiveness and demographics in 
relation to task and firm performance. They note that “directors face many 
competing demands for their time and must keep carefully budgeted schedules”  
(Lorsch, 1989 and Mace, 1986, cited in Forbes and Milliken, 1999:493). The UK 
Corporate Governance Code requires Directors “to allocate sufficient time to the 
company to discharge their responsibilities effectively” (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014:5). However, Harris and Shimizu (2004:792) suggest that 
“busy directors can somehow overcome this [trade-off between time 
constraints and activity]  and govern as required. It may be that they 
draw upon their experiences from other Boards and become more 
efficient decision makers. That is, they may recognize patterns and 
problems that have been encountered at other companies. Such 
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accumulated knowledge can facilitate faster learning and minimize 
preparation time.” 
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) identify that there is a lack of clarity around the role of 
effort in relation to Directors and Boards. They identify that there is a link between 
the time and effort allocated to the role and the individuals and Board’s 
understanding of their role. This research provides greater depth to this discussion 
and theorises that, as illustrated in Figure 24: 
The level of engagement with the information by Directors is 
determined by ‘Allocating Effort’. This effort is a balance between the 
level of risk perceived by, and to, the individual, the Board as a group 
and the organisation, balanced with the perceived complexity of the 
issue at each stage of the Board pack’s journey. This balance is 
constrained by the time available and the understanding of the role of 
the Board. 
 
Figure 24 – Key Factors Influencing 'Allocating Effort'  
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9 HOW ‘ALLOCATING EFFORT’ IS EXTERNALISED 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to ground the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’ back within the 
actions of the Board. This chapter returns to the philosophical underpinnings of this 
research, that of pragmatism, as discussed in 3.2.2. Peirce (1984-1992) identifies 
that there are “symbols which are associated with meaning through their common 
language… symbols are understood by both the utterer and the listener” (emphasis 
in original Nathaniel, 2011:191). Nathaniel (2011:193) goes on to explain that “each 
person understands and interprets symbols from their own unique perspective”. In 
this research, the perspectives of ‘Allocating Effort’ are that of the Board’s role and 
risk perception. Therefore, assuming the accuracy of this philosophical stance, there 
must be symbols within the Board’s processes that enable us to glimpse an 
understanding of the perspectives in ‘Allocating Effort’. 
 
9.2 ‘Symbols’  
 “The decision-making process is particularly good in that we know 
when we’re turning up to a Board meeting what’s on the agenda that 
needs a decision, we know which things are being presented just for 
information to keep us in the loop of things that are going on …and if a 
decision needs to be made there’s enough information there and offer 
an opportunity beforehand for a sub-committee to have done a lot of 
work and then present that back to the rest of the Board with the 
papers that everyone’s had the chance to read beforehand.” (Mr 
Linden, October 2013) 
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This quote provides an insight into how Boards begin to externalise the issue of 
‘Allocating Effort’. During the Boardroom observations, each of the Board paper 
types was clearly annotated on both the agenda and the papers themselves. In the 
case of Curie NHS Trust, the majority of the items on the agenda were “To Note” 
with only a few “To Approve”. Likewise, Pasteur NHS Trust papers were 
predominately categorised as “Note” with a small number labelled “Discuss”, 
“Review” or “Approve”.  
 
The Board papers are categorised into types, though it should be noted that 
different Boards may use different terms for each type. Broadly the types 
encompass; 
 For Note: noted but not specifically discussed in the Board meeting, often 
the Chair will ask if there are any questions relating to the item but there will 
be no formal presentation of the issues e.g. update on the social media 
policy 
 For Report: a presentation or a paper that is formally presented to the 
Board in the meeting, usually by an Executive Director, and is briefly 
discussed e.g. financial report  
 For Discussion: items that require the Board to debate the issue and come 
to an agreement, often the output will provide the Executive team with a 
mandate for action e.g. organisational structure review and resulting actions 
These three types of Board papers are symbols that have “meanings, significances, 
and interpretations” (Nathaniel, 2011:194) for the Directors, Board and organisation. 
These three paper types are illustrated in the quotes in Figure 25 (page 176). 
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Figure 25 – Quotes Illustrating Paper Types 
9.2.1 For Note 
Items provided to the Board in the ‘For Note’ category are usually straight forward 
and of a policy or procedural nature which lack complexity. These often include 
such items as updates to mandatory polices or reports from standing sub-
committees. Often the issues in this category are those which ‘good practice’ 
perceived as belonging to the Board but where the knowledge and expertise 
required lies within the organisation. The majority of Board papers are in this 
category, in the five Board meetings observed on average two thirds of all agenda 
item were listed as ‘For Note’ and were not formally discussed unless a Director had 
a specific question.  
 
In relation to the individual Director, ‘For Note’ items are usually deemed low risk as 
the organisation has identified a suitable answer and there is no requirement for the 
Director to have an in depth understanding as there is no decision required from 
them. In relation to the Board as a group, these issues are not deemed to be high 
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risk. The organisation views these as risks that they are managing suitably and 
require minimal input from the Board.  
 
9.2.2 For Report 
Reported items are often complex, however, a clear understandable report can be 
produced for the Board. These reports often use trend analysis to communicate 
progress, such as financial trends and utilise tools such as Kaplan and Norton’s 
(1996) Balanced Scorecard (Mr Cedrela, October 2013). In the meeting the 
appropriate Director, usually the CEO or CFO, would talk to the written report with 
or without the use of further presentation materials (e.g. PowerPoint slides). This 
would then be followed by a short discussion primarily relating to clarification of the 
specific issues. These discussions would usually be dominated by Directors with 
experience in that specific arena, for example in the case of both Boards observed 
there were Non-Executive Directors with Financial experience who would usually be 
the first to ask questions on the Chief Financial Officers’ (CFO) report. These 
questions were usually of a complex nature relating to, for example, underlying 
fiscal assumptions. 
 
Whilst the Board as a group may own the issue, such as ensuring the fiscal 
soundness of the organisation, within the organisation there are usually 
professionals who specialise in the areas reported on. These professionals, such as 
trained accountants, manage the risks related to the issues on behalf of the 
organisation and the Board.  The reliance on the experienced Directors to ask 
suitable questions in the Boardroom lowers the perceived risks by the individual 
non-expert Directors.  
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9.2.3 For Discussion 
Items for discussion in the Board meeting are often complicated but not usually 
complex. That is to say, whilst there are a significant number of variables to be 
considered, the decision is straight forward enough to be able to be made within the 
short time that the Board has available for the agenda item. Of the meetings 
observed most items had only ten minutes allocated for discussion, with the longest 
observed being allocated twenty minutes. That being said, the ‘For Discussion’ 
items usually over ran their time allocation, though all except one of the observed 
meetings ultimately finished on time. 
 
The ‘For Discussion’ items usually required a decision to be made by the Board for 
the organisation to implement. The decisions usually have more than one suitable 
option with risks attached to each outcome. In most cases the Board paper has a 
recommendation for the Board to agree, or disagree, with. As such, the organisation 
transfers the risk of the decision to the Board; likewise, individual Directors 
collectively agree the decision, thereby mitigating individual risk by making a group 
decision. Occasionally, a Director will disagree with the overall decision and this 
would usually be recorded in the minutes for future record should the decision turn 
out to be unsound.   
 
9.3 Allocation Process 
Directors need information that is “appropriate to the organisation” however “[i]t’s 
impossible to say” what that might be (Prof Cherry, January 2013); that is to say the 
information required is “Board specific” (Prof Cherry, January 2013). Therefore, the 
allocation of effort to enable the Board to make sound business judgements 
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(Leblanc and Gilles, 2005:19, Nowak and McCabe, 2003) will also be Board 
specific. As such, the process is intrinsic to the journey of the Board pack, as 
described in chapter 5. 
 
The type of paper is decided early in the process. As discussed in section 5.2, the 
setting of the agenda is usually a collaborative effort between the CEO, the Chair 
and the Company Secretary. It is commonly based on an annual pattern of issues 
(Mr Oak, November 2013; Ms Elderberry, May 2013) for example the annual 
reporting process. It is this trio of individuals who will, usually, decide if a paper is 
‘For Note’, ‘For Report’ or ‘For Discussion’.  
 
The allocation of paper type will usually be related to the output required. This 
allocation will be based on a number of factors, predominately: who owns the risk of 
the output, such as a regulatory requirement and what is the role of the Board in 
relation to the issue, to ‘rubber stamp’ it or to provide input. The role of the Board for 
each paper will sit within the wider context of the Board’s overall role as perceived 
by the CEO, Chair and Company Secretary. 
 
Time is also a factor in the paper allocation process. Most interviewees noted that 
their meetings were three to four hours long, four to ten times per year. With, at 
most, 40 hours of meeting time per annum, there is the requirement to ask “how 
much time we have allocated to [each item]?” (Ms Lilac, May 2013). This time 
restriction reduces the ability for the Board to have lengthy discussions on multiple 
topics. As such, the agenda needs to be clear, and focused, on the critical, high risk 
issues (Mr Larch, November 2013).  
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9.4  Externalisation of ‘Allocating Effort’  
‘Allocating Effort’ is a complex interplay of the perception of the role by individual 
Directors, the Board and the organisation; this is intertwined with the risk perception 
of each individual Directors, the Board and the organisation. This interplay is 
illuminated on a practical level by the use of paper types in the Board pack. 
 
The two dimensions of allocating effort can be mapped on a two-by-two matrix. As 
illustrated in Figure 26 (page 181) (adapted from McFadzean et al., 2007:Fig.9), the 
horizontal axis refers to the perception of complexity in the issue to be discussed. 
This complexity can be complicated or complex; to differentiate between these two 
an analogy is useful: 
 Complicated: a Boeing 747 is a complicated system however it can be 
broken down into its many individual components with basic DIY skills 
 Complex: mayonnaise is complex as it is impossible to break it down into its 
original components without scientific expertise 
In relation to Board papers, the perception of complexity relates to the Directors 
perception of their own ability to decompose the issue into its component parts.  
 
The vertical axis is the perception of risk the Director, Board or organisation 
attached to the issue. Where there is a low risk there is minimal input; conversely 
where there is high risk there is greater input. This input level is reflected across all 
stages of the Board pack’s journey.  
 
This risk and complexity matrix can then be overlaid by the paper types as symbols 
of perception. That is to say, the label attached to the paper provides a symbolic 
representation of the risk and complexity of the issue that the paper contains.  
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Figure 26 – Externalising ‘Allocating Effort’ (1)  
(adapted from McFadzean et al., 2007:Fig.9) 
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However, as can be seen from the matrix, there is no paper type for high risk, 
complex issues. This is due to the issue being beyond the manageable scope of a 
Board meeting, therefore outside of the Board pack process. This usually results in 
an ad hoc committee being set up to look at the issue in further detail. Mr Linden 
(October 2013) provides an example: 
“When the concept of the academy for the school was introduced to 
the Board it was very much in the context of other people have done 
something very similar - financially it’s worked very well for the school, 
it’s given them a lot more independence - and then when the sub-
committee went off to investigate it further that conclusion was 
reconfirmed and re-presented and everybody bought into it.” 
In this example, it was a high risk decision with a significant number of complex 
variables for which the Board felt that it had insufficient information to make the 
decision.  
 
Mr Chestnut (February 2013) summarises the role of the ad hoc committee as: 
“[The Board] gets together a sort of sub-group so that the heavy lifting 
is done by three or four people and then any recommendations or 
decisions are taken before [the] Board for discussion”  
 
9.4.1 Ad Hoc Committees 
Ad hoc committees are usually utilised for highly complex issues. The issues usually 
have a large number of dynamic and interwoven aspects with numerous options for 
solutions.  The decisions allocated to ad hoc committees are usually high risk, such 
as a large investment (Ms Maple, February 201) or a strategic review (Ms 
Eucalyptus, January 2014).  
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In a review of the 2013 Annual Reports for all FTSE100 companies, six specifically 
mention ad hoc committees in their reports. As can be seen in Table 5, many of the 
reports identify the constraints within which the ad hoc committees operate. These 
can be summarised into three constituent parts: activity, authority and actors. 
 
 
Table 5 - Ad Hoc Committee References in FTSE100 Companies 2013 Annual Reports 
 
The first constituent part is activity. The activities of an ad hoc committee can 
broadly be categorised as; action, decision or information sifting. An action may 
include, for example, the setting up of a joint venture or the implementation of a new 
strategic vendor (Mr Ironwood, January 2013). A decision may either be a full 
decision or a partial decision; the latter being the most common with a 
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recommendation being brought to the full Board for decision (Mr Birch, January 
2014). Finally, it may be an information sifting exercise to enable the full Board to 
have clarity on an issue. The ad hoc committee’s activity will usually require a 
significant amount of information, from both internal and external sources, to enable 
it to undertake the specified activity. This large amount of information will usually 
make the activity impractical to undertake in the usual Board meeting due to the 
complexity (Mr Ironwood, January 2014).  
 
Authority is the second constituent part. The Board will define the remit of the ad 
hoc committee; the remit will usually clearly identify the scope of work to be 
undertaken. Likewise, the remit would usually specify the limits to the level of 
decision making which the committee is authorised to make. The authority would 
also, usually, specify the reporting process to the main Board to ensure that all 
Directors were fully informed. This allocation of authority provides a clear statement 
on the level of risk delegated to the ad hoc committee by the main Board. 
 
The final constituent part is that of actors. The members of the ad hoc committee 
will usually be a blend of Executive Directors, NEDs and subject matter experts, 
either from within the organisation or external (Prof Cherry, January 2014). The 
committee members will have suitable skills, knowledge and experience to enable 
the task to be undertaken. In addition they will have the time and motivation to 
dedicate to the additional work (Prof Cherry, January 2014). Furthermore, the actors 
on the ad hoc committee must perceive that they have the power to engage with the 
activity. That is to say, they believe that they are trusted by the Board to undertake 
the work. Finally, the membership must vary between different ad hoc committees 
to ensure that there is not a reliance on one, or a small number, of individuals. This 
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membership variety ensures that “no individual or small group of individuals can 
dominate the board’s decision taking” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014:10). 
 
These three constituent parts, and their components, are illustrated in Figure 27 
(page 186). As described in section 3.3.3.1, many of the interviewees were asked to 
discuss a time when the Board did, and did not, work well together. A third of the 
interviewees used an example of setting up an ad hoc committee when describing a 
time the Board worked well together.  The interviewees identifies that there are 
three core tenants to the use of ad hoc committees, these can be summarised as: 
 “The issue needs to be large and time consuming causing it to be beyond 
the practical scope of a standard Board meeting 
 The issue needs to be complex with an number of facets to be considered 
and different solutions identifiable 
 The ad hoc committee needs to have a clear outline of their responsibilities, 
decision making powers and reporting process” (Massie, 2014a) 
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Figure 27 - Constituent Parts of an Ad Hoc Committee (Massie, 2014b)
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It is worth highlighting that, as identified in section 7.3.5, there are two types of 
Board subcommittees: standing and ad hoc. Within most corporate governance 
regulations there are requirements for specific, standing, subcommittees, for 
example the UK Corporate Governance Code mandates the formation of 
nominations, audit and remuneration committees (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014). Other organisations will have additional standing subcommittees, for 
example Pasteur NHS Trust has a governance committee. These committees 
usually have defined terms of references, therefore are allocated appropriate issues 
without needing to reference the Board each time (Mr Ironwood, February 2013). As 
Mr Boxelder (February 2013) notes “everybody [Director] sits on at least one 
[standing] committee”. As such, they form a standard part of the Director’s role.  
 
Standing committees are a tool for effective governance, however, they are outside 
of the issue of ‘Allocating Effort’ as they form part of a Director’s ordinary duties. In 
contrast, ad hoc committees are set up to look at specific, complex issues and fall 
outside of the usual duties of the Director. Therefore, the Director has to put 
additional effort into their role when participating in ad hoc committees.  
 
9.5 Perception Grid 
The use of an ad hoc committee completes the two-by-two matric, or ‘Perception 
Grid’ (term adopted from McFadzean et al., 2007:Fig.9), as can be seen in Figure 
28 (page 190). The four quadrants provide symbolic objects through which 
externalisation of the perception of risk and complexity can be glimpsed (Nathaniel, 
2011:194). 
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It is important to note that the papers types are not permanently fixed, both over the 
long and short term. For example, Leblanc and Gilles (2005:89) identifies that it is 
for the Chair to ensure that there is sufficient time for the discussion of agenda 
items. Therefore, Mr Fothergilla (October 2013) uses the routine of a telephone call 
with each of the NEDs between their receipt of the Board pack and the Board 
meeting to understand 
“what they thought was important, what particularly fussed them, what 
they thought the Board papers missed out on, not in any sense in order 
to rig the discussion but so that I can then alert the executives”  
This enables him to pre-brief the reporting Executive of any specific issues and to 
adjust the timing allocated for discussion if necessary. Likewise, Mr Boxelder 
(February 2013) will talk to other Board members, particularly those with in interest 
in the paper’s topic, ahead of the meeting to understand how the “discussion is 
going to go”.  
 
Furthermore, once in the meeting the allocation type may change. The individual 
Director’s perception of their role, or the risk they associate with the issue, may 
impact on the time slots available for discussion. As such, the Chair needs to 
balance the time for discussion with ensuring the meeting progresses (Mr 
Fothergilla, October 2013; Mr Ironwood, February 2013). For example, in each of 
the Currie and Pasteur NHS Trust observations, the reports from the Committee 
Chairs were curtailed due to over running discussions, as the Directors were keen 
to engage with ‘For Report’ and ‘For Discussion’ papers. In most cases, this 
resulted in the ‘For Report’ presentation slot allocated to each Committee Chair, to 
summaries their committee’s activities, being replaced by the Board Chair asking 
the Board members to note the committee’s minutes and asking if there were any 
specific questions.  
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In relation to longer term changes, Mr Cedar (February 2013) gave an example of 
Health and Safety where “the Board never really looked at” it until they had an issue 
resulting in a fine and now his Board has “a much more comprehensive health and 
safety report … every time we meet”. As such, the perception of risk on this issue 
changed, thereby changing the report type from ‘For Note’ to ‘For Report’. 
 
In summary, ‘Allocating Effort’ is externalised by the use of symbols represented by 
‘For Note’, ‘For Report’, ‘For Discussion’ and ‘Ad Hoc Committees’. If all parties 
have a common, agreed, perception of the role of the organisation’s Board as well 
as an understanding of each Board members perception of risk, the Board as a 
groups’ perception of risk and the organisation’s perception of risk then the symbols 
will be representative of ‘Allocating Effort’. Alternatively, it will be the visible 
manifestation of the misalignment between the parties either in relation to their role 
understanding or the risk attributed to the issue. 
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Figure 28 – Externalising ‘Allocating Effort’ – (2) Perception Grid  
(adapted from McFadzean et al., 2007:Fig.9) 
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10 CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
As explained in chapter 1, “The grounded theory researcher starts with an area of 
interest, not a professionally preconceived problem” (Glaser, 1998:118). The area of 
interest for this research, as illustrated in Figure 29, was the stage after the 
individual Director has received the information, usually in the form of a Board pack, 
and prior to a Board agreed output, such as a decision. It should be noted that it 
quickly became apparent that the stage in the Board pack process prior to 
distribution is a key part of understanding the area of research. 
 
Figure 29 – Research Area of Interest 
This research used a grounded theory approach to understand, in depth, the area of 
interest and the issues the Directors face when engaging with the information, as 
identified by the Directors themselves (Glaser, 1998:115). The output of this 
research is a substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:114) that aims to assist 
a lay person, that is to say an ordinary Director or other interested party, to 
understand the interrelationship between information, the Board member and the 
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Board. Glaser and Strauss (1967:114) identify that a substantive theory is one that 
‘stand ups’ in relation to the population (or substantive area) studied. 
 
The data collected for the research was interviews, observations and technical 
meetings. The interviewees included: nine Board Chairs; eleven Non-Executive 
Directors; four Board level Executives; five information providers to Boards; one 
Board advisor and one industry/academic expert. This represented experiences 
from over 100 Boards including two top FTSE100 companies. Additionally, five 
Board meetings were attended to observe Directors in context and four technical 
meetings were undertaken to understand specific issues. The data was analysed in 
accordance with grounded theory principles and processes. 
 
Through analysis of the journey of a Board pack in chapter 5, and the subsequent 
understanding of the context of the Boardroom in chapter 7, a substantive theory 
was developed, based on the core concept of ‘Allocating Effort’. That theory, as 
articulated in chapter 8 and illustrated in Figure 24 (page 173), is: 
The level of engagement with the information by Directors is 
determined by ‘Allocating Effort’. This effort is a balance between the 
level of risk perceived by, and to, the individual, the Board as a group 
and the organisation, balanced with the perceived complexity of the 
issue at each stage of the Board pack’s journey. This balance is 
constrained by the time available and the understanding of the role of 
the Board. 
 
This theory was further developed by looking at the symbols that externalise the 
allocation of effort. These were identified, in chapter 9, through investigating the 
types of papers produced within a Board pack. They are identified as: ‘For Note’, 
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‘For Report’ and ‘For Discussion’. Each of these paper types have a risk and 
complexity element, however, there was no paper type for high risk/complex. This 
research identified that ‘Ad Hoc Committees’ are used to fill the gap in the process 
of ‘Allocating Effort’.  
 
However, in relating the symbols back to the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’, it was 
noted that if all parties have a common, agreed, perception of the role of the 
organisation’s Board; an understanding of each Board member’s perception of risk; 
the Board as a groups’ perception of risk; and the organisation’s perception of risk 
then the symbols will be representative of ‘Allocating Effort’. Alternatively, it will be 
the visible manifestation of the misalignment between the parties either in relation to 
their role understanding or the risk attributed to the issue. 
 
10.2 Existing Literature 
Glaser and Strauss (1967:37) identify that an “effective strategy” for a grounded 
theorist 
“is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of theory and fact on the 
area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories 
will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas. 
Similarities and convergences with the literature can be established 
after the analytical core of categories has emerged” 
 
The literature referred to in this research, so far, comes from a wide range of 
academic disciplines including: corporate governance, management, behavioural 
science, anthropology, psychology and sociology.  A review of the literature 
provides no single text that exactly mirrors this research. Nonetheless, there are a 
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number of complimentary studies that ought to be recognised in relation to this 
research. 
 
In 1957 James Edwards wrote a paper on accounting reports for top management. 
In his paper he noted that Directors “may not be trained accountants” (Edwards, 
1957:56) therefore the financials need to be readable to ensure they are understood 
by the audience. He also notes that Directors’ require internal and external 
information to enable them to contextualise, and therefore utilise, the financial 
information.  
 
In 1978 William Boulton identified that as the role of Boards evolve from legitimising 
to an active role in auditing and directing the organisation, the Directors’ information 
needs also evolve. Boulton (1978:835) summarises by stating that  
“[i]t is no longer adequate for Directors to rely solely upon management 
to… determine the information requirements of the Board. The 
complexity of the problem must be taken into account … as each 
Board begins to move into its more active Auditing and Directing roles” 
(emphasis in original)  
 
There is, however, a “trade-off between information costs and uncertainty… 
[which] is an issue for Boards in the fulfilment of both” its monitoring and 
performance roles (Nowak and McCabe, 2003:301). In their research, Nowak 
and McCabe (2003) identify that the CEO/management are the gatekeeper 
for information, which becomes more of an issue as the Board “assumes a 
more active role” (ibid:304).  
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A longitudinal study undertaken of 31 Board meetings of six Boards, 
undertaken by Machold and Farquhar (2013), investigated the tasks Boards 
undertook and the time allocated to those tasks in Board meetings. The 
study identified that a considerable amount of meeting time was “devoted to 
information dissemination and legal compliance activities” (ibid:160). They go 
on to conclude that Boards should “reflect on their use of scarce meeting 
time” (ibid:161).  
 
Another longitudinal study inside the Boardroom, this time conducted by Pugliese et 
al. (2015), identified that different Directors took the lead in discussions based on 
either their role or expertise. They also identified that, of the two Boards they 
studied, one perceived the Board meeting as an “arena to share information” 
whereas the other saw is as an “arena in which to shape strategy” (ibid:19).  
 
Finally, Leblanc and Gilles (2005:248) conclude that one of the pivotal factors in 
decision making is the behavioural aspects of the Board of Directors both as 
individuals and as a group. They postulate that  
“Board dynamics may be the single most important factor in determining 
the effectiveness of the Board in carrying out its duties” (ibid.) 
 
Whilst many other papers could have been included in this section, these papers 
provide a ‘snap shot’ of the literature. They provide the context for identifying where 
this research sits within the academic discourse on Boards and individual Directors 
engagement with information.  
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10.3 New and Novel 
A Doctoral Thesis needs to demonstrate “the creation and interpretation of new 
knowledge” (The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, 2011:32). As 
such, this section aims to clearly demonstrate how this research has developed new 
knowledge in the field of corporate governance. This will be done in two parts: 
theoretical and impact. As this is a grounded theory study, which aims to assist a lay 
person, there is more emphasis on impact than theory.  
 
10.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
The theory established in this research was developed from the inside of the “black 
box” of the Board (Pettigrew, 1992:178). This approach to theory development 
within the corporate governance sphere has provided a unique opportunity to 
understand the Board from the inside out. That is not to say that this approach is 
novel, it is to highlight that gaining access to inside the proverbial “Black Box” (ibid) 
allows a different perspective to be gained than from the more traditional corporate 
governance research approach of looking from the outside in.  
 
As identified in the previous section, a search of the literature provides no matching 
research to support, or contradict, the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’. However, as this 
dissertation has identified, a number of the variables associated with ‘Allocating 
Effort’ have previously been extensively researched, for example risk perception. 
Likewise, this research adds to the debates around the attention-based view of the 
firm, routed in the works of Simon (1947); as Ocasio (1997:203) explains 
“Existing theories of bounded rationality, enacted environments, and 
managerial cognition all share the first principle of the theory - that 
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what decision-makers do depends on how they selectively focus their 
attention on certain characteristics of the organization and its 
environment, and ignore others” 
 
The new, and novel, theoretical development put forward by this dissertation is the 
thesis stated in the introduction to this conclusion, that of ‘Allocating Effort’ which 
combines the concepts of; the perception of the Board’s role, issue complexity 
perception, risk perception and time available. This adds to the body of knowledge 
on “how they [in this case Directors] selectively focus their attention” (Ocasio, 
1997:203) on the information provided within the Boardroom context.  
 
This research has, in addition, added to the body of knowledge of Board processes. 
In identifying and illuminating the journey of the Board pack, and the critical impact 
this has on the decisions taken by the Board, it provides a foundation for further 
process-based research. In addition, the development of the Perception Grid 
provides a tool for further theoretical development in relation to the internal 
processes of the Board.  
  
10.3.2 Impact 
At this stage in the research process it is not possible to clearly state the impact of 
this research. Nonetheless, there are a number of areas that may provide new and 
novel ways for Boards to utilise this research, as discussed below.  
 
The primary impact of this research is in the development of a tool to assist Boards 
in the allocation process for paper types. The Perception Grid provides a structure 
for this discussion; the output of which impacts within each stage of the Board 
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pack’s journey, from identifying papers required to time spent discussing the paper 
in the Board meeting. Furthermore, there are numerous activities undertaken within 
an organisation that require Board level support. The Perception Grid provides the 
organisation with a tool to assist in understanding how the Board is, practically, able 
to interact with all of these requirements; for example, during the planning for a 
Board meeting the allocation of timings for the meetings can be decided by 
reference to the grid and the appropriate classification of an individual paper. 
 
Additionally, in Board evaluations, the Perception Grid provides a tool for reflecting 
on the effective use of the Directors time, both in meetings and in preparation for 
those meetings. Whilst the Perception Grid, in its current form, could not be used as 
a formalised measurement system, the grid can be utilised as a discussion aid 
during the evaluations. For example, during Board evaluations it could be utilised at 
an individual level to classify existing reports (e.g. the contents of the past few 
Board packs). This could then be compared across the Board and with other key 
influencers (e.g. the Company Secretary) to gauge the differing risk and complexity 
perceptions, as illustrated in Figure 30 
 
 
Figure 30 – Perception Grid Application Example 
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In this example, Board Members A and B have differing views on papers four and 
six, understanding why this might be could prove illuminating in interpreting the 
Board dynamics. As such, the Perception Grid can be used to discern the differing 
perspectives within the Boardroom by engaging Directors in a discussion of their 
understanding of their role and their perception of risk and complexity. This could be 
especially useful in understanding Director diversity, or lack thereof, in relation to 
Boardroom decision making. 
 
As identified in section 6.3.1, Boards are increasingly moving towards electronic 
Board packs. This is often done via the use of off-the-shelf-software solutions 
provided by third party organisation. In the meetings with both Board software 
providers they described how their software separated the information the Directors 
received by types (Mr Fir, October 2013; Mr Cypress, January 2014). The 
Perception Grid provides a tool for the Board to begin the process of transitioning to 
a structured electronic system by providing a framework for these discussions. 
Moreover, the use of these software packages is normalising the separation of 
paper types across Boards. This normalisation includes the expectation that 
Directors will be able to remotely make decisions without formally meeting via tools 
embedded in the software. This is a change in both the role of the Board meeting, 
and the ability for Directors to allocate time to a Board, as the ‘Boardroom’ is able to 
be with them virtually. This may lead to a positive effect for the organisation but may 
have a detrimental effect on other roles undertaken by the Directors (such as full 
time executive roles), however, further research is required to understand this 
potential issue.  
 
Most importantly, this research provides an opportunity to re-evaluate corporate 
governance policy. Currently, in the UK, there is no requirement for Boards to 
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disclose their use of ad hoc committees. As this research has shown, these 
committees regularly form part of a Director’s duty as well as being delegated the 
task of dealing with the most complex and potentially highest risk issues. As such, 
the committees form a core part in the Boards processes and should, therefore, be 
open to stakeholder scrutiny. The disclosure should include the activities, authority 
and actors involved in each committee. Policies are needed to take these ad hoc 
committees out of the shadows and ensure they receive the exposure needed to 
enable the organisation’s governance processes to be full evaluated.  
 
10.4 Critique of the Research 
Grounded theory, as a method, is not without its critics (Bryman, 2008:548). These 
range from scepticism as to whether a researcher can “suspend their awareness of 
relevant theories” to the fact that the method “is still vague on certain points” and 
terminology (Bryman, 2008:549). As such, almost all grounded theory methodology 
books devote space to the discussion of evaluating the approach. Table 6, provides 
a summary of the evaluation criteria. 
 
Table 6 - Classic Approaches for Judging Grounded Theory Research 
(with additional italicised data, adapted from Birks and Mills, 2011:149) 
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Given this variety of evaluation criteria, it is unfeasible to evaluate this thesis against 
all of these. As such, this thesis will be evaluated against Glaser and Strauss’ four 
original requisite properties, as most other criteria are a derivation of these. These 
properties are: 
“The first requisite property is that the theory must closely fit the 
substantive area in which it will be used. Second, it must be readily 
understandable by laymen concerned with this area. Third, it must be 
sufficiently general to be applicable to a multitude of diverse daily 
situations within the substantive area, not just a specific type of 
situation. Fourth, it must allow the user partial control over the structure 
and process of daily situations as they change through time.” 
(emphasis in original Glaser and Strauss, 1967:237) 
 
In relation to fitness, Glaser and Strauss (1967:238) highlight that the derived theory 
“must closely correspond with the data”. Throughout this dissertation there has been 
much emphasis on quoting words of the participants. This provides the basis of the 
evidence to ensure that the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’ evolved from the data. In 
addition, Glaser and Strauss (1967:238) also note that, where the theory does not fit 
the substantive area, “one does not quite know how to apply them”. Chapter 9 
provides a clear explanation of how ‘Allocating Effort’ applies to the substantive area 
of Boards.  
 
A grounded theory “will make sense and be understandable to the people working in 
the substantive area” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:239). In terms of evidencing the 
understanding of the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’, this is somewhat complex to prove. 
Nonetheless, a paper produced on ad hoc committees (Massie, 2014a) was 
awarded the ‘Best Development Paper Prize’ for Corporate Governance at the 
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British Academy of Management Conference 2014 (British Academy of 
Management, 2014). This, therefore, provides a small amount of evidence of 
general acceptance of this research.  
 
The third property is that of generality, as such the theory should be “general 
enough to be applicable to the whole picture” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:242) within 
the substantive area. The substantive area for theory of ‘Allocating Effort’ is the 
Board of Directors. As such, the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’ should generally be 
applicable to this environment; however, only further empirical testing will be able to 
confirm the width and depth of the application of the theory. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that the theory is grounded in data drawn from participants with either 
wholly or partial UK experience; as such, there is no evidence of it being 
generalisable outside of the UK. Additionally, whilst the participants have a variety a 
wide variety of Board experience, including large, small, public, private and non-
profit organisations, further research is required to confirm the application of the 
theory within each of these differing environments.  
 
Finally, control has two variables: controllability and access, that is to say the 
individual applying the theory has the ability to produce and control the resulting 
change (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:245). In the case of ‘Allocating Effort’ the Director 
can control the change in four ways: changing their understanding of their role, 
changing their perception of risk, reducing the complexity of the issue by clarifying 
the information and, finally, allocating more time to engaging with the information.  
 
As can been seen from this section, the grounded theory developed within this 
research meets all of Glaser and Strauss’ original requisite properties. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’ is a valid theory. To further 
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assess the grounded theory method utilised for this dissertation, see the 
considerations listed in appendix 11.6.  
 
10.5 Limitations 
The main limitation to this study, as mentioned above is that it is primarily UK 
focused. Whilst a small number of interviewees represented international nations, 
specifically Australia, China and the USA, they all had UK experiences within which 
to contextualise their contributions.  
 
The second limitation is with regards to bias. The access gained was, in most case, 
via personal contacts, this may have introduced an accidental bias into the research 
into the sample. Nonetheless, the access gained varied across organisation types 
and included both males and females; though it should be noted that the percentage 
of females interviewed is greater than is representative of women on Boards in 
general. Furthermore, bias may have been introduced by the self-selection of 
interviewees willing to participate. In addition, as all of the data collection and 
analysis was undertaken by one person bias may have been unconsciously 
included in the development of the theory. 
 
With regards to the observations, only one type of Board was observed; that is to 
say only NHS Trust Boards were observed and then only for their public meetings. 
As such, it is impossible to precisely identify how well the observations accurately 
reflect general Board meetings. 
 
A final, but nonetheless important limitation, is that of the interviewees multiple roles 
and the complexity of analysing the data collated by specific Board role. As can be 
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seen in section 4.2.2.1, the 31 interviewees currently hold 68 roles between them 
and have significant experience in over 40 more roles; for many of the interviewees 
this included concurrent holding of Executive and NED Board roles, with the latter 
being a mix of independent and non-independent, or multiple NED roles. During the 
interviews, the interviewees where encouraged to talk widely across these roles. Ms 
Eucalyptus (January 2014) provides an example of the issue in her statement 
comparing Boards that she has served on 
“I’ve sat in a lot of different Board meetings with different hats on and 
… one of them does Board meetings at half the time of the other one 
and it was a far better run company actually.  ... why the other one 
used to take so long is that the chairman used to insist on summarising 
what everyone had said afterwards and you spend double on 
everything.”   
Whilst this comparison between her experiences provides depth and significance to 
the findings, it limited the ability to classify the findings by role types. As such, this 
limitation is recognised and future research will need to be cognisant of the issue.  
 
10.6 Further Research 
This study lends itself to a number of avenues of further study. The first is the 
operationalization of the theory of ‘Allocating Effort’ potentially through the use of, 
for example, Structured Equation Modelling. This would allow the process of 
verification of the theory to begin (Rosenbaum, 2011:293). In order to ensure clarity 
in this future research, it would be important to ask the respondents of any data 
collection undertaken to focus on one primary role, where they hold/have held more 
than one Directorship. This would increase the opportunity to identify any role-
specific variables.  
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The theory developed is substantive in relation the population studied, that is to say 
UK Boards (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:114). Formal theories go beyond that and are 
relevant to a conceptual area. If the data collated for this research was cross 
referenced with other research and further data samples included, the theory could 
be proven to be relevant to other populations. Therefore there is further work that 
can be done to broaden this theory. 
 
Another area of further research is the linking this theory with the major, accepted, 
corporate governance theories (as outlined in Table 1). This may provide a useful 
perspective on how the current theories are viewed. 
 
The use of Actor Network Theory to further understand the journey of the Board 
pack may produce illuminating insights. This approach enables both the human and 
non-human parts of the network to be further considered (Latour, 1996), thereby 
potentially providing further clarity.  
 
Another interesting area of further research it that of the introduction of electronic 
Board packs. As noted in section 10.3.2, this may be causing a shift in how 
Directors engage with the role and, as such, may highlight some temporal issues 
with this theory. As Glaser (1998:238) notes any grounded theory is routed in 
“nowism” and, as such, will evolve over time.  
 
In addition, there is future work that could be undertaken in relation to the use of the 
Perception Grid. As alluded to in section 10.3.2, there is the potential for this to be 
utilised in the Board review process as a tool for discussion. The use of the 
Perception Grid may illuminate differing views in the Board, as illustrated in Figure 
30 (page 198). A simple exercise of categorising Board papers into the four types 
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could generate discussions across the Board members as to; how they perceive 
risk; what they consider complex/complicated and why; and what they see as their 
role and therefore should be part of the Board’s discussions. This would provide an 
opportunity for Board members to more comprehensively understand each other’s 
viewpoints, not with an aim to synchronise them but to aid clarity in the discussions 
through understanding their diversity. This approach requires further empirical 
research to understand the possibilities, complexities and potential applications. 
 
Finally, this research has identified the use of ad hoc committees as critical to the 
work of modern Boards. Further research is required to fully understand these 
committees and the impact they have on the corporate governance of an 
organisation. Whilst much research has been undertaken looking at standing 
committees, (see for example Spira and Bender, 2004), little or no focus has been 
given to these temporary, ad hoc, committees. As the decisions allocated to ad hoc 
committees are usually high risk, such as a large investment (Ms Maple, February 
201) or a strategic review (Ms Eucalyptus, January 2014), these appear to form an 
integral part of the decision making processes of the Board and, therefore, require 
further research. This research needs to incorporate, as a minimum: 
 The role they play and how wide spread they are within the governance 
structures of different organisations 
 The structure and the constituent parts of an ad hoc committee – this has 
been initially defined in Figure 27 (page 186), nonetheless this requires 
further research to clarify the variables and their impact on the committee 
effectiveness 
 How they are mandated by and report to the Board 
 What impact they have on the overall governance of the organisation  
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 How they are, or should be, reported on to the wider stakeholders 
Overall, these ad hoc committees appear to play a role that is key to the 
governance of an organisation and should be researched in the same depth as 
standing committees.  
 
10.7 Reflections 
Undertaking a grounded theory study is not the easiest approach to completing a 
PhD; nonetheless, I have found it hugely rewarding. However, the lack of a 
specialist grounded theory mentor means I had to find my own way through this 
family of methods. With the support of my supervisors, I have had to truly engage 
with the process, deeply understand it and develop my own approach based on my 
philosophical underpinnings; not just follow one person’s approach. 
 
I am hugely grateful to all of my participants: to have such rich access was a 
blessing for this research. However, I learnt that it often took great courage to ask 
people to engage with the research process. Furthermore, I have learnt that most 
people will be more than willing to help and those who are not usually have an 
excellent reason why not. 
 
I have learnt a lot about the complexity of being a Board Director. Although there 
are a small number of Directors who are paid vast sums of money to undertake the 
role, most are not. The Directors I met were genuinely hardworking individuals out 
to do the best for their organisation.  
 
Finally, I am reminded of a quote  
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“When you acquire knowledge there is a certain responsibility that 
comes with it. One must use it - otherwise one is no more than the 
proverbial donkey with books. The donkey carries books on his back, 
but as he does not do anything with the knowledge within them they 
are no more than a heavy burden.” (Joseph, 2013) 
This is as true for researchers as it is for Directors.  
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11 APPENDICES 
11.1 Vignettes 
Notes on Vignettes 
1. All names and company names have been replaced with pseudonyms to 
preserve confidentiality, a requirement of the ethical process   
2. Wherever possible the interviewees own words have been used to describe 
themselves. These have come from either their interviews or the process of 
arranging the interviews 
3. Additional details where identified through; their company’s website, their 
LinkedIn profile or other career management websites. 
 
11.1.1 Interviews 
Interviewee No. 1 & 31 - Prof Cherry (Face to Face) January 2013 & January 
2014  
Mr Cherry is an internationally renowned academic, working in the field of Corporate 
Governance at Masaccio University. He also runs his own consultancy, Rothko Ltd, 
through which he has provided services to major corporate Boards for over 25 
years. He is a published author on the subject of corporate governance and 
specialises in Board development. Prof Cherry was interviewed twice; initially for 
open data collection then post the one page summary of findings to discuss further.  
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Interviewee No. 2 – Mr Poplar (Telephone) February 2013  
Mr Poplar is an experienced Chair. He has successfully managed a number of 
companies through the Initial Public Offering (IPO) process. He is currently a 
Director of more than a dozen companies. The main focus of his discussions was 
Fontana PLC which is an AIM registered company. Mr Poplar has over 25 years of 
Board experience.  
 
Interviewee No. 3 – Ms Maple (Skype) February 2013  
Ms Maple is a recent immigrant to the UK from Australia. In Australia she was the 
President, and previously the Chair, of a regional division of an international charity, 
Degas Nonprofit. During her term as President she over saw a major review and 
change of the information provided to the Board which facilitated a change in 
organisational culture. Ms Maple has been sitting on Boards, predominately 
nonprofit for 20 years. Since arriving in the UK Ms Maple has joined the Board of 
Moreau Independent Body.  
 
Interview No. 4 & 29 – Mr Ironwood (Face to Face) February 2013 & January 
2014  
Mr Ironwood is a former information provider to a FTSE100's pension Board, 
Picasso Trustee Board. Mr Ironwood’s role, as an employee of Picasso PLC, was to 
provide the Trustee Board with the appropriate papers and ensure that all required 
information was made available to the Board prior to the meetings. Additionally, he 
sat on the Administration and Risk committee of the Board. Mr Ironwood also 
attended the full Board meeting as an advisor. Mr Ironwood has over 15 years’ 
experience of working with Pension Boards. Mr Ironwood was interviewed twice; 
initially for open data collection then post a one page summary of findings to discuss 
further. 
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Interviewee No. 5 – Ms Willow (Skype) February 2013  
Ms Willow is a US citizen who, having lived in the UK for a number of years returned 
to the USA. In her career she is a successful senior manager reporting to the Board. 
In her spare time she volunteers on three Boards. The first is Martini Academy, a 
US high school, where she is the Board Chair. The second is Mantegna Charity, in 
the role as Vice-President, and the third is Klee Charity, where she is a Director, 
both are gender equality charities. She has four years’ experience as a Board 
Director. 
 
Interviewee No. 6 - Mr Hawthorn (Telephone) February 2013  
Mr Hawthorne is a Trustee of a FTSE100's pension Board, Picasso Trustee Board. 
Additionally, he is the chair of the Investment sub-committee of the Board. Mr 
Hawthorn was previously an employee of Picasso PLC and served as a Member 
Nominated Trustee. Since his retirement from Picasso PLC, he has remained on the 
Board as a Picasso PLC appointed Trustee.  
 
Interviewee No. 7 – Mr Boxelder (Telephone) February 2013  
Mr Boxelder works for a third party legal firm and is contracted to act as the 
independent Chair to a FTSE100's pension Board, Picasso Trustee Board. He is 
currently an Independent Trustee on a number of Pensions Boards. He has just 
introduced electronic Board papers to the Board. Mr Boxelder has over 30 years 
Senior Management and Board experience. 
 
Interviewee No. 8 – Mr Hickory (Telephone) February 2013  
Mr Hickory is an executive level manager of Richter Trust. Richter Trust is charity 
supported by a Limited company that works to develop British youth. Mr Hickory’s 
role is to provide information to the Trustees, via the CEO. He is responsible for the 
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financial and commercial aspects of the reporting based on the strategic plan. Mr 
Hickory has been fulfilling this role for over nine years. 
 
Interviewee No. 9 – Mr Cedar (Face to Face) February 2013  
Mr Cedar is an experienced Director who is currently a Non-Executive Director of 
Turner Ltd. He is also a director on another Ltd company and a charitable 
organisation. These roles follow on from an extensive career with senior 
management experience. Mr Cedar has over eight years Board experience.  
 
Interviewee No. 10 – Mr Chestnut (Telephone) February 2013  
Mr Chestnut is a Trustee of a FTSE100's pension Board, Picasso Trustee Board. 
Additionally, he is the chair of the Administration and Risk sub-committee of the 
Board. Since his retirement from Picasso PLC, he has remained on the Board as a 
Picasso PLC appointed Trustee. Mr Chestnut has been on the Pension Trustees 
Board for 13 years. 
 
Interviewee No. 11 – Mr Hemlock (Face to Face) March 2013  
Mr Hemlock is the recently appointed CEO of Titan Ltd, a major service organisation 
recently created via a spin-off. Titan Ltd is undergoing an intensive structural 
change with regards to its organisational structure, including the creation of a Board 
containing Non-Executive Directors. As part of this change, Mr Hemlock is putting in 
place all of the Board processes and related reporting activities. Mr Hemlock has 
five years Board level experience after an extensive career.  
 
Interviewee No. 12 – Ms Magnolia (Telephone) March 2013  
Ms Magnolia is a Trustee of a FTSE100's pension Board, Picasso Trustee Board. 
Additionally, she is a member of the Administration and Risk sub-committee of the 
   Appendices 
 
213 
 
Board. Ms Magnolia previously worked for Picasso Trust for in the pension’s arena 
including as secretary to the Pension Board. She has been a Trustee for over 12 
years; firstly as a Member nominated representative then, upon her own retirement, 
as a pensioner nominated representative. 
  
Interviewee No. 13 – Mr Elm (Face to Face) March 2013  
Mr Elm is an information provider to a FTSE100's pension Board, Picasso Trustee 
Board. Mr Elm is a voting member of the Investment committee; however, with 
regards to the main pension’s Board his role is to provide Picasso PLC’s views to 
the Board of Trustees. He is responsible for ensuring that all of the information is 
provided to the Board is timely and accurate. He has been in this role for over ten 
years. In addition, he is a Non-Executive member of a charitable Trust. 
 
Interviewee No. 14 – Ms Juniper (Telephone) May 2013 
Ms Juniper was the inaugural Chair of a Limited company associated with a 
charitable organisation, Greco Trust Ltd. Ms Juniper’s role was to set up the Board 
and identify appropriate members. Subsequently she became the Chair of the 
charity Greco Trust. She has also served on other small business and charity 
Boards.  
 
Interviewee No. 15 - Ms Elderberry (Telephone) May 2013 
Ms Elderberry is a Non-Executive Director of two major international firms. The first 
is a Fortune500 firm where she is additionally the Chair of the Audit committee. The 
second is a FTSE500 company where she is additionally a member of the Audit 
committee. Ms Elderberry has had an extensive career in both senior management 
and at director level with over 15 years’ experience. 
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Interviewee No. 16 – Ms Ginkgo (Telephone) May 2013 
Ms Ginkgo is a beneficiary representative on a local charitable trust, Duchamp Trust 
Ltd. She holds the status of a Non-Executive Director. Prior to this appointment she 
had no Board level, or senior management, experience. She was invited to apply for 
the selection panel by the Chair of the Board. She has been on the Board for three 
years. 
 
Interviewee No. 17 - Ms Persimmon (Telephone) May 2013 
Ms Persimmon is the CEO of a federation of independent organisations, Whistle 
Federation Ltd. She is the only employee of the company but has a Board of 
Directors that represents the members to whom she is responsible. She is also a 
Non-Executive Director of another organisation. After a public career, Ms 
Persimmons has been a CEO for two years. 
 
Interviewee No. 18 – Ms Camellia (Telephone) May 2013 
Ms Camellia is a Shareholder Representative Director on the Board of Holbein Ltd. 
Additionally, she is Chair of two further Boards and member of four more. She has 
extensive experience in both Executive and Non-Executive roles. Ms Camellia has 
been reporting to or serving on Boards for over 15 years. 
 
Interviewee No. 19 – Ms Lilac (Telephone) May 2013 
Ms Lilac is a Trustee Director for Kooning Nonprofit. The organisation is a local 
branch of a national charity. Additionally, she is also a Chair of Governors for a local 
school. Ms Lilac has been on the Board for two years, prior to which she was a CEO 
for another company for three years.  
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Interviewee No. 20 - Ms Silverbell (Face to Face) July 2013 
Ms Silverbell is an Executive Director for a large NHS Trust, Chirico Trust. In her full 
time role she is the Director (CEO) of a major division of the Trust. She has sat on 
the Board for 13 years and is the longest serving member of the Board. 
 
Interviewee No. 21 - Mr Buckeye (Face to Face) August 2013 
Mr Buckeye in a Non-Executive, Independent, Director for a specialised local 
Limited company facing a major restructure. He was recruited to the Board due to 
his role of being a Senior Manager for a local, influential, firm. He has been involved 
with the organisation for 2 years and formally appointed to the Board for 1 year.  
 
Interviewee No. 22 - Mr Fothergilla (Telephone) October 2013 
Mr Fothergilla is an Independent Chair for a major FTSE100 company. He has been 
working at Board level for 20 years, initially as a CEO of a major corporation 
progressing through roles to Chair. He has previously Chaired another FTSE100 
company. Mr Fothergilla has been Chair of this Board for 2 years. 
 
Interviewee No. 23 – Mr Mulberry (Telephone) October 2013 
Mr Mulberry is a Board member for a number of small organisations. He also 
provides consultancy support to Boards through his work at Millet Consultancy Ltd. 
He has served on Boards since 2004 primarily as a shareholder Director. 
 
Interviewee No. 24 – Mr Linden (Telephone) October 2013 
Mr Linden has, until, recently served as an Executive Director for Kahlo Ltd, a 
financial services company. He has served on a variety of Boards since 2004. He 
was actively involved in the restructuring of the company, including a total 
restructure of the Board. He has also served on a number of charitable Boards. 
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Interviewee No. 25 – Mr Cedrela (Telephone) October 2013 
Mr Cadrela is a NED for a construction firm, Mondrian Ltd, which is a family 
company. He has been on the Board for four years and acts as the Senior 
Independent Director. He has a background in quality management within the 
financial services industry. 
 
Interviewee No. 26 – Mr Larch (Telephone) November 2013  
Mr Larch is the Chair of a substantial social housing company, Boccioni PLC. He 
has served on the Board for 10 years, when the company was formed, and became 
Chair 4 years ago. He is in the process of restructuring the Board to match their 
company’s strategic aims. 
  
Interviewee No. 27 – Mr Oak (Telephone) November 2013 
Mr Oak is the Chair of a large investment house, Holmer PLC. He was appointed 
Chair in 2013. Prior to that he has served on a large number of Boards over 20 
years. He has served both as CEO and NED for a variety of major, significant, 
organisations.  
 
Interviewee No. 28 – Mr Pine (Telephone) November 2013 
Mr Pine is a Chair of a Chinese organisation listed on the UK AIM market, Courbet 
PLC. Mr Pine is also a NED with three other companies and has served on eleven 
further Boards, six of which he has Chaired. He has over 20 years’ service on 
Boards specialising in supporting them through the AIM listings process.  
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Interviewee No. 30 – Mr Birch (Face to Face) January 2014 
Mr Birch is the Company Secretary for a FTSE100 company, Monet PLC. He has 
served in that role for 6 years, prior to that he was Company Secretary for another 
FTSE100 for 11 years. He is a non-voting Board observer and acts as the 
information conduit between the Board and the organisation.  
 
Interviewee No. 32 – Ms Eucalyptus (Telephone) January 2014  
Ms Eucalyptus works for an Asset Management firm, Pollock Ltd and in her role sits 
on three Boards; two Fund management organisations and a Pensions Board. She 
has a Diploma in Company Direction and is working towards Chartered Director. 
 
Interviewee No. 33 – Ms Yew (Face to Face) February 2014  
Ms Yew is an information provider to a FTSE100 company, Monet PLC, in particular 
the remunerations sub-committee. Ms Yew has been in this position for over 10 
years. In addition she is also has served as a NED for a large nonprofit organisation 
for the last three years. 
 
11.1.2 Meetings 
Meeting A – Mr Yellowwood (Face to Face) February 2013  
Mr Yellowwood is a Chair of Braque PLC which specialises in providing research to 
small PLCs. He has chaired the company for a year and has previously been a 
Managing Director. His area of specialism is Board recruitment and remuneration. 
 
Meeting B – Mr Fir (Face to Face) October 2013  
Mr Fir is a consultant for Rossetti Consultancy Ltd which specialises in enabling 
Boards to work better. His role is to provide advice to Boards on how to structure 
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their Board processes. The company provides a software package that manages 
the provision of the papers for the Board.   
 
Meeting C – Mr Cypress (Telephone) January 2014  
Mr Cypress this the founder and CEO of a software company, Rembrandt Ltd. Mr 
Cypress was a former Actuary in the Pension’s industry and saw a gap in the 
market for Board software. This meeting provided background technical information 
on Board software. 
 
Meeting D – Mr Walnut (Telephone) January 2014  
Mr Walnut is an entrepreneur in the process of setting up an organisation, Blake 
Ltd, to enable smaller organisations can access experienced NEDs. He has 
experience as both a NED and Board-level advisor.  
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11.2 Memo Examples 
Memos were made in many different formats. Predominately this was a mix of 
paper, iPad and NVivo but usually was whichever was easiest to hand at the time. 
This appendix provides evidence of some of those memos. 
 
11.2.1 Memo - Method Issues - 14/02/13 (iPad) 
So over the last few weeks I have had my head in a bucket of sand. I'd coded Prof 
Cherry's interview but frankly it was a disaster. Why? Because my field notes are a 
nightmare and my coding reflected that. So I backed it up and deleted my coding so 
I could start a fresh. 
 
In my head I'm stuck but I have read two items; 
 
Using QSR-NVivo to facilitate the development of a grounded theory project: an 
account of a worked example 
 
Andrew John Hutchisona*, Lynne Halley Johnstonb and Jeff David Breckona 
 
And  
 
The Qualitative Coding Manual (?) - the orange fronted book 
 
Both of these have provided inspiration. Firstly the article outlined how they had 
used NVivo including an illustration of their coding structure. This included having 
coding for a continuum - so you can double code a bit e.g. 'Dialoguing' and 'very 
little' - this means I can use some of the NVivo functionality to sort it at a later date. 
 
The book has told me more about the actual coding process, as well as providing 
illustrations. It also (pg25) gave me the structure for my node related memos (i.e. a 
code book) - which really helps. It turns out that I like structure! 
 
So now I have a process for listening to a transcript, anonymising it, writing a memo 
and then coding the transcript. I then create a memo for each node. I try to either 
use an in vivo code or a word ending in -ing. I'm yet to write a coding memo in full 
but this is positive progress. Admittedly, I've completed one in full, and now only 
have the coding to do on the second but progress is progress! 
 
I've also been doing some charities governance work in NVivo which has made me 
feel a little more confident on the system. Additionally, I'm book on a training course 
soon which will really help. 
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11.2.2 Memo – Post interview – 13/03/13 (NVivo) 
 
11.2.3 Memo – First Sort (Process not content) – 09/03/13 
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11.2.4 Memo – Category Memo – 01/04/13 (NVivo) 
 
11.2.5 Memo – Theory Development – 10/08/14 21:22 (iPad) 
Directors engage with info not through the information but thought the structures put 
in place to manage the information.  
 
The size and complexity of the information means that the directors cannot 
effectively engage with the information. As such, they rely on structures to support 
their engagement. These structures include; diversity of view points, diversity of 
engagement levels (information alone but in detail v low level of detail but based in 
experiences), [delivery systems -tbc] and ad hoc committees. 
 
It's not a theory of flexibility it's a theory of structures. It's about enabling each 
Director to be positioned to engage. For some this is reading in detail, for others it's 
about bringing relevant experience to the information. For some it's about being 
able to recall the information for others it's about the generalizability of the 
information to this context in comparison to contexts they have seen before.  
 
The use of ad hoc committees enables those who wish, or who the skills/experience 
to be more involved. It also is a form of trust between the Directors and those on the 
ad hoc committee. They have to trust the members in the same way they have to 
trust the information they are provided with.  
 
The use of technology is an additional structure which is yet to have a discernible 
influence as, for many Boards, they are just beginning to implement this. As such, it 
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is not possible for this structure to yet be part of this theory but, potentially, will be a 
future development on this theory. 
 
Just a thought; it's funny how people seemed to dismiss the regulated committees 
as prescribed nauseas but value the ad hoc committees 
 
Or is my theory actually about 'flexible structures'? 
 
Technology supports these flexible structures as it facilitates communication 
between the structures and the dissemination of the information in a way that 
facilitates the structures in a flexible manner. 
 
 
11.2.6 Memo – Writing up – 11/09/14 12:28 (iPad) 
Risk is a tacitly agreed level - only in rare cases will the Board, for example ask for a 
discussion on a paper provided 
 
Most of the risk decisions are done between Chair and CEO (supported by the Co 
Sec) -> Power! 
 
Need a section on setting the Board Agenda 
 
Tech solutions are supporting these four quadrants by providing ways for the board 
to interact outside - look at tech meetings transcriptions 
 
Look at critical realism 
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11.3 Consent Form  
 
   Appendices 
 
224 
 
 
  
   Appendices 
 
225 
 
11.4 Prof Cherry – Field Notes from Round One Interview 
[Questions asked are in Bold] 
 
What is your view of what the Board of Directors does? 
Resolve balance between forward and control – directors dilemma 
 
Role of Independent Director? 
No such thing 
Legally speaking 
Throughout the Commonwealth 
Nonsense  
Reinforced in 2006 Companies Act 
Why not obey primary law - statuary law,  
How can you be independent – highly questionable  
NEDs - nonsense 
Director Job title - US fashion 
What interests him is the people sitting round the table managing the dilemma 
How diverse is the boards experience, competence 
Gain experience by being on board – potential skewed experience 
Doesn't use exec/non exec on his own boards, just statuary 
Disconnect execs from their exec role 
Separate exec/non exec contracts – statuary director contract for services 
Changes attitude and behaviours around boardroom table when done 
Discussions less operational and more strategic 
Info flows - outward facing v inwards facing 
Little rigorous outward, over doing inwards focus 
Need wise chair to rebalance 
Very experience he’s having with a board he’s currently working with; Chair getting 
overly operational and politically biased 
 
Information should a Statuary board member should have? 
Impossible to say 
Theme of learning at board level 
In, out and pull it all together  
Reg Revells work (1950s) 
WR Ashby (1940) sufficient diversity in Systems 
Can’t say information needed it’s Board specific 
Change: problem formulation and problem solution  
Three seminal works 
Double loop learning 
How get them to focus on messy outside world, and how to utilise it 
Board is central processor of double loop learning 
Board risk being isolated if not linked in with stakeholder learning 
Psychology, Social Sociology, Anthropology - where corporate governance needs to 
be 
1930 – 60s lots of research 
Everything we needed to know on effective corporate governance known by 1970s 
Little/none applied  
Look at codes not dynamics – not good 
Curt Lewin work from 1930s 
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e.g. board size 4-12 group members, diversity 
Absorbed unconsciously into codes 
 
What issues to do see around Non-financial information? 
Not valuable to split financial/not financial information 
Most Board members don't know the financials either 
Board dashboard; financials part but though not always exact 
Can you think for 10-12 trend lines/ratios that the board can follow 
Info Board members are comfortable with 
Trends key 
 
What do think if tools such as the Balanced Scorecard? 
Useful starting content 
Flaky, generalised 
Personalise dashboard using double loop learning 
What do we need to know about outside world? 
Who are our key stakeholders? 
How are our owners? More and more unclear 
How are the other stake holders? 
Which stakeholder have the ability to sanction other activities e.g. Gov, community,  
Information flow both ways – need sensitivity 
How do you make sense of the all information e.g. FT, broadsheets 
Board members often have modest intellect 
Gestalt out of data? 
Data to information 
Financial and stakeholder - easier to identify 
Political world 
Cope with what turns up – 90% do nothing but moan 
PEST political, physical, Eco, social, social demographics, technology, trade 
Framework is useful – does with his boards 
How do you then make sense of it? 
Broad sheet newspapers - are a PEST analysis, review with focus over the next 
quarter 
Next quarterly strategy day - max 4 page impact analyses on each PEST access 
Then each pair moves on to the next PEST topic 
Helicopter view / reframing 
Reduce operational focus increase in strategy focus then seen 
Then less on doing the on the execs job 
There is no set information that we always need – continuously changing 
Partly fixed internal but no control on external issues 
Be very sensitive to the trends and possible meanings – ahead of the game 
 
Change in boards during organisations life cycle? 
Selection processes - few mature 
Few have select, indication and deselection processes 
Induction process - induction book and possibly a quick meeting with co sec 
Immature for that board, how you deal with the board members is an issue 
Code got right: board evaluation is great but checklist mentality 
Do Board and then committees rarely do individual board members, just chat with 
chair 
External evaluators need to ask the awkward questions; but usually use established 
auditors who are reliant on work 
Work he does, does review individual 3 months after board and committees 
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Info flows? 
Too much data and not enough information 
Oldest trick in book – huge pile of data 
Why dashboards so important - stop overload 
Gov board he’s work with 40-80 page times 6-10 reports per meeting 
Huge board pack 
2 page board papers recommend – context, propositions, options 
Board members he see awash with data and miserable with it 
 
Comment on my research 
Managers manage, directors direct, board is the meeting to discuss 
Optimise not maximise  
Brian Pitman quotes ex Lloyds 
Reasonable demands, long term and fiduciary duty 
Board member not exec 
Everyone had right to speak 
Key words “reasonable short term demands” 
Board has to be prepared to resign if short term demands over ride long term value 
Remuneration issues long term health 
Risk appetite – avoidance mind-set currently not to take risk 
Place of risk in future  
Cybernetics is important 
[Colleague name] re legal issues and basis of laws 
 
Theories – any particular one more relevant? 
Increasingly stewardship because of messy ownership issues but horrible 
generalisation 
Stewarding for a number of competition stakeholders  
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11.5 Prof Cherry - Field Note Codes after Pilot Interview  
Name No of References 
Behaviours - poor 3 
Board size 1 
Changing attitude - positive 1 
Changing behaviours - positive 5 
Competence 4 
Consequential actions 1 
Continuously changing 1 
Cybernetics 1 
Dashboard 4 
Data to information 3 
Directors dilemma 2 
Disconnecting roles 1 
Diversity 2 
Double loop learning 4 
Exec & NED naming 1 
Experience 1 
Financial knowledge 2 
Fiduciary duty 1 
Flowing information 2 
Generational differences 2 
Historical CG 1 
Information identification 1 
Informational needs 4 
Interference tactics 1 
Interview details 1 
Interview question 9 
Inwards facing information 2 
Learning at board level 2 
Legal positioning 3 
Long term 2 
Managing instead of Directing 3 
Operational discussions 1 
Outward facing Information 2 
Reasonable demands 2 
Remuneration 1 
Research to follow up on 5 
Risk 1 
Risk appetite 1 
Sense making 3 
Situating CG 1 
Split financial ~ non-financial information 1 
Stakeholder 1 
Stewardship 1 
Strategic discussions 1 
Trends 3 
Wise chair 1 
   Appendices 
 
229 
 
11.6 Criteria for Evaluating Grounded Theory Research 
The following list is taken from Birks and Mills (2011:153) 
 
Researcher Expertise  Does the researcher demonstrate skills in scholarly writing?  Is there evidence that the researcher is familiar with grounded theory 
methods?  Has the researcher accessed and presented citations of relevant 
methodological resources?  Are limitations in the study design and research process acknowledged and 
addressed where possible? 
Methodological Congruence  Has the researcher articulated their philosophical position?  Is grounded theory an appropriate research strategy for the stated aims of 
the study?  Do the outcomes of the research achieve the stated aims?  Is a grounded theory presented as the end product of the research?  Are philosophical and methodological inconsistencies identified and 
addressed? 
Procedural Precision  Is there evidence that the researcher has employed memoing in support of 
the study?  Has the researcher indicated the mechanisms by which an audit trail was 
maintained?  Are procedures described for the management of data and resources?  Is there evidence that the researcher has applied essential grounded theory 
methods appropriately in the context of the study described?  Does the researcher make logical connections between the data and 
abstractions?  Is there evidence that the theory is grounded in the data?  Is the final theory credible?  Are potential applications [of the theory] examined and explored? 
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